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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is occasioned by my role as one of several responders to 
Dr. Larry Laudan’s paper at the Seton Hall Law School symposium honoring 
D. Michael Risinger.1  Although a brief comment could suffice, thanks to the 
flexibility of law reviews and their relative indifference to article length, I’ve 
taken the opportunity to offer an extended comment on Laudan and other 
authors whose positions on criminal procedure and criminal justice I label 
anti-Blackstonian.  The authors reviewed herein are (i) Daniel Epps,2 (ii) 
 
* Professor, Criminal Justice Department, Wayne State University.  Thanks to Shawn 
Bushway, Paul Cassell, Steven Drizin, Gipsy Escobar, Brian Forst, Saul Kassin, Richard Leo, 
Will Ortman, Bill Thompson and Greta Zalman for helpful comments.   
 1  For other coments, see Keith Findley, Reducing Error in the Criminal Justice System, 
48 SETON HALL L. REV 1265 (2018); and Roger Koppl, Comment on Laudan, 48 SETON HALL 
L. REV 1255 (2018).   
 2  Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065 
(2015).  Prof. Epps declined to respond to my critique, pointing out that he had responded to 
other critiques; see Daniel Epps, Essay: One Last Word on the Blackstone Principle, 102 VA. 
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Larry Laudan,3 along with Ronald Allen,4  and (iii) Paul Cassell.5  These 
authors do not agree on all points and their approaches differ in some 
respects.  Nevertheless, their core positions share the view that reducing 
defendants’ procedural protections would make criminal trials more accurate 
and would reduce crime—positions that can reasonably be labeled anti-
Blackstonian.6 
At the outset it is useful to borrow from Epps who distinguishes the 
famous Blackstone ratio from the Blackstone principle.  The Blackstone 
ratio—”it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent 
suffer”7 was the subject of an amusing and informative article that rang 
changes on all its variations.8  The ratio seems to attract the attention of 
quantitatively oriented scholars who enjoy manipulating its parameters.9  
Among the anti-Blackstonians, Allen and Laudan are most drawn to taking 
the Blackstone ratio seriously.  Epps does not think much of the ratio; 
instead, he defines a Blackstone principle: 
 
Of course, no one maintains that our system produces exactly ten 
false acquittals for every false conviction — nor do many hold that 
out as a serious goal. But the constant recitation of Blackstone’s 
 
L. REV. ONLINE 34; responding to Joel S. Johnson, Note: Benefits of Error in Criminal Justice, 
102 VA. L. REV. 237 (2016); John Bronsteen  & Jonathan S. Masur, The Overlooked Benefits 
of the Blackstone Principle, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 289 (2015), and Laura I. Appleman, A 
Tragedy of Errors: Blackstone, Procedural Asymmetry, and Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 91 (2015) 
 3  LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIAL AND ERRORS? (2016); Larry 
Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the Error Patterns in Criminal 
Prosecutions by ‘Empiricizing’ the Rules of Criminal Law and Taking False Acquittals 
Seriously, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1243 (2018). 
 4  Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 65 
(2008).  At times I will evaluate Dr. Laudan’s work alone and at other times refer to their joint 
work.   
 5  Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some Skeptical 
Observations on Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1063 
(2011-12) [hereinafter, Cassell, Freeing]; Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent 
without Freeing the Guilty? Thoughts on Innocence Reforms That Avoid Harmful Trade-Offs, 
in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING 
THE INNOCENT 264-290 (Daniel S. Medwed ed. 2017).  [hereinafter, Cassell, Protect].   
 6  As a result of my critique of Paul Cassell’s work and his reply, Prof. Risinger expanded 
the Symposium to include Prof. Cassell’s response and my reply.  Rather than incorporating 
all of Prof. Cassell’s points in a revision of this Article, my complete position should include 
“A Reply to Professor Cassell,” 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1493 (2018).   
 7  Robert J. Norris et al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer:” Evaluating State Safeguards 
Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 1301, 1301 (2010-11) (quoting WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 358 (1760)).   
 8  Alexander Volokh, Aside: n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997).   
 9  “The continuing interest in trying to fix the Blackstone ratio is scarcely surprising.”  
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 48.  Epps and others are indifferent to or even 
dismissive about this fascination.   
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ratio matters, even if the numbers themselves do not. The maxim 
is “a slogan meant to convey a message quickly and memorably,” 
standing for a more general rule, which I’ll call the “Blackstone 
principle”: in distributing criminal punishment, we must strongly 
err in favor of false negatives (failures to convict the guilty) in 
order to minimize false positives (convictions of the innocent), 
even if doing so significantly decreases overall accuracy.10 
 
Whether or not no one maintains a 10-to-1 or some other ratio as a 
description or goal of verdict error, Epps’s clear statement of the principle is 
a helpful starting point. 
To summarize each author, Epps presents a major exposition of the 
Blackstone principle with an elaborate jurisprudential argument for 
replacing procedural asymmetry favoring defendants (i.e., the Blackstone 
principle) with a principle of neutral adjudication.11  His concern is with the 
principle itself and not with procedural rules with which it is consistent.  
Epps dismisses the Blackstone ratio as one that “can’t be taken literally.”12  
Laudan and Allen, contrary to Epps, are concerned with the ratio of false 
acquittals to false convictions; in The Law’s Flaws, Laudan calculates a 
different ratio.  Although Laudan, unlike Epps, agrees with the Blackstone 
principle that false convictions are more harmful than false acquittals, his 
numerical calculations with crime and criminal justice data show that 
defendants’ advantages in procedural adjudication rules result in excessive 
false acquittals.  Consequently, he argues for changing the standard of proof 
for recidivist defendants from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and 
convincing evidence, and advocates eliminating a host of pro-defendant 
criminal procedure rules.13  Cassell’s article and chapter do not explicitly 
address the Blackstone ratio, although he adopts some of Allen and Laudan’s 
 
 10  Epps, supra note 2, at 1068.  Michael Risinger agrees: “As for the ‘Blackstone 
ratio,’ . . . I believe that all we can say about the intendment of this expression was that it was 
meant as a general declaration that, for any given crime, an error that convicts an innocent 
person is much worse morally than an error that acquits a guilty person.”  D. Michael Risinger, 
Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 991, 1002 (2010) [hereinafter Risinger, Tragic].  Taking the Blackstone ratio 
seriously can produce weird results.  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 47.  For 
example, Laudan asserts, “Blackstone opined that a false positive was ten times more harmful 
than a false negative.”  This statement is specious.  There is nothing in Blackstone other than 
the quote to suggest that he engaged in this come of comparative harm analysis.  Laudan, 
however, seems not to be concerned with a qualitative measure of harm but rather with the 
number of people victimized by two kinds of error.  See infra III.B.1.  See also Keith A. 
Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges 
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 133, 136 (2008). 
 11  See Part III. A. 1 infra.   
 12  Epps, supra note 2, at 1072. 
 13  See Part III. B. 1 & 2 infra.   
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reasoning.  Unlike Epps and like Laudan, Cassell accepts the Blackstone 
principle.14  Unlike both Epps and Laudan and Allen, Cassell is concerned 
with sources of error throughout the criminal justice system, not just the 
adjudication process.  As a self-defined innocence skeptic, Cassell offers a 
mix of proposals that would benefit and harm defendants’ interests; some 
would purportedly improve system accuracy and others might generate 
greater error.15  The overall direction of Cassell’s proposals would reduce 
defendants’ procedural protections.  I have no doubt that Epps, Laudan and 
Allen, and Cassell genuinely grieve over false convictions.  However, 
although Laudan claims adherence to a variation of the Blackstone ratio and 
Cassell agrees with the Blackstone principle, I still count them as anti-
Blackstonians because, despite their claims, in my view their programs 
would (1) seriously weaken defendants’ rights, (2) not reduce wrongful 
convictions, and (3) not enhance public safety.16 
These authors advance theories and propose rules that seek to make the 
adjudication process more accurate and that would reduce overall harm to 
society by reducing the number of false acquittals relative to false 
convictions.  To Epps, rejecting the Blackstone principle “would mean better 
committing ourselves to accuracy in criminal adjudication.”17  Allen and 
Laudan conclude that “the objective should be the pursuit of overall factual 
accuracy, and we think much could be done that would, in general, facilitate 
truth finding rather than just one aspect of it.”18  Cassell, also concerned with 
the one-sided skew of the innocence movement and innocence scholars, 
asserts, “it is possible to craft reforms that help to protect the innocent 
without allowing the escape of the guilty.”19  Because all these authors would 
 
 14  “Proceeding from the perspective of “innocentrism” (that is, the idea that exoneration 
of the “innocent” ought to be privileged over other values in the criminal justice system), I 
suggest eight proposals for reformFalse” Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1065.   
 15  See Part III. C. 1 infra.   
 16  See Part III. A. 2, B. 3 & 4, C. 2 infra.   
 17  Epps, supra note 2, at 1143.  
 18  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 89.  This conclusion follows a somewhat polemical 
article that takes innocence scholars to task for fastening on wrongful convictions and not 
considering wrongful acquittals.  They propose, by way of examples, six procedural reforms 
that would make the criminal justice process more accurate: robust discovery, videotaping 
police interviews of witnesses and suspects, explaining the meaning of privileges to juries, 
eliminating the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, allowing retrial after acquittal on the basis 
of substantial evidence, and admitting corroborated, voluntary, non-Mirandized confessions, 
ibid., at 89-90.  
 19  Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 264.  His list of prescriptions overlaps with those of 
Allen and Laudan: implementing the Brady requirement, increasing defense and prosecutorial 
resources to focus on innocence issues, abolishing the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 
replacing Miranda with videotaped interrogation, barring state habeas petitions without a 
colorable claim of factual innocence, and requiring defense attorneys to ask clients if they 
committed the crime charged.  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1084-95.  While some of 
these proposals are balanced, for the most part they read like a prosecutor’s wish list.   
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purportedly achieve these laudable goals by neutralizing the theory of pro-
defendant procedural asymmetry (Epps), by reducing the standard of proof 
(Laudan and Allen), and by eliminating some procedural protections 
(Cassell), is no stretch to label these authors anti-Blackstonians. 
The innocence movement has influenced these authors.20  Along with 
most criminal justice professionals, the anti-Blackstonians now accept that 
false convictions are not vanishingly rare.  Cassell, who challenged early 
innocence scholarship in the 1980s before DNA exonerations sparked the 
movement,21 now seems to believe that the number of false convictions is 
nontrivial.22  His article and chapter respond most directly to innocence 
issues among the four authors.  As an innocence skeptic, he raises the 
reasonable concern (along with Laudan and Allen) that innocence reforms 
not increase false acquittals.  Allen and Laudan’s article reacts to a 
perception of excessive innocence movement concern for exonerees and 
little concern for crime victims.23  In their article, they reason their way to a 
wrongful conviction rate of between one-half of one percent and one percent, 
but by 2016 Laudan accepted a wrongful conviction rate of about three 
percent.24  Epps’s major arguments are largely orthogonal to innocence 
movement concerns.  He develops a concept that the Blackstone principle 
has dynamic effects that generate error and, contrary to common thinking, 
works to the detriment of criminal defendants.  The Blackstone principle 
should therefore be dismissed as an organizing principle of criminal 
procedure.  Epps’s dynamic thesis obliquely comments on innocence 
movement positions. 
 
 
 
 20  See infra Part II. A for a description of the innocence movement. 
 21  Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Comment: Protecting the Innocent: A 
Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121(1988). 
 22  See Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 266.  
 23  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 66 (“The significance of the externalities that 
wrongful executions impose may be seen in the emergent national concern that has reached a 
crescendo in the last decade over the accuracy of capital convictions specifically and the 
criminal justice system generally.”).  The authors loosely link the concern for wrongful 
convictions, which implies dissatisfaction with government, with what they perceive as a 
widespread attack on the legitimacy of the American state since the 1960s, slyly linking liberal 
American critiques of governance to Mao Zedong’s initiation of the Cultural Revolution, ibid. 
at 66-67.  Curiously, the current authoritarian (and increasingly repressive) regime in China 
attempts to remediate many of its citizens’ concerns, like air pollution.  The Chinese 
party/state reacted to widespread demonstrations set off by the wrongful conviction of 
homicide defendants with what I interpret as a Chinese innocence movement that operates 
within the party/state.  See Marvin Zalman, Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Analysis 
in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 449-72 (A. J. Treviño ed., 2018).   
 24  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 71; LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, at xi, passim.  Laudan 
states that he borrows this figure from assessments by innocence projects.  Id. at 50-55.   
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As a self-defined innocence scholar, I analyze the works of Epps, 
Laudan and Allen, and Cassell from an “innocentric” perspective.25  This is 
a bit odd because innocence movement advocacy and scholarship differs 
from the standard criminal defense orientation.  The usual juxtaposition of 
Blackstonian and anti-Blackstonian is defense vs. prosecution, or in 
reformist terms that Risinger popularized, between Romillist or Payleyite 
positions.26  These Enlightenment Era thinkers staked out their positions 
when English criminal justice predated the bureaucratic system that arose in 
the nineteenth century.27  In eighteenth century England no organized police 
force existed and prisons were not yet invented.  Order depended on the in 
terrorem use of the death penalty and the criminal law as applied by judges 
who mixed harshness and mercy, and whose punishment options were 
limited to the noose, flogging, fines and transportation to the colonies.28  
Contemporary innocence reforms address an array of justice system 
processes that did not then exist, including police investigation and forensic 
science, which are believed to generate errors that lead not only to wrongful 
convictions, but also to wrongful acquittals.  In this light, the trial-related 
focus of the anti-Blackstonians, especially of Laudan and Allen and of Epps, 
seems archaic and overly abstract.29 
My critique might be a case of scholars talking past each another.  I 
argue that Epps and Cassell lack empirical support for their positions, while 
Laudan and Allen’s reductionist empiricism misses relevant evidence.  A 
 
 25  Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549 (2008).  See Marvin 
Zalman, Criminal Justice System Reform and Wrongful Conviction: A Research Agenda, 17 
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 468 (2006); Marvin Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful 
Convictions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1465 (2011) [hereinafter, Zalman, Integrated]; Marvin Zalman 
& Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV. 955 (2014).  I am not 
affiliated with any Innocence Network (http://innocencenetwork.org/) organization, but do 
serve as a “senior advisor” to Proving Innocence (http://www.provinginnocence.org/about-
pi/senior-advisors.html), a local innocence organization that provides some investigation 
assistance to the Michigan Innocence Clinic (http://www.law.umich.edu/clinical/innocencecli
nic/Pages/default.aspx).   
 26  D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful 
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 763-764 (2007) [hereinafter Risinger, 
Innocents Convicted].  Risinger introduced readers to two late eighteenth century English 
leaders.  Paley believed that convicting the innocent is inevitable and a necessary price paid 
to maintain security while Romilly abhorred wrongful convictions and argued for many 
reforms to avoid them.  They wrote in the context of an Enlightenment sensibility, see J. M. 
KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 294-98 (1992). 
 27  SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2nd 
ed. 1997) [hereinafter WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE].  
 28  LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 
FROM 1750 (1948); Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in DOUGLAS 
HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 
17-63 (1975).  
 29  Epps, supra note 2, at 1081-87 uses this historical view to support his anti-
Blackstonian argument.   
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criminal law theorist like Epps might shrug off my criticism as not relevant 
to his vocation.  But where empirical evidence contradicts a theoretical 
position the theory must be reconsidered.  Law is ultimately a profession that 
shapes the way in which individuals and institutions behave, which means 
that legal theory must at some point be concerned with empirical effects.30  
The latter point is amplified by my position as a law/criminal justice scholar, 
and my understanding of the difference in how criminologists and legal 
scholars address the same issues. 
Part II includes three sections that establish contexts for thinking about 
the Blackstone ratio and Blackstone principle and that draw admittedly 
tendentious conclusions.  Part II.A briefly describes the innocence 
movement and suggests that the classic Blackstonian and anti-Blackstonian 
debate has been changed by the innocence movement’s research and reform 
project.  Part II.B describes Brian Forst’s labor-economics vision of balanced 
justice, which is more comprehensive and less polemical than that of Epps 
and Laudan and Allen.  The latter describe only glimpses of balanced justice, 
mixed with teleological arguments.  Although Forst’s policy orientation 
seems more Blackstonian than not, the book-length scope of his work and 
his data-driven and criminological perspective provides a less argumentative 
basis for analysis.  Part II.C describes two Blackstone ratio analyses by 
criminologists Shawn Bushway and Brian Forst.  Bushway describes an 
empirical imbalance between potential suspects not convicted and 
defendants convicted for homicides.  I argue that this real imbalance is well-
known and results mainly from features of society, law enforcement, and 
prosecution rather from the operations of trial courts.  Forst’s mathematical 
manipulation of the ratio shows that the population of false negatives 
(wrongful acquittals) must be hugely expanded in order to reduce the number 
of false positives (wrongful convictions).31  I argue that the exercise is 
hypothetical and does not describe the actual court or justice system.  These 
arguments form the core of my position that Laudan and Allen and to a 
degree Epps, are fundamentally mistaken. 
Part III describes the positions of Epps, Laudan and Allen, and Cassell, 
followed by “internal” critiques that are peculiar to each author, although 
some overlap occurs.  Part IV is an “external” critique of anti-
Blackstonianism that provides empirical examples of a justice system 
 
 30  This, of course, does not mean that particular legal philosophers must work out all or 
any of the practical implications of their positions.  However, Laudan and Allen and Cassell 
either make strong empirical predictions or operate on the level of standard legal scholarship, 
which implies conclusions that have real-world effects; Epps writes on a theoretical plane but 
does make empirical/theoretical predictions that I take empirical aim at.   
 31  False negatives/false positives can be narrowly defined as false acquittals/convictions, 
which implicate only the trial process, or more broadly viewed as errors of impunity/due 
process, which implicate the entire criminal justice system.   
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stacked against defendants and filled with error-generating processes that are 
orthogonal to anti-Blackstonian concerns.  In such a system anti-
Blackstonian reforms could generate greater error.32  Part V, the Conclusion, 
provides positive reasons for the Blackstone principle that rest not only on 
the anti-Blackstonian critique in Part III and the depiction of a flawed, 
prosecution-friendly justice system in Part IV, but also on the ground of 
constraining government power, which is orthogonal to concerns of verdict 
accuracy. 
Although I am critical of the works reviewed herein, it must be said that 
at the most general level their base idea—that trade-offs exist in all social 
processes including criminal justice—is not wrong, which is surely why the 
“Paleyite-Romillist” debate has continued for more than two centuries.33  
The innocence movement’s growth period (which has probably not ended), 
seeks to potentially reduce the incidence of errors by emphasizing the 
benefits of innocence reforms based on logic and scientific research.  It is 
noteworthy that many innocence reforms seek to improve system accuracy 
in ways that increase the potential of both convicting the guilty and not-
selecting or quickly exonerating innocent suspects.  Still, the point that most 
pro-innocence scholarship does not focus on trade-offs is fair criticism.  
When Allen and Laudan, however, seek to explore “a highly complicated 
matrix of relationships” where serious crime impunity (“other equally 
 
 32  The anti-Blackstonians critiqued in my article discuss issues, which have been the 
basis of research by criminologists and criminal justice social scientists.  As a side comment, 
I suggest that some of what I see as serious deficiencies in their work could have been avoided 
by collaboration with crime scientists or by paying greater attention to criminological 
literature.  This point hit home when Epps, supra note 2, at 1117, referred to “criminal justice 
scholars” who abhor hyper- incarceration, and mentioned to two superb law-school based 
scholars.  In my world “criminal justice scholars” hang out in departments of criminal justice, 
criminology, and sociology.  Very few are employed in law schools; indeed the only one who 
comes to mind is Jeffrey Fagan at Columbia Law School.  Ideally, crime scholarship should 
see greater cooperation of empirical and doctrinal scholars, but I don’t expect a rush of greater 
collaboration because professional rewards are generally not enhanced by crossing 
disciplinary boundaries.   
            Neither legal scholars nor social scientists make the practical agency decisions or the 
policy innovations made by a range of administrators, supervisors, legislators, and judges.  
But their ideas can stimulate, impede or influence reforms.  Scholars and researchers, of 
course, have an obligation to extend the imagination of system personnel and policy makers 
and in doing so might go pretty far out on some weak limbs.  It helps for academics who study 
criminal justice (whether in law, social science or both), a field of inquiry which is bounded 
by the realities of practice, to strive to appreciate the system’s complexity into which our ideas 
may fall.  An effort to know the system as best as possible might improve our scholarship by 
channeling efforts into usable forms and to avoid injecting ideas that could generate 
unintended and possibly deleterious consequences.  The ideas that animate justice scholarship 
will inevitably reflect the ideological variations in the larger polity.  However, before law 
professors or philosophers make claims about the effects of their ideas on crime or on justice 
system operations, it would be helpful for them to consult relevant empirical research.   
 33  See Risinger, supra note 26.   
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horrifying mistakes”) “go unnoticed in the conventional discourse,” their 
quantitative reasoning is wrapped up in a polemic that seems aimed less at 
sorting out real costs and benefits but more at drowning the innocence 
movement like a kitten in a bathtub.34  As will be seen, a more balanced and 
far from obscure cost-benefit analysis exists which has not been referenced 
by the anti-Blackstonians.35  Also, anti-Blackstonians are not wrong to keep 
the suffering of serious crime victims in mind, but my observations of 
innocence lawyers and policy people is that in practice and in policy they are 
sensitive to the pains of crime victimization.36 
These thoughts about costs and benefits lead me to characterize the 
approaches of Epps, Laudan and Allen, and, in a different register, Cassell, 
as kinds of “global” anti-Blackstonianism, in that they analyze the entire 
justice process through the Blackstone principle, or the Blackstone ratio, or 
a conservative criminal procedure filter.  In doing so, their analyses try to 
cover too much ground in too little space and result in arguments with 
weaknesses that I seek to expose in this Article.  Other scholars honing in on 
specific processes can offer more convincing anti-Blackstonian arguments, 
which is where the innocence movement’s intellectual battle lines will surely 
be drawn.  One prominent example is the work of Steven Clark, a 
psychological scientist who has empirically challenged the benefits of 
eyewitness reforms.37  I would finally note that this Article cannot address 
every argument made by anti-Blackstonians.38 
 
 
 
 34  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 68.  
 35  I refer to Brian Forst, Errors of Justice, see infra note 80.  
 36  Although this is a worthy point in Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 85 they seem 
almost to libel innocence advocates with a lack of concern for crime victims by being 
concerned with only one kind of error, an attitude that I’ve never sensed in the presence of 
innocence lawyers or exonerees.  I doubt if an attempt to weigh relative harms is useful or 
reasonably possible (e.g., is a murder always worse than a wrongful conviction resulting in a 
life spent in/dying in prison).  While some violent crime victimizations do not always leave 
much if any trauma (e.g., some armed robberies), I assert that a wrongful conviction always 
leaves a defendant with, at the least, a profound distrust in the legitimacy of the justice system 
and at most severe psychological incapacitation.  See Adrian Grounds, Psychological 
Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & 
CRIM. JUST., 165 (2004).   
 37 See e.g., Steven E. Clark, Cost and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform: 
Psychological Science and Public Policy, 7 PERSPECTIVES PSYCH. SCI. 238 (2012); see also 
Cassell, Protect supra note 5, at 267, which alludes to this issue; see discussion at infra, Part 
III.C.2.f.  
 38  At several points in this article I point out specific points not addressed. Epps, supra 
note 2, at 1089-92, briefly reviews the works of other thinkers, including Laudan, who have 
been critical of a Blackstonian approach.   
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II. CONTEXTS FOR THINKING ABOUT THE BLACKSTONE 
PRINCIPLE 
The innocence movement provides the impetus and the setting for the 
contemporary anti-Blackstonians, especially Laudan and Allen and Cassell.  
The partial sketch of the movement herein helps place the anti-Blackstonian 
writings in context.  Additional context is provided by reviewing analyses of 
two criminologists with quantitative and labor-economic skill sets.  Forst 
provides a vision of a balanced criminal justice system; Bushway and Forst 
analyze the Blackstone ratio in ways that provide useful comparisons those 
of the anti-Blackstonians.39 
A. The Innocence Movement and Its Critics 
The innocence movement has existed for about 25 years; its 
organizational core lies in more than 50 innocence projects or 
organizations.40  I have described it as “a related set of activities by lawyers, 
cognitive and social psychologists, other social scientists, legal scholars, 
government personnel, journalists, documentarians, freelance writers, and 
citizen-activists who, since the mid-1990s, have worked to free innocent 
prisoners and rectify perceived causes of miscarriages of justice in the United 
States.”41  Most innocence reform efforts target practices thought to generate 
(or not screen out at trial) erroneous convictions, especially in police 
investigation (lineups, interrogation, informants), forensic science (faulty 
methods like bite mark analysis; deficient crime laboratories), prosecution 
(failure to turn over exculpatory evidence to defendants, prejudicial remarks 
in closing statements), ineffective defense counsel, and limited post-
conviction review.42  As a result, justice system professionals now accept the 
regular occurrence of a non-trivial number of wrongful convictions.43  Until 
recently innocence scholars gave little attention to adjudication as a source 
of error.44 
 
 39  Note that Epps, supra note 2, is more concerned with establishing a theoretical basis 
for his anti-Blackstonian stance rather than advocating procedural changes; nevertheless, it 
seems that his argument could be employed to weaken procedural rules that favor defendants.   
 40  See INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://innocencenetwork.org/.    
 41  Zalman, Integrated, supra note 25, at 1468.  
 42  See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE 
INNOCENT 40-56 (Daniel S. Medwed ed. 2017).  
 43  See ROBERT J. NORRIS, EXONERATED: A HISTORY OF THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT 
(2017) [hereinafter Norris, Exonerated]; Richard A. Leo, The Criminology of Wrongful 
Conviction: A Decade Later, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82 (2017).   
 44  Marvin Zalman, Notes on the ‘Adversary System’ and Wrongful Convictions, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 71-91 
(C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias, eds., 2008) [hereinafter, Zalman, Notes].  
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The innocence movement is, ostensibly, politically and ideologically 
neutral.  It is often said, “[n]obody wants to convict an innocent person.”  
Some prominent conservatives have championed the innocence movement.45  
In this spirit Jon Gould described the Innocence Commission for Virginia as 
nonprofit, nongovernmental, and nonpartisan.46  Robert Norris interviewed 
innocence movement founders who raised the intriguing speculation that 
penal harshness may have played a role in the movement’s rise.  The 
innocence movement, paradoxically, arose just as America’s “tough on 
crime” and pro-death penalty policies reached their apogee in the 1990s and 
well before political conservatives became skittish about the costs of mass 
incarceration and began to advocate milder punishments.47  As penalties 
became increasingly draconian, “tough on crime” states passed strong 
innocence laws; an example is Texas, whose exoneree compensation law 
offers the highest awards in the country.48  According to Steve Saloom, 
former Innocence Project policy director, “[t]hose who want to be tough on 
crime also want to seem like they’re being fair at the same time.”49 
Yet, partisan divides often occur in valence issues, usually over 
implementation methods.50  Soon after the innocence movement came into 
public consciousness criticisms arose from defense-oriented scholars on the 
“left” and a few critics on the “right.”  The defense critics were concerned 
that juries would absorb the lessons of “actual innocence” and would 
disregard judges’ instructions regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 
they would return not guilty verdicts only when convinced of a defendant’s 
actual innocence, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.51  These fears 
 
 45  See e.g., Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission: 
Catching Cases that Fall Through the Cracks, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 249-65 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano, eds., 2014) (discussing 
North Carolina Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake); see JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE 
COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 58 (2008) (discussing William Sessions, former federal judge and FBI director under 
President Reagan); Jon B. Gould, Introduction, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 5 (2014) (explaining former Attorney General Edwin 
Meese told Jon Gould that he supported the study of and rectification of wrongful 
convictions).   
 46  Gould, Commission, supra note 45.  
 47  HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION ERA POLITICS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2015); DAVID DAGAN AND STEVEN M. TELES, 
PRISON BREAK: WHY CONSERVATIVES TURNED AGAINST MASS INCARCERATION (2016).   
 48  Robert J. Norris, Assessing Compensation Statutes for the Wrongly Convicted, 23 
CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 352 (2012).   
 49  Norris, Exonerated, supra note 43, at 135.  
 50  Marvin Zalman, Brad Smith & Angie Kiger, Officials’ Estimates of the Incidence of 
‘Actual Innocence’ Convictions, 25 JUST. Q. 72, 74 (2008); see also W. M. OLIVER, THE LAW 
& ORDER PRESIDENCY 125 (2003).  
 51  Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and 
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. 
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have not materialized.  Another defense criticism, trenchantly stated by Abbe 
Smith, was that growing concern about actual innocence devalues legitimate 
concerns about factually guilty defendants, most of whom are society’s 
losers, who are more in need of support than the stereotypical predator who 
the public imagines when the label “criminal” is brandished.52 
On the right, a noted scholar-judge erroneously claimed that innocence 
movement activists believe that one-half of all convicted defendants are 
innocent; his own wrongful conviction estimate was in fact close to the low 
estimate made by innocence scholars.53  A prosecutor’s casual and misguided 
effort to dismiss the number of wrongful convictions,54 although taken to 
heart by a Supreme Court Justice,55 was simply wrong.56  Another more 
potent criticism is found in the work of philosopher of science Larry Laudan, 
who along with evidence professor Ronald Allen, has staked out a critique 
of the innocence movement based on cost/benefit reasoning57 and an analysis 
of the Blackstone ratio, which is reviewed herein. 
Two innocence movement defenses against such critiques appeared in 
2008; they positioned the innocence movement in a middle ground, 
threatening neither traditional defense nor crime control orientations.  Daniel 
Medwed, replying in part to a death penalty cost/benefit analysis,58 
challenged a “mechanical” view of the Blackstone ratio, stating that 
“wrongful convictions do not seem to be incidental effects of a system 
designed to maximize social benefit [i.e., of a Blackstone ratio]; on the 
contrary they are direct, unabashed examples of the system’s flaws.”59  
Medwed also argued that defining a conviction as one of actual innocence 
 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587 (2005); Raymond, infra note 165.   
 52  Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing 
Anxiety about Innocence Projects, 13 UNIV. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315 (2010); DAVID 
FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER’S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 
(2006); Steve Saloom also links Smith’s point to pro-innocence activism among 
conservatives.  See, Norris supra note 43, at 128 (“the harsher the punishments, the more you 
want to keep the innocent out because really you’re trying to scapegoat [offenders].”) (quoting 
Steve Saloom).   
 53  Morris Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 663 
(2007).  
 54  Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 26, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/26/opinion/the-innocent-and-the-shammed.html (last 
visited May 12, 2018).   
 55  Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185-99 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 56  Samuel R. Gross, Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat in the Marsh, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67-72 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/
vol105/gross.pdf 
 57  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4.  
 58  Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the Guillotine, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 625 (2005). 
 59  Medwed, Innocentrism, supra note 25, at 1564. 
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“should aim as close to certainty as possible” but not be based on absolute 
proof.  The latter standard, advocated by some innocence movement critics, 
would severely undercount wrongful convictions.60 
Keith Findley identified the innocence movement as a new justice 
paradigm—a “Reliability Model” aiming for investigation and prosecution 
accuracy.  His model is situated between Herbert Packer’s adversary 
conceptualization of criminal justice as marked by the “Due Process” and 
“Crime Control” models.61  Both Findley and Medwed agreed that in the 
“real world” there are and must be some limits to which the justice system 
will go to prevent convicting the innocent.  Accordingly, their essays were 
mindful of the time and resource constraints that attend any proposed justice 
system change to reduce the number of false convictions.62 
In all fairness, the innocence movement has a strong defense flavor.63  
Most innocence lawyers came from the world of criminal defense, and the 
Innocence Network64 appears to have informal ties with the National 
 
 60  Medwed, Innocentrism, supra note 25, at 1563.  The definition-of-wrongful-
conviction issue is not entirely settled and is a potential area of contest.  See Richard A. Leo, 
Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration Movement? The Risks and Rewards of 
Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 57-83 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017). 
 61  Findley, New Paradigm, supra note 10; see HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-246 (1968) (hereinafter PACKER, LIMITS).  
 62  The gist of their essays, especially Findley’s, was to sketch out a defense of innocence 
movement reforms in broad terms, but their attentiveness to a working system indicates that 
they would not seek impossible or unfeasible changes.  In Findley’s case, he and the 
Wisconsin Innocence Project worked with a bipartisan commission established by the 
Wisconsin legislature to develop accuracy-enhancing reforms in relation to police lineup and 
interrogation procedures, see Keith Findley & Larry Golden, The Innocence Movement, the 
Innocence Network, and Policy Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 93-110 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano, eds., 2014).  The cost/benefit 
and other practical constraints on reforms occur in the give-and-take of the practical politics 
that underlie virtually all policymaking.  For two innocence reform examples, see Rebecca 
Brown & Stephen Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identification Reform and the Role 
of Police Leadership, 42 U. BALTIMORE L. REV. 535 (2013) and Mumma, North Carolina, 
supra note 45.   
 63  “[W]hile the Innocence Movement is largely perceived as a defense–oriented 
movement, its rhetoric includes respect for fundamental crime control values.” Findley, New 
Paradigm, supra note 10, at 141.   
 64  The Innocence Network: 
 
 “is an affiliation of 69 organizations from all over the world dedicated 
to providing pro bono legal and investigative services to individuals 
seeking to prove innocence of crimes for which they have been 
convicted, and working to redress the causes of wrongful convictions. 
Currently, the Innocence Network consists of 56 U.S. based and 13 
non-U.S. based organizations.”  
 
http://innocencenetwork.org/ (last visited May 12, 2018).   
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Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL).65  Barry Scheck, the 
co-founder of the Innocence Project and in many ways the face of the 
innocence movement, was a past president of the NACDL.66  Some 
prosecutorial conviction integrity units have hired defense attorneys to better 
guarantee their effectiveness.67  Nevertheless, as Risinger and Risinger have 
noted, the role of the “innocence lawyer” differs from the traditional defense 
lawyer in significant ways.  The innocence lawyer—a lawyer representing 
clients at various innocence organizations or innocence projects—does not 
represent any convicted prisoner and is not indifferent to the client’s factual 
guilt or innocence.  The innocence lawyer is committed to carefully 
investigating cases for factual innocence and in so doing violates the “anti-
signaling” ethic of standard defense lawyers.  Innocence advocacy involves 
intense scrutiny and winnowing (triage) of cases before taking on clients and 
the investment of extraordinary investigation and litigation resources once a 
case is accepted.  A client will be dropped if evidence convinces the 
innocence lawyers that the person is factually guilty.  The Risingers opine 
that most criminal defense lawyers will not be comfortable with the 
innocence lawyer’s role because innocence advocacy in one or a few cases 
tends to undermine the anti-signaling posture related to their other clients.68 
Putting aside the differences between innocence lawyering and 
standard defense advocacy, Keith Findley suggested that innocence 
movement policy reforms would benefit prosecutors as well as innocent 
defendants and prisoners, through the greater accuracy in police 
investigation and forensic science methods.  On balance, such diagnosticity-
improving procedures will help police convict a larger number of “bad guys” 
while snaring a smaller number of innocent suspects.  To put a familiar face 
on this point, the same Barry Scheck who was a president of the NACDL 
was also a commissioner on New York State’s Forensic Science Review 
Board from 1994 to 2016, “a body that regulates all crime and forensic DNA 
laboratories in the state.”69 
 
 
 65  NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW., NADCL, https://www.nacdl.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2018).   
 66  The popularity of the innocence movement is displayed in a Time Magazine special 
edition devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Innocence Project.  See Innocent: The Fight 
Against Wrongful Convictions—25 Years of the Innocence Project, TIME MAG. (Larry Sutton 
ed., 2017).   
 67  Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance of Getting It 
Right the First Time, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1033(2012).   
 68  D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, The Emerging Role of Innocence Lawyer 
and the Need for Role-Differentiated Standards of Professional Conduct, in CONTROVERSIES 
IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 123, 135 (Sarah L. Cooper, ed., 2014). 
 69  Univ. of Hawai’i at Manoa William. S. Richardson Sch. of L., Barry Scheck: Visiting 
Professor (2018) https://www.law.hawaii.edu/person/barry-scheck.  
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To reiterate, until recently wrongful conviction scholarship had little to 
say about the adjudication process.70  The enormous bulk of innocence 
scholarship focused on what Sam Gross has famously called the canonical 
causes of false convictions: 
 
There is a canonical list of factors that lead to false convictions: 
eyewitness misidentification; false confession; misleading, false, 
or fraudulent forensic evidence; testimony by highly motivated 
police informants such as “jailhouse snitches”; perjury in general; 
prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective legal defense. All these 
factors are common among cases of known exonerations.71 
 
Despite the considerable literature on these subjects, other possible sources 
of wrongful convictions require more research.72  More recently, however, 
legal scholars have turned their attention to attributes of the adjudicative 
process that might either be a source of wrongful convictions or, more likely, 
fail to screen out errors made by police investigators, forensic scientists, or 
in the pre-trial and prosecutorial charging process.  A German legal scholar 
and I reviewed five studies by prominent legal scholars, including our 
symposium host, D. Michael Risinger, Tim Bakken, Keith Findley, Samuel 
Gross, and Christopher Slobogin.73  These authors proposed novel trial 
procedure modifications aimed at preventing wrongful convictions and 
producing more accurate verdicts.  Among the anti-Blackstonians, Cassell, 
who is more concerned with adversarially testing innocence movement 
claims than with developing a theoretical model, offered a spirited and in 
some ways convincing rebuttal to Bakken’s approach.74  These five more or 
less inquisitorial proposals, sparked by judicial process diagnostic weakness 
disclosed by the innocence movement, on the whole provide better 
approaches to resolving adversary system inadequacies than the anti-
Blackstonians’ proposals.  While not reviewing them in detail, they offer 
other ways to think about system improvement. 
 
 70  Zalman, Notes, supra note 44.   
 71  Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 186 (2008) 
(citations omitted).  
 72  A recent law review symposium explored “non-canonical” sources of wrongful 
convictions.  See James R. Acker, Allison D. Redlich, Catherine L. Bonventre & Robert J. 
Norris, Elephants in the Courtroom: Examining Overlooked Issues In Wrongful Convictions, 
79 ALB. L. REV. 705 (2016).  
 73  Marvin Zalman & Ralph Grunewald, Reinventing the Trial: The Innocence Revolution 
and Proposals to Modify the American Criminal Trial, 3 TEXAS A&M L. REV. 189 (2015).  In 
this article, we also addressed the plausibility of any of the reforms coming into being.  Id. at 
238-41.  Laudan does not address the feasibility of adoption. 
 74  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1064-80. Cassell has not proposed alternate error-
reducing trial procedures. 
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It seems to me that Epps and Laudan and Allen are unconcerned with 
this kind of innocentric modeling (which Cassell critiqued).  Adjudication 
errors flow from many structural and psychological factors that skew errors 
against the state as well as the defendant.75  Many possible levers of change 
could produce more accurate trials in addition to the few analyzed by the 
anti-Blackstonians.  Grunewald and I identified fourteen proposed accuracy-
enhancing changes (not simply wrongful-conviction reducing proposals) 
raised by the five studies. Of these, several focused on the trial process as 
such: (1) drop the jury or constrain the evidence it receives, (2) enhance 
judicial control over the entire process, (3) increase judicial control over 
expert witnesses, (4) modify the lawyer’s role, (5) allow a plea of “innocent,” 
and (6) expand discovery.  Among the concerns discussed, four of the five 
authors recommended some change to the rules of trial procedure or 
evidence, with only Keith Findley leaving the trial process “as it lays,” but 
modifying the institutional setting for defense attorneys and prosecutors.76 
The innocence movement is more concerned with decision-accuracy 
throughout the criminal justice process than the anti-Blackstonians credit.77  
The defense lawyer’s classic position, tasked with putting the state to its 
proof and owing full concern to ethically defending the client, is not 
concerned with overall system accuracy.  The defense background of most 
innocence organization lawyers and their use of defense strategies in post-
conviction litigation makes innocence work seem like standard defense 
work.  But innocence lawyers encourage and work with prosecutors’ 
conviction integrity units78 and interact with police officials and forensic 
scientists to promote accuracy-enhancing investigations, supporting the 
innocence movement’s “Reliability Model.”  In short, many diagnostic-
improving innocence reforms will make police, forensic scientists, and 
prosecutors more proficient in convicting serious offenders.  Nevertheless, it 
seems that innocence movement advocates wish to preserve the rules of trial 
evidence, whether embedded in constitutional principle or not, which favor 
the defendant and are targets of anti-Blackstonian critiques.79 
 
 75 A critical source for understanding the human sources of error in the trial process is 
Dan Simon’s magisterial review of the psychological literature.  DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 144-222, 324-74 (2012). 
 76  Zalman & Grunewald, supra note 73, at 212.  None of the five authors whose work 
was analyzed were concerned with the standard of proof.   
 77  This criticism applies more to Epps and Laudan and Allen than to Cassell.  See 
generally Allen & Laudan, supra note 4; Epps, supra note 2; Cassell, supra note 5.   
 78  John Hollway, Conviction Review Units: A National Comparison, (Univ. Penn., 
Working Paper No. 1614 2016), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?fy 
article=2615&context=faculty_scholarship.  
 79  I elaborate on this point in the Conclusion, infra Part V.  
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B. The Ideal of Balanced Justice 
The anti-Blackstonians desire a level adversary process playing field, 
but their balanced system descriptions, grounded in the tradition of legal 
scholarship, tend to tilt toward the prosecution.  I believe the clearest and 
least partisan theoretical description of a balanced criminal justice system is 
Brian Forst’s Errors of Justice.80  It examines procedural and substantive 
errors of justice across a range of criminal justice processes.81  Forst 
conceives of “justice” as “an optimal outcome of justice for a criminal case.  
An optimal outcome is one that minimizes the total social cost of crime and 
crime control.”82  The anti-Blackstonians, especially Allen and Laudan, and 
Cassell, emphasize the costs of crime without sufficiently weighing the 
effects and costs of crime control.83 
Errors of justice impose social costs of both crimes and sanctions, and 
are defined as “the net reduction in aggregate wealth associated with the 
act.”84  From the point of optimal justice, errors of justice —”errors in the 
interpretation, procedure, or execution of the law”—can run in opposite 
directions.  The two directions are labeled “errors of due process” and “errors 
of impunity.”  The social costs of due process errors fall not only on innocent 
defendants but “include as well excessive intrusions against those who 
violate the law.”85  In the opposite direction, errors of impunity involve 
insufficient criminal law sanctions or “none at all where one is warranted.”86  
Errors of due process or impunity can be systematic (the product of justice 
policies that bias outcomes toward errors) or random (actions of individual 
justice practitioners or private individuals or unforeseeable events that 
 
 80  BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES, AND REMEDIES (2004); Laudan 
covers some of the ground specified by Forst in Law’s Flaws, supra note 3, at xix-xx but in a 
casual and discursive, rather than in a systematic, way.   
 81  FORST, supra note 80, at 3. 
 82  FORST, supra note 80, at 4 (partial emphasis in original deleted and emphasis added).   
 83  Thus, although it seems counterintuitive, it is likely that mass incarceration may have 
increased crime in some areas by weakening community social control.  See TODD CLEAR, 
IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED 
NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007). 
 84  FORST, supra note 80, at 46.  Forst divides social costs into costs associated with 
crimes and costs of prevention and response to crime.  He observes that costs are incurred 
privately (e.g., Costs of crime: property lost, medical costs, pain and suffering; Costs of 
prevention: locks, dependents deprived of income) and publicly (e.g., Costs of crime: 
insurance costs for theft, lost productivity of victims; Costs of prevention: criminal justice 
system).  Forst discusses the difficulties of measuring intangible costs and the difficulty of 
measuring costs related to offenses with hard-to-identify victims.  Costs include the costs of 
intervention.  Id. at 52.  A critical unanswered “piece of information” in these theoretical 
calculations is “the social cost of the detention, conviction and incarceration of an innocent 
person.”  Id. at 55.   
 85  FORST, supra note 80, at 4. 
 86  FORST, supra note 80, at 4. 
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
2018] THE ANTI-BLACKSTONIANS 1337 
inhibit or facilitate detection and conviction or that generate false 
convictions).87 
The anti-Blackstonians focus attention on the criminal trial/
adjudication process rather than the entire criminal justice process (referring 
to false positives/negatives rather than errors of due process/impunity),88 
although some inconsistency may be present.89  Laudan and Allen also 
expand the adjudication category by mislabeling prosecutorial dismissals as 
acquittals.  Forst’s book differs from that narrow approach in that his data-
analytic analyses apply to a variety of justice system areas across the criminal 
justice system, including police-induced errors, prosecution policy and 
justice errors, sentencing, and homicide, as well as to the issue that fascinates 
anti-Blackstonians—standards of evidence at trials.  His analyses use data 
relevant to those procedures in separate chapters and provide alternative 
analytic approaches to better understand these pressing issues.90  He counts 
the failure of the justice system to adhere to rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure as due process errors of justice (in analytic rather than legal 
terms).  To him, such errors have more than symbolic consequences.  If 
constitutional protections are reduced, “protections falter, innocent people 
are more likely to be harassed, detained, and convicted, and actions taken 
against offenders, from interrogation to the terms of incarceration, may 
become needlessly harsh, with avoidable external costs imposed on 
taxpayers, the punished, and their dependents.”91  If the justice system comes 
to be seen as “increasingly corrupt,” consequences of due process errors may 
include increased crime and civil unrest.92  The sources of due process errors 
 
 87  FORST, supra note 80, at 4.  
 88  Epps, supra note 2, at 1128 (“The Blackstone principle can prevent only those harms 
that are caused by the adjudicative system itself. A false conviction may represent a greater 
tragedy than a false acquittal, but that tells us little about how the justice system should 
distribute errors.”).  This terminology diverts attention from a larger array of processes that 
allow potentially dangerous people who have committed acts that could lead to prosecution 
to escape detection. 
 89  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, seems to have it both ways by asserting the 
decisions in the adjudication stage can have substantial effects on crime.  This is discussed 
infra Part III.B.1&3.  Laudan also raises the loophole that police action can also reduce crime, 
but he strongly emphasizes that changes in the standard of proof will reduce crime.   
 90  FORST, supra note 80.  
 91  FORST, supra note 80, at 16.  This is in stark contrast to Laudan, who asserts that 
adherence to rules of constitutional criminal procedure will increase wrongful acquittals and 
increase crime, LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 110-37 (Chapter 6).   
 92  Epps advances this idea.  Epps, supra note 2; see also infra Part III.A.2.a.  This point 
is not abstract from the perspective of linking riots or rebellions of African Americans since 
the 1960s to the effects of deeply embedded racialized policies borne of frustration with 
justice system wrongs, and at a more mundane level viewing the friction between police and 
minority communities that impedes the effectiveness of law enforcement as a factor in causing 
crime.  See infra, Part IV; Alice George, The 1968 Kerner Commission Got It Right, But 
Nobody Listened, Smithsonian.com (March 1, 2018) https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smit
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may be innocent or inadvertent (e.g., mistaken eyewitness identification), 
due to systemic resource deficiencies, the result of unprofessionalism, or to 
more sinister motives involved in unjustified police killings.  In Forst’s 
scheme, legal but unduly harsh punishment is an error of due process.  This 
Blackstonian position is made in a principled manner (the obverse of Epps’s 
anti-Blackstonianism), and is not influenced by his Blackstone ratio 
calculations, discussed below.93 
C. Criminologists on Blackstone 
Criminologists Shawn Bushway and Brian Forst estimated criminal 
justice system errors.  Bushway’s estimate relied on a data set of homicide 
investigations and convictions in Chicago, while Forst applied the 
Blackstone ratio to hypothetical trial data.  Bushway asserted that Blackstone 
took it seriously: “Blackstone hypothesizes that it would be ideal to have a 
justice system that generates ten false negatives for every false positive.”94 
1. Bushway on the Blackstone Ratio. 
Sean Bushway conducted what he called a Blackstone ratio of murder 
convictions based on a detailed study of a sample of sixty-three Chicago 
murders reported to police in 1979.95  Investigators reported the suspects per 
case they believed to be involved in the murders, which totaled to ninety.96  
Of these ninety suspects, sixty-one were not convicted and twenty-nine were 
convicted.  Bushway assumed all sixty-one suspects who were not convicted 
were false negatives (falsely acquitted) due to the “strong assumption that 
the police estimate the number of suspects based on witness testimony, and 
evidence is a good estimate of the number of people who were actually guilty 
of murder.”97  He extrapolated a 3.4 percent wrongful conviction rate from 
 
hsonian-institution/1968-kerner-commission-got-it-right-nobody-listened-180968318/ (last 
visited, May 19, 2018); CHRIS HAYES, A COLONY IN A NATION (2017).  
 93  Infra at Part III.A.  
 94  Shawn D. Bushway, Estimating Empirical Blackstone Ratios in Two Settings: Murder 
Cases and Hiring, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2011).  Volokh, supra, note 8, (citing that the 
idea that it is better for guilty men to go free than an innocent man be imprisoned was a deeply 
rooted cultural tradition).  In light of Epps’s note that the ratio was propounded somewhat 
casually, it is likely that Blackstone himself used the number as a way of emphasizing the 
principle’s importance.  Epps, supra note 2.   
 95  Actually, seventy-two were reported to police, but nine were dropped. No data about 
the number of suspects was reported.  Bushway, supra note 94, at 1092.   
 96 Bushway, supra note 94, at 1092.  This was a unique feature of the data set.  See also 
Joseph L. Peterson et al., Forensic Evidence and the Police, 1976-1980 (2006) 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/8186/detail.   
 97  Bushway, supra note 94, at 1093 (comma added to original).  For a less sanguine view 
of evidence-based murder investigations by Chicago police, see Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the 
Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW 
ENGLAND L. REV. 1 (1993).  To his credit, Bushway notes that his estimate “rests crucially on 
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Risinger’s estimate of error in rape/murder cases and assigned one of the 
twenty-nine convicted to the factually falsely convicted category.98 
Thus, when estimating the suspects who were assumed to commit/not 
commit the crime by people convicted/not convicted, sixty-one were 
assumed guilty/not convicted, twenty-eight were assumed guilty/convicted, 
and one was assumed not guilty/convicted.  None were assumed to be not 
guilty/not convicted.99  The original data set included detailed descriptions 
of the adjudications and final conviction charges.  Of the twenty-nine found 
guilty of murder, attempted murder, or voluntary or involuntary 
manslaughter, Bushway reports that fourteen pleaded guilty and three were 
convicted by jury.  He does not report, but we might assume, that the 
remaining twelve were convicted in bench trials.  Unfortunately Bushway 
does not report whether any of the sixty-one who were not convicted were 
acquitted at trial or were dismissed.  It may not matter to some utilitarians, 
but given what we know about trial acquittals, most of the sixty-one probably 
were not charged by prosecutors. 100 
With the lopsided assumption of police accuracy that equates a suspect 
with a guilty defendant, Bushway estimated a Blackstone ratio of sixty-one 
to one.  He then pulled back from the assumption that all ninety suspects 
identified by the police were guilty perpetrators, and as an alternative 
reduced the number of murderers in the 1979 data set from ninety to sixty-
three, “the smallest number of murderers possible.”101  Recalculating the 
table with sixty-three instead of eighty-nine “guilty” murderers “provides an 
estimate of thirty-five false negatives, which provides a false negative rate 
of 55.5 percent, and an empirical Blackstone ratio of thirty five-to-one.  As 
a result, I feel confident that the lower bound or floor of the Blackstone ratio 
in this data is thirty-five-to-one.”102  Either estimate is far above the 
Blackstone ratio “ideal” of ten guilty to one innocent. 
 
the assumption that the police estimate of the number of perpetrators is a good estimate of the 
number of guilty parties.  If this assumption is incorrect, the exercise is flawed.”  Bushway, 
supra note 94, at 1094. 
 98  Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 26.  Risinger warns against such 
extrapolation.   
 99  See Bushway, supra, note 94, at 1092.  (“[T]he total number of people who did not 
commit the crime, is a difficult conceptual number. Clearly, any number of people in Chicago 
did not commit the crime, so this number could be arbitrarily large.”).   
 100  It is important to understand the underlying criminal process that generates these 
statistics. Laudan, for example, calls dismissals “acquittals.” Laudan, Different Strokes, supra 
note 3; LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 60 (“We know that of those arrested by the 
police and charged with volent crimes in 2008, some 37% never made it to a trial or plea 
bargain; the prosecutor or the pre-trial judge, in effect, acquits them.”).  I will return to 
Bushway’s data when I offer a critique of Laudan’s approach, infra Part III.B.3.  
 101  Bushway, supra note 94, at 1093–94.  
 102  Bushway, supra, note 94, at 1094.  
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Bushway’s analysis, although based on “strong assumptions,” is surely 
correct in broad strokes: there are many more people who commit criminal 
acts and are not sanctioned by the criminal justice system than are convicted.  
This point is worth lingering over because Laudan and Allen’s argument 
rests in good part on the finding that the risk of being a crime victim is much 
higher than the risk of being wrongfully convicted.  This point, however, 
comes as no surprise to anyone familiar with the criminal justice and trial 
systems.  Defense attorneys know that most of their clients are factually 
guilty to some degree.  Laudan recites criminal justice data to that effect and 
Risinger makes the point in his response to Allen and Laudan: “the numbers 
given by Allen and Laudan are almost certainly artificially high and seem to 
have been selected to make their readership . . . more threatened.”103  But in 
Risinger’s view the ratio of false acquittals to false convictions does not 
matter or is to be expected “because some such substantially higher risk must 
always attach to the risk of being a victim over the risk of being a convicted 
innocent simply as an inevitability of any likely set of social arrangements 
in the real world.  Any other result is virtually unimaginable.”104 
Risinger’s observation makes sense if we ask, what is the source of 
Bushway’s 35-to-1 ratio of false negatives (false “acquittals”) to false 
positives (false convictions)?  To the anti-Blackstonians the sources of error 
lie mainly in rules of criminal procedure that make it harder to convict the 
guilty at trial.  I assume, however, that most if not all of the sixty-one 
suspects in Bushway’s sample who were “not convicted” were dismissed by 
the prosecutor (perhaps a few were acquitted at trial).  Some of the sixty-one 
(probably dismissed) non-convicted may have been guilty.105  But it is risky 
to make assumptions about what goes on in prosecutorial charging and 
dismissal, a process which is not that well documented.106  In any event, the 
source of the disproportion of convicted guilty to unconvicted guilty is 
important because Laudan argued that increasing the proportion of trial 
convictions, lowering the proportion of dismissals, and longer prison 
sentences will reduce crime.  If, however, the primary sources of unconvicted 
guilty people lie outside the adjudication process, then the focus of crime 
reduction should be on those areas, not the trial. 
 
 
 
 103  Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 1016. 
 104  Id.  I would add that it is unimaginable in any “normal” state; one could imagine that 
in a repressive, totalitarian dictatorship going through a phase of “eliminating enemies” a 
different ratio might exist. 
 105  Laudan, Different Strokes, supra note 3, at 1-2 argues that prosecutorial dismissals 
should be treated as acquittals, a point that will be discussed, discussed infra. 
 106  See discussion infra, at notes 147–154.   
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For Laudan and Allen, crime will be reduced and verdict accuracy 
increased by lowering the standard of proof, eliminate defendants’ 
procedural protections, dismissing fewer cases and convicting more of the 
guilty at trial (which will result from a relaxed standard of proof and fewer 
procedural protections).  But empirical knowledge about the criminal justice 
system demonstrates that the fault probably lies in the failure to report and 
apprehend, and the (poor) quality of evidence in cases that came to the 
attention of prosecutors.  If evidence in the Chicago homicide cases was 
stronger, the prosecutor would likely have obtained more guilty pleas and 
brought more cases to trial.  The innocence/empirical perspective is that 
deficiencies in processing cases at all pretrial stages, not only at trial, 
generates false prosecutions and false convictions, and that these pretrial 
deficiencies also reduce the state’s ability to successfully prosecute serious 
crimes. 
So, Bushway’s Blackstone ratio rests not so much on the difficulty of 
proving their guilt at trial because the burden of proof is too high, but more 
on upstream problems allowing serious criminals to go uncaught and 
handing prosecutors weak cases that lead juries to acquit.107  The reasons for 
this are well known.  Aside from murder, which usually comes to the 
attention of police, many violent crimes are not reported.  Non-reporting 
might indicate distrust of the police based on mistreatment of minority 
populations; deportation of undocumented immigrants; fear that police 
might negligently injure or kill a witness;108 mental disability; or a sense of 
hopelessness generated by conditions of poverty and systemic deprivation of 
standard government services by law, custom, or the greater political 
influence of the affluent.109  Flaws in police and forensic investigation and 
the lack of defense investigation services compound the problem by not 
screening out innocent suspects.  It is likely that lowering the burden of proof 
without correcting current weaknesses in the upstream criminal justice 
process will deepen the sense of impunity or negligence among police and 
forensic investigators.110 
 
 
 
 107  To be clear, Bushway does not assert an anti-Blackstonian reason for his speculation.  
See generally Bushway, supra note 94.  
 108  See John Eligon, Vivian Yee & Matt Furber, In Minneapolis, Unusual Police Killing 
Raises an Old Outcry: Why?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/
22/us/minneapolis-police-shooting.html?ref=todayspaper  
 109  See Part IV.B.5, Murder, Race, and the State, infra.   
 110  This point is made by Forst, supra note 80, at 64.  I discuss this moral hazard in the 
critique of Laudan and Allen regarding the Blackstone ratio, infra Part III.B.3. 
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2. Forst on Reasonable Doubt. 
Brian Forst, in Chapter 6 of his book, examines standards of evidence 
in cases that go to trial, asking, “[w]hat precisely is meant by ‘poof beyond 
a reasonable doubt’?”111  Forst takes readers through hypothetical scenarios 
by “establishing relationships among three variables: the percentage of cases 
with true offenders, the conviction rate, and the percentage of defendants 
convicted who actually committed the crime.”112  In scenarios in which he 
holds the actually guilty and actually innocent rates constant while varying 
the conviction rate, Forst demonstrates that if a “super-judge” (my term) 
were to try to reduce the number of false convictions by decreasing the 
conviction rate, the number of falsely acquitted would increase sharply, 
producing “Blackstone ratios” of up to 101-to-1 (where the conviction rate 
is decreased to forty percent).  If, in his scenarios, the conviction rate were 
increased to eighty percent, the ratio would be one to one, or eight factually 
guilty acquitted and eight factually innocent convicted, a scenario that 
“violates” the Blackstone ratio but convicts far more guilty persons.  This 
exercise shows if one were to strictly apply the Blackstone ratio as if it were 
a law of nature, a very large number of guilty people must be freed in order 
to reduce the number of wrongfully convicted.  Forst’s abstract analysis of 
standards of proof is only one chapter in a larger and more empirically 
informed project to speculate about possible challenges to optimal justice. 
Given the mathematically reciprocal ratios in Frost’s scenarios, the 
presentation almost suggests an automatic or “hydraulic” effect of modifying 
the standard of proof.  Laudan and Allen engage in a similar exercise and 
seem almost to invest the quantitative relationships with agency.113  But 
Forst’s mathematical exercise in Chapter 6 must be read in the context of 
comments in Chapter 5, which comprehensively and normatively assess 
justice error costs.  He asks, for example, whether the ratio should apply 
equally in serious and trivial crime, implying that the ratio masks ethical 
questions.114  So for all of the numeric manipulation of the trial standard of 
evidence in Chapter 6, Forst makes it clear that the trial is only one venue 
for thinking about tradeoffs in the justice system, and that a system of 
optimal interventions against crime must consider the social costs of both 
crime (including pain and suffering) and the application of the justice system 
(monetary costs to society, deprivations to prisoners’ families, etc.), special 
evaluations for victimless crimes, and the like.  A rational frame for making 
 
 111  FORST, supra note 80, at 58.   
 112  FORST, supra note 80, at 58.   
 113  Infra Part III.B.1&3.   
 114  FORST, supra note 80, at 45 (“Blackstone’s dictum places an arbitrary lower bound on 
the tradeoff, leaving open the question, ‘How much better,?’ thus side-stepping an assessment 
of the respective social costs of each type of error.”) (emphasis in original).   
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cost/benefit estimates of justice might exist, but the data to make firm 
conclusions are not available, and the frame itself does “not eliminate the 
prospects for ideology to trump objectivity in the development of an error-
sensitive justice policy.”115 
Forst pulls back from going this far and, along with cordoning off his 
Blackstonian analysis in a separate chapter, applies data-analytic approaches 
to a variety of justice system issues.116  Each issue is analyzed in the context 
of contemporary criminological research and where possible uses available 
or hypothetical data relevant to that issue (rather than a global Blackstone 
ratio).  This is quite different from Laudan and Allen who seem to claim that 
every aspect of criminal investigation, prosecution and crime control can be 
manipulated by adjusting the conviction ratio.  Forst warns readers: “such 
information provides just a single piece of the large and complex puzzle of 
criminal justice policy.”117  So Forst’s Blackstonian study, like a musician’s 
finger exercises, provides a sense of how the Blackstone ratio would operate 
if it were like a natural law of hydraulics.  But his more wide-ranging book 
offers different and more specific analytic strategies that provide food for 
thought and potential guides for action.  He clearly knows too much about 
justice institutions to propose radical changes based on hypothetical analysis: 
“[t]he obvious problem with the numbers used in these scenarios is that we 
don’t know which set is nearest to the truth in any jurisdiction.”118  Also, like 
most criminologists, he identifies the source of error with system actors and 
not on the automatic operation of legal standards of proof.119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115  FORST, supra note 80, at 55.  
 116  The chapters in his book assess the sources of error of due process and impunity in 
regard to police investigation, prosecution policy, the jury, sentencing and corrections, and 
homicide.  He concludes with a chapter on the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.  See 
generally FORST, supra note 80.  
 117  FORST, supra note 80, at 65. 
 118  FORST, supra note 80, at 63. 
 119  FORST, supra note 80, at 62-63.  (“The percentage of those convicted who did not 
commit the crime will be based largely on police and prosecution practices, as well as the 
inclination of judges to protect the rights of the defendant and the willingness of juries to 
decide on verdicts of guilt. . . . The number of offenders freed per innocent defendant 
convicted and corresponding total error rate are likely to be affected also by the quality of 
defense counsel in the jurisdiction and the willingness of each side to engage in plea 
negotiations”).   
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III. OVERVIEW AND INTERNAL CRITIQUES OF EPPS, LAUDAN 
AND ALLEN, AND CASSELL 
A. Epps on Blackstone 
1. Overview 
Epps’s encyclopedic review of the Blackstone principle situates the 
principle as a regnant idea shaping the legal world’s views of procedural 
rules asymmetrically favoring the defendant.  Given his uphill battle against 
its entrenched position, he is justified in covering as many bases as 
possible.120  He ties the principle’s development to the amelioration of the 
death penalty and harsh trial procedures of eighteenth-century English 
criminal law, suggesting that the current justification for the principle is 
attenuated or no longer necessary.121  He then traces the traditional account, 
which prefers the cost of a wrongful acquittal to that of a wrongful 
conviction, and the utilitarian reaction against it going back to Bentham.122  
Epps follows this review with his original idea that the principle’s effects are 
not static but dynamic, and supports this claim with six analyses that suggest 
that the Blackstone principle might make a defendant worse off.123  This 
argument is grounded in a mix of theoretical and empirical observations; my 
critique, in Part III.A.2, will address only this part of Epps’s Article.  The 
gist of my criticism does not deny the dynamic effects of legal rules, but 
argues that Epps’s logical and theoretically supported points are, based on 
an empirical understanding of criminal justice, too small to significantly 
affect the justice system.124 
Epps follows his analysis of the dynamic Blackstone principle with 
“alternative justifications,” that raise, meet, challenge, and (in his estimation) 
vanquish a number of jurisprudential defenses of Blackstonianism, both 
 
 120  Epps, supra note 2, at 1072-77.  His overview includes a few glimmers of social 
reality: (i) Blackstone-Principle analysis may be limited where vast majority of convictions 
are obtained by guilty plea; (ii) he raises the “real-world” effect with a concern that terrorists 
may escape conviction (although he makes no reference either to the costs of crime victims 
or the wrongfully convicted); and (iii) he refers to two opinion polls. These stabs at social 
reality do not topple his largely theoretic exercise.  Id.   
 121  Epps, supra note 2, at 1077-87.  Above, I suggested a different approach to this 
historical understanding, namely that analyzing criminal justice only thorough adjudication 
procedures fails to account for the ways in which the contemporary criminal justice system is 
a product of the world since the 1820s.  See WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 27. 
 122  Epps, supra note 2, at 1087-92.  Laudan and Allen continue the Benthamite/utilitarian 
critique of the Blackstone principle.  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4.   
 123  Epps, supra note 2, at 1092-1124.   
 124  The temperature of a lit match is higher than the water temperature of the Atlantic 
Ocean, but tossing a lit match into the surf at Jones Beach has a minuscule effect on the 
Ocean’s mean temperature.  
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consequentialist and deontological.125  About these arguments I have nothing 
to say, aside from some incidental comment.  My critique is based on what I 
can bring to the table as a criminal justice scholar and not as a legal 
philosopher.  Whether my critique might cause an anti-Blackstonian to pause 
depends perhaps on whether one is convinced more by legal-theoretical 
analysis or by less elegant empirical considerations.126 
An engaging element of Epps’s article is his caution and openness to 
possible error.  He allows, despite his intellectual tour de force (which he 
assumes has undermined “complete and persuasive justification for the 
Blackstone principle”), that “[a] compelling argument for the Blackstone 
principle could well emerge.”127  He also addresses a number of reasons why 
his analysis might fall short, including plea-bargaining, unintended 
consequences, and limited knowledge of how the system produces error.128  
He refreshingly notes, “we can’t reach conclusions about how our system 
produces errors by looking solely to formal rules.”129 
Epps’s anti-Blackstonianism differs from Laudan and Allen’s in at least 
two ways.  First, he avoids the numerical Blackstone ratio and focuses on the 
Blackstone principle, while Laudan and Allen make assumption-based 
numerical calculations with crime statistics.  In keeping with his quantitative 
approach, Laudan approximately equates the harm of a wrongful conviction 
with the harm of a violent victimization and replaces the Blackstone ten to 
one ratio with his “metric [that] a false conviction (2.2 victims) is roughly 
twice as harmful as a false negative (1.2 victims).  That justifies that the state 
should make it harder to convict an innocent person than it is to acquit a 
guilty one.”130 
Second, Epps rejects the Blackstone principle entirely while Laudan 
“does not dispute the traditional and familiar claim that a typical false 
positive [i.e., wrongful conviction] is more harmful to society than a false 
negative.”131  The Blackstone principle is reflected in a number of procedural 
rules like proof beyond a reasonable doubt that create formal asymmetries in 
favor of the defendant.  Epps emphasizes that his Article is not aimed at 
attacking these rules; rather he “is critiquing an idea about how criminal 
punishment should be distributed, one that may not actually be consistent 
 
 125  Epps, supra note 2, at 1124-43. 
 126  FORST, supra note 80, at 159 takes a certain brand of theoreticians to task: “Many 
criminologists are justifiably skeptical of the economist’s rather narrow approach to analyzing 
crime, regarding it not so much incorrect as reductionist and incomplete.”  
 127  Epps, supra note 2, at 1142-43. 
 128  Epps, supra note 2, at 1143-48.  This section reads much like the obligatory section in 
social science journal articles, which specify the limits of the research.  
 129  Epps, supra note 2, at 1145. 
 130  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 80. 
 131  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 80.   
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with the way our system operates.”132  Epps rejects the Blackstone principle 
“as a theory of the proper distribution of punishment” for two reasons: (1) 
its benefits are “smaller than usually assumed” (and might make defendants 
worse off) and (2) it causes voters to be inclined toward harsh punishment 
and to feel less sympathy for defendants—labeled a “political-process 
failure,” that hurts defendants and society as a whole.133  My critique of Epps 
(which overlaps with those of Laudan and Allen and Cassell) is aimed at the 
six arguments he raises to support his dynamic interpretation.  To the degree 
that my analysis is based on empirical evidence and conjecture, it could be 
seen as orthogonal to Epps’s rational/theoretical approach. 
2. Internal Critique of Epps 
Epps’s rests his assertion that the Blackstone principle (BP) does not 
deliver benefits to defendants on his speculative thesis134 that the Blackstone 
principle is “dynamic” and that a system that includes the Blackstone 
principle will lessen benefits to defendants.  This thesis is not based on 
quantitative reasoning but upon six “imaginative comparison[s]” between 
two systems (a BP system and a non-BP system).135  On the whole I found 
Epps six “imaginative comparison[s]” less than compelling, and often 
tentatively phrased. 
i. Crime, Punishment, and Policing136 
The base argument in this section is that the BP, by making convictions 
harder to obtain, makes crime more prevalent than in a non-BP society.137  
This theory makes little sense from a criminological perspective, which links 
the prevalence of crime to a number of social, economic, political, cultural, 
situational, and psychological factors.  For example, one of the most debated 
topics in contemporary criminal justice policy is why serious crime dropped 
precipitously after 1990.138  Crime increased from 1965 to the 1980s, 
 
 132  Epps, supra note 2, at 1074 (emphasis in original).  Some asymmetries listed by Epps 
include, for example, reasonable doubt, jury unanimity, and no prosecution appeal of not 
guilty verdicts.  Id. at 1073.  Laudan takes on many of these asymmetries.  See LAUDAN, 
LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 110-37.  Epps claims that the Blackstone principle is given lip 
service but “surprisingly little rigorous analysis.”  Epps, supra note 2, at 1069.   
 133  Epps, supra note 2, at 1070, 1102-04.   
 134  Epps, supra note 2, at 1094 (admitting that his thesis involves a generous dose of 
speculation but claims that “is preferable to implicitly assuming that the Blackstone principle 
has no systemic consequences at all”).   
 135  Epps, supra note 2, at 1094. 
 136  Epps, supra note 2, at 1095-99.  
 137  Epps, supra note 2, at 1095-99.  The argument is also asserted, in different ways, by 
Laudan and Allen and Cassell, so my critique in this section applies generally to the other 
anti-Blackstonians.  See Cassell, supra note 5; Allen & Laudan, supra note 4.   
 138  Candidates include harsh sentences, improved policing, economic upturn, 
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fluctuated for a decade, and then dropped continuously throughout the 1990s 
and into the 2000s absent changes in the fundamental rules guiding 
adjudication practices.  Epps’s analysis includes a passel of arguments that 
mostly rest on abstract utilitarian or economic thinking and wanders off in a 
number of directions.  He discusses: the counter-argument that the BP 
decreases crime through increasing respect for and obedience to law;139 one 
public opinion poll showing that a majority of citizens disagree with the 
BP;140 public outrage at verdicts like the Casey Anthony acquittal;141 an 
assumption that increased crime caused by the Blackstone principle reduces 
accuracy in the criminal justice process;142 economic reasoning that the 
fewer people punished, the harsher the punishment;143 speculation about 
 
demographic changes, changes in illicit drug markets, legal abortion, and more.  See THE 
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, eds., 2000); FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007); JOHN E. CONKLIN, WHY CRIME 
RATES FELL (2003); Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Markets and Crime, in CRIME AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 183-209 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011).  A recently published study 
provides data and analysis to support the role played by local, community-based, nonprofit 
organizations in reducing serious crime since 1990.  See Patrick Sharkey et al., Community 
and the Crime Decline: The Causal Effect of Local Nonprofits on Violent Crime, AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. (2017).  
 139  Epps, supra note 2 at 1095-96; in discussing errors of impunity, Forst, supra note 80 
at 23, observes that “the credibility of deterrent effectiveness is lost, and citizens become 
increasingly inclined to perceive injustices to victims and alienation from the police and the 
courts, if not from government generally.”   
 140  Epps, supra note 2 (citing one opinion poll showing that 56% of respondent disagreed 
with the BP could simply be a makeweight argument).  Contrast Baumgartner et al.’s review 
of all the public opinion polls related to the death penalty in America from 1953 to 2005, 
showing that while public opinion on a topic as deeply rooted as capital punishment is inertial, 
it does respond to environmental factors the number of homicides and to the innocence frame. 
These factors led to a historic decline in support for the death penalty.  See FRANK R. 
BAUMGARTNER, SUZANNA L. DEBOEF, & AMBER E. BOYDSTUN, THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE 166-99 (2008).   
 141  False acquittals at trial do occur and notorious false negatives raise public ire, but 
along with other, perhaps less justified social ills, are absorbed by society.  The 1990s seems 
to have been a big false negative decade, or perhaps that perception is shaped by a number of 
notorious cases.  See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS’ 
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1996); POSTMORTEM: THE O. J. SIMPSON CASE—JUSTICE 
CONFRONTS RACE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LAWYERS, MONEY AND THE MEDIA (Jeffrey 
Abramson ed., 1996).  
 142  There may have been a link between the increase of serious crime from the 1960 to 
the 1980s, the metastatic expansion of punitiveness known as the war on drugs and mass 
incarceration that flooded the courts, and an increase of wrongful convictions.  See Hannah 
Laqueur et al., Wrongful Conviction, Policing, and the “Wars on Crime and Drugs,” in 
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 93-107 (Allison 
D. Redlich, et al., eds. 2014).  Laqueur et al. did not include the BP as a cause of the problem.  
Id.   
 143  This theory seems refuted by the lower imprisonment rates and shorter average 
sentences before 1970 and the increase in the prison rate and longer average sentences in the 
mass incarceration era.  I would think that any empirical examination of the issue would 
include surplus wealth available to the state, crime rate, and ideology to an equation.   
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whether police spending would increase in a BP world to compensate for the 
“heightened difficulty” of obtaining convictions; and doubts about whether 
increased policing would compensate for the alleged increase in crime cause 
by Blackstonianism.  Epps concludes the section with this: “The key point, 
however, is that unless the legitimacy thesis is right and the Blackstone 
principle is essential for deterrence, then letting more guilty people go free 
must result in some combination of increased crime, heightened punishment, 
and greater investment in policing.”144 
Even if proven, the asserted Blackstonian effect, while logical, would 
have a minuscule effect on crime, one that is, perhaps, too small to measure.  
Epps’s speculation rests on a premise that what occurs in the conviction of 
criminal cases already in the adjudication stage will directly impact crime 
rates.  This must be the case because Epps insists that his reasoning applies 
only to errors “that are endogenous to the rules governing criminal 
adjudicationFalse  Expanding the lens to include all of the justice system’s 
failures to correctly identify wrongdoers would implicate a much broader set 
of normative tradeoffs — such as how much society should invest in policing 
as opposed to other social goals — that needlessly complicate the inquiry.”145  
However, Epps does not limit effects to those caused by the false positives 
and false negatives among the five percent of cases that go to trial, but, like 
Laudan, includes cases dismissed by prosecutors based on limits of proof, 
thus expanding the impact of the BP on crime rates.146 
By bringing prosecutorial dismissals into his qualitative analysis, Epps 
must be assuming that he can precisely measure the reasons for why 
prosecutors dismiss cases.  But the truth is that data on prosecutorial 
dismissals are severely limited.  John Pfaff, perhaps exaggeratedly claims 
“we have almost no information whatsoever on what prosecutors do or how 
(or why) they do it.”147  Some data, gathered by legal scholars and 
criminologists do exist, but it reveals general patterns not sufficiently refined 
to answer the kinds of questions relevant to the anti-Blackstonians’ concerns 
of separating the guilty from the innocent.  Miller and Wright, for example, 
mined a decade’s worth of data on reasons for prosecutorial dismissals in 
 
 144  Epps, supra note 2, at 1099.  
 145  Epps, supra note 2, at 1076, at n. 39.  Of course, looking at upstream causes of error 
is a major concern of the innocence movement.   
 146  Epps, supra note 2, at 1076, n. 39 (“[I]t also includes dispositions short of actual trial, 
such as a prosecutor’s decision to drop charges upon determining that she could not prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; such an outcome is the product of the rules that govern trials 
even if no trial occurs.”).   
 147  JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW 
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 17 (2017).  Pfaff uncovered data about gross charging statistics.  
Id. at 71-72.  However, data is unavailable “about how prosecutors . . . determine who they 
will charge and how they will charge them.”  Id. at 42.  
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
2018] THE ANTI-BLACKSTONIANS 1349 
New Orleans (before that data collection was terminated), and concluded that 
the regularity of those decisions demonstrates that discretion is exercised in 
ways that “reveal[s] an internal legal order at work.”148  While it is reassuring 
that prosecutors do not exercise discretion in lawless or entirely arbitrary 
ways, the gross categories of reasons given do not answer whether cases 
were dismissed because of actual innocence.  Criminological studies of 
prosecutorial discretion have been criticized as “dated, restricted to small 
samples, and focused on limited offense types in specific jurisdictions.”149  
Nevertheless, those studies, like the Miller and Wright data, show reasonable 
general patterns and professionalism in decision-making.  A large-sample 
federal charge reduction study under mandatory guidelines, for example, 
found no evidence of racially biased decisions.150  The bulk of criminological 
research shows that prosecutorial discretion is motivated primarily by 
evidence strength and crime seriousness.151  Yet, according to Forst, the data 
are not sufficiently refined to dispel the hypothesis that many decisions are 
subjective.152  Reflecting on the termination of a systemic data gathering 
program, Forst comments that “it is really remarkable that we have less 
useful information now about the routine prosecution of felony cases than 
we did 30 years ago.”153 
Not knowing, with specificity, what goes on in the opaque world of 
prosecutorial charging and dismissals weakens Epps’s speculation.  Even 
with available studies we might speculate that thoughtful prosecutors in the 
charging process, alert to an array of justice concerns, may be conducting a 
kind of Khadi justice and dismissing cases based on complex, perhaps 
somewhat personalistic, notions of right and wrong but guided by more or 
less reasonable factors.  Or, in the alternative, policies may vary from one 
county to another without much rationale except for the elected prosecutor’s 
predilections.154  In any event, it is hard to know how a sudden drop in the 
 
 148  Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 130 (2008).  
The reasons for recording dismissals by assistant prosecutors was for internal review; 
although the practice was discontinued when a new prosecutor came into office there is no 
reason to believe that the general pattern of dismissal reasons would be dramatically different 
under a different prosecutor.   
 149  Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 
394, 396 (2010).   
 150  Shermer & Johnson, supra note 149.   
 151  Brian Forst, Prosecution, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 437-66, 446 (James Q. Wilson 
& Joan Petersilia, eds., 2011).   
 152  Forst, Prosecution, supra note 151, at 447. 
 153  Forst, Prosecution, supra note 151, at 439 (emphasis in original); see Shermer & 
Johnson, supra note 149, at 396 n. 1 (Prosecutor’s Management Information System 
[PROMIS] terminated in 1992).   
 154  Recent data from the new web-based county-level justice information system, 
Measures for Justice (MFJ), allows us to peer into justice processes as never before.  On 
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standard of proof would affect prosecutors’ decisions related to their 
assessment of the factual guilt of defendants.  Perhaps most prosecutors 
would seek to increase the number of convictions but others might not. 
Epps’s “imaginative comparisons” operate under a presumably 
unchanged or contemporary criminal justice system and Laudan and Allen 
seem to think that a lowered burden of proof would simply be passed by 
rational legislators convinced by rationalistic argument.  But consider a 
political scenario that might have to exist to cause state legislatures to enact 
evidence statutes that replace beyond a reasonable doubt with clear and 
convincing evidence.  Such a radical departure would most likely be part of 
an extreme right-wing or alt-right political advance that would make the Tea 
Party appear middle of the road and, like the attempt of the Polish 
government in 2017, would make courts subservient to the government.155  
One could then imagine intense polarization over the issue, with staunch 
ACLU opposition, a possible red-state-blue-state divide, and some 
prosecutors in clear and convincing jurisdictions, having an attachment to 
older ideals, holding to beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prosecutorial charging 
standards.  Although passage of such a law might strike some as bizarre, 
adherence to the traditional rule of law ideas, at least in criminal cases, 
should not be assumed.156 
 
August 28, 2017, data for “Cases Not Prosecuted” in Florida indicate very different dismissal 
rates for two adjacent counties in the Florida panhandle: Liberty County (8.45%) and Calhoun 
County (26.39%), and two large adjacent counties on the Atlantic coast: Broward County 
(15.2%) and Palm Beach County (31.35%).  Why these differences exist in adjacent counties 
in anybody’s guess, but Measures for Justice should be thought of as the equivalent of van 
Leeuenhoek’s microscope for America’s justice system – we are beginning to see things about 
the justice system never before clearly seen, even if their existence was sensed.  
            The need for expert knowledge and caution when assessing the sources of criminal 
justice data is provided by an exchange with MFJ. State Attorney Offices in Florida are 
organized by Judicial Circuit, some of which have jurisdiction over multiple counties. Thus, 
although Liberty and Calhoun Counties belong to different judicial circuits, there are high 
variations of declination rates between some counties within the same Judicial Circuit/State 
Attorney Office (email communication with Gipsy Escobar, MFJ, Feb. 2, 2018, on file with 
author).  The wide variations in rates of prosecutorial declination that may exist within a 
prosecutor’s office, suggest that scholars apply extreme caution when making statements 
about prosecutorial decision-making. 
 155  Any government that wants its trials to come out in a preordained way is better off 
handpicking safe judges.  See Rick Lyman, In Poland, an Assault on the Courts Provokes 
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/world/europ
e/poland-courts-law-and-justice-party.html?ref=todayspaper.  The attempt to control the 
courts led to massive opposition, with the government backing off.  Rick Lyman & Joanna 
Berendt, Poland’s Court Crisis Cools Off, but It’s Far From Over, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/europe/poland-court-protests-andrzej-du
da.html; Marc Santora and Joanna Berendt, Poland Overhauls Courts, and Critics See Retreat 
From Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world
/europe/eu-poland-law.html  
 156  Tom Delay, who rose to the position of House Majority Leader, holds the radically 
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In today’s America, a historically and comparatively unprecedented 
number of people are under penal control not because of the BP or a rational 
response to serious crime but because of two generations of irrational fear of 
drugs and a politicized and racialized justice policy.157  Contra the purely 
rational idea of more policing reducing serious crime, the historic pattern 
shows police treating black-on-black crime and homicide with impunity, 
thus not deterring or incapacitating serious criminals, while a neoliberal 
polity simultaneously avoids addressing criminogenic and correctible social, 
economic, and health needs of minority and poor communities.158  In any 
event, the number and deployment of police is determined by a range of 
practical, political, and budgetary influences and the impact of police alone 
on crime levels is subject to debate.159  Penalization may increase crime 
under some conditions.160  The length of prison terms might, for example, 
result from an increase in the number of full time rural prosecutors and low 
visibility prosecutorial decisions driven by organizational incentives.161  
These multiple factors are orthogonal to the BP. 
 
 
populist view that court decisions should be subservient to legislation, although he applies 
that view only to right-wing issues.  Bill Hoffman, Tom DeLay: Trump Should Buck Courts 
on Immigration, NEWSMAX (June 29, 2017), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsmax-Tv/Tom-
DeLay-immigration-SCOTUS-courts/2017/06/29/id/799026/ (“‘People need to re-read 
Article III of the Constitution. The opinions by the courts are only opinions, the rulings by the 
court are only opinions, but they’re not enforced by the executive branch or the legislative 
branch,’ DeLay said.”).  It is also the case, however, that some conservative benefactors, most 
notably the Koch brothers, have supported traditional defense protections in the law in part to 
better defend against criminal prosecutions for environmental law violations.  See Molly Ball, 
Do the Koch Brothers Really Care About Criminal-Justice Reform?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar 3, 
2015) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/do-the-koch-brothers-really-car
e-about-criminal-justice-reform/386615/.   
 157  See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed., 2012); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: 
HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE 
OF FEAR (2007); David A. Boyum, Jonathan P. Caulkins & Mark A. R. Kleiman, Drugs, 
Crime, and Public Policy, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 368-410 (James Q. Wilson & Joan 
Petersilia, eds., 2011).  On the range of theoretical orientations that can explain variations in 
crime control policies, see Peter B. Kraska, Criminal Justice Theory: Toward Legitimacy and 
an Infrastructure, 23 JUST. Q. 167 (2006). 
 158  See JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015); LISA L. 
MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL 
(2008); NICK REDING, METHLAND: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AN AMERICAN SMALL TOWN 
(2010).  See infra Part IV.   
 159  See, e.g., Gary Kleck & J. C. Barnes, Do More Police Lead to More Crime 
Deterrence? 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 716 (2014) (finding no relationship found between officers 
per capita and perceptions of risk of arrest).   
 160  TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007).   
 161  PFAFF, supra note 147.   
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Empirical analysis of crime and criminal justice grounded in 
observation and data analysis does not have the elegance of economic 
modeling, so my listing of a few recent, prominent works on criminal justice 
policy may not carry weight with law and economics adepts, even as 
conservative politicians and interests selectively step away from their earlier 
harsh crime policies.162  I place these sources on the table to support my 
position that Epps’s crime analysis seems thin and unconvincing.163 
ii. Social Meaning164 
Epps’s next point is that the stigma of criminal convictions is not as 
great as it should be in a BP society because people harbor doubts about the 
accuracy of guilty verdicts.  Evidence for this includes the chance of holding 
an acquitted person liable for intentional torts and the difficulty of clearing 
the name of acquitted defendants.  The evidence is weak and indirect.  Epps 
asserts that in a non-BP world, acquittals will be more closely aligned with 
actual innocence.  This reasoning parallels Margaret Raymond’s concern 
that growing knowledge of actual innocence will lead juries to demand proof 
greater than reasonable doubt to acquit; except for the special case of the 
decline of death sentences, this fear has not materialized.165  Epps’s social 
meaning argument is based on abstract reasoning and indirect evidence at 
best.  It seems a recklessly thin ground as a basis for dumping procedural 
rights. 
iii. Voter Attitudes166 
Most voters are not very likely to become defendants; they identify with 
victims, not criminal defendants.  In the abstract logic employed by Epps the 
BP should make average voters more inclined toward harsh punishment and 
feel less sympathetic toward defendants.  Criminologists, sociologists, 
political scientists and legal scholars have given the fear of crime a good deal 
of thought and the influence of the burden of proof or the BP has never 
entered into their calculations.167  James Q. Whitman’s comparative social 
history of punishment explored the deep cultural roots of penal harshness in 
 
 162  HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION ERA POLITICS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2015); DAVID DAGAN & STEVEN M. TELES, 
PRISON BREAK: WHY CONSERVATIVES TURNED AGAINST MASS INCARCERATION (2016).   
 163  This approach is expanded in Part IV, infra. 
 164  Epps, supra note 2, at 1099-1102 
 165  Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 449-64 
(2001); see BAUMGARTNER et al., supra note 140; Medwed, Innocentrism, supra note 25.   
 166  Epps, supra note 2, at 1102-06. 
 167  See, e.g., Brian R. Wyant, Multilevel Impacts of Perceived Incivilities and Perceptions 
of Crime Risk on Fear of Crime: Isolating Endogenous Impacts, 45 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 
39 (2008) (finding perceived incivility positively correlated with fear of crime).  
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the United States, and his comparison of the United States (a harsh “BP 
nation”) with France and Germany (mild inquisitorial systems) might offer 
some facile support for Epps, although his historical evidence does not rest 
on different modes of proof in the different systems.168  Other socio-legal 
scholarship offers macro-economic and political explanations for the rise in 
punitiveness after the 1970s.169  An empirical/statistical study demonstrated 
President Clinton’s use of the levers of presidential discourse to run up the 
fear of crime in opinion polls, at a time when crime was dropping, in order 
to mitigate the political defeat of his failed attempt to revamp the American 
health care system, thus paving the way for the 1994 Violent Crime Control 
Act.170  None of these shifts in public opinion or crime rates had anything to 
do with the BP, which presumably remained constant.  Whatever the 
underlying attitudes to crime, with the decline in crime rates, the substantial 
monetary and social costs of crime control have led to a significant 
conservative turn-around on justice issues, with contemporary conservative 
crime rhetoric expressing sympathy for stereotypical first-time, low-level 
drug offenders, although not for stereotypical predators.171  In light of this 
and much more empirical research on the politics of crime and crime control, 
the abstract reasoning employed by Epps, unsupported by empirical 
research, is weak at best. 
iv. Law Enforcement Behavior.172 
“The Blackstone principle could also influence the behavior of law 
enforcement actors.”173  So could many other factors, but this idea is missing 
in contemporary studies of police behavior.  His following argument is 
specious: “the Blackstone principle could lead actors within the system to 
feel less responsibility for preventing false convictions because those actors 
will know that the procedural system is already designed to guard against 
such outcomes.”174  Even if police dwelled on the Blackstone principle —
which I doubt, given the staggering fragmentation of American law 
enforcement into about 17,000 agencies, the wide discretion allowed to line 
 
 168  JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).  His argument provides evidence that 
challenges a popular criminological theory that attributes increasing punitiveness to penal 
modernism.  See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).  
 169  SIMON, supra note 157.   
 170  OLIVER, supra note 50.  
 171  AVIRAM, supra note 162; DAGAN & TELES, supra note 162.  See also RIGHT ON CRIME, 
http://rightoncrime.com/ (last visited May 14, 2018).   
 172  Epps, supra note 2, at 1106-08. 
 173  Epps, supra note 2, at 1106 (emphasis added). 
 174  Epps, supra note 2, at 1106. 
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officers, the limited professional training required, and substantial 
differences in role orientations and even ideologies of policing among 
officers in the same agencies—such a broad statement cannot hold up 
without some empirical research support.  The same is true for prosecutors’ 
offices and individual prosecutors.175  The innocence literature is replete with 
stories of misconduct by callous cops and indifferent prosecutors leading to 
wrongful convictions.  There are also many instances of conscience-stricken 
and conscientious law enforcement officers who go on missions to exonerate 
the innocent.  Facile abstract assumptions based on assertions rather than 
empirical evidence, and a principle that in many ways may have very little 
grip in actual justice system practice outside the courtroom,176 are 
makeweight arguments at best. 
v. Legislative Behavior.177 
Epps argues that legislators will broaden criminal statutes to help 
obviate the benefits of procedural safeguards in a BP world, based on a 
hypothetical put forward by William J. Stuntz.178  Is the obverse true?  Does 
lowering the standard of proof and eliminating procedural protections mean 
that legislatures will pass mild criminal laws?  I speculated that any political 
movement powerful enough to reverse the Blackstone principle would likely 
be a right-wing authoritarian movement, favoring severe crime legislation.179  
The shift among conservative politicians toward milder punishment since 
about 2012 has been a rational response to the costs of mass incarceration, 
but the pushback by Attorney General Sessions appears to be driven by 
ideology and political calculation.  None of this has anything to do with the 
BP.  Strong opinion exists among a large number of Americans to once again 
criminalize medical abortions, use criminal law to stigmatize LGBT folks, 
and the like.  I cannot believe that this opinion would be deterred by lowering 
the burden of proof.  In addition, if American states were to begin to emulate 
the penal mildness of western European democracies, my speculation is that 
 
 175  I recently attended a meeting of the Criminal Law Section of the Michigan State Bar 
on the topic of conviction integrity and heard a number of young assistant prosecutors making 
statements that would be hard to differentiate from opinions of defense lawyers.  My biases 
are probably influencing my perception, but for a study of justice system actors related to 
wrongful conviction that produced more stereotypical results, see Brad Smith, Marvin 
Zalman, and Angie Kiger, How Justice System Officials View Wrongful Convictions, 57 
CRIME & DELINQ. 663 (2009) (finding defense lawyers significantly more favorable to 
innocence reforms than police or prosecutors in Michigan).  The prosecutorial respondents 
were presumably the county chief prosecutors.   
 176  I address this in Part III, infra.  
 177  Epps, supra note 2, at 1108. 
 178  Epps, supra note 2, at 1108 (quoting William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519 (2001)).   
 179  See text and note at footnote 155 supra.   
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such changes would have nothing to do with changes in burdens of proof.  
As for legislatures’ willingness to trash constitutional rights to support 
reelection, Justice O’Connor had enough political experience to dissent from 
extending the Fourth Amendment good faith reliance doctrine from search 
warrants to legislation.180  As a high-ranking legislator, she knew that many 
state legislators, faced with re-election where a “weak-on-crime” stance 
would expose them to defeat, would vote for blatantly unconstitutional laws 
in a heartbeat, expecting the courts to fix the problem later.  This depended 
on a political context in which being “tough-on-crime” was essential for re-
election.  In light of this political and social reality, Epps’s argument that 
legislatures pass harsher criminal legislation because of the BP is thin and 
abstract. 
vi. Procedural Subversion.181 
“A final potential effect flowing from a system’s formal commitment 
to the Blackstone principle is outright subversion by judges, prosecutors, and 
the other actors who run the system.”182  Epps draws on John Langbein’s 
exemplary scholarship linking the use of judicial torture in medieval 
continental courts to their burden of proof to argue that contemporary 
standards of proof generate unfair plea bargaining.183  Epps is correct but 
understates medieval Europe’s law of proof as “overly demanding”; it was 
more—it was an absolute requirement of perfect proof even for covert 
crimes: two eye-witnesses (which has Biblical roots)184 or a confession that 
made convictions in serious cases nearly impossible without resorting to 
torture.185  Langbein compared the rigidity of the continental system to the 
common law’s “torture-free” law of proof, with verdicts rendered not by 
professional judges but by lay juries.  “The jury standard of proof gave 
England no cause to torture.”186  Thus, Langbein’s research is justification 
 
 180  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 361-69 (1987).  
 181  Epps, supra note 2, at 1108-09.  Epps drops his tentative approach and asserts  “[l]ike 
police and prosecutors, legislators will also behave differently in a world with the Blackstone 
principle”  Epps, supra note 2, at 1108 (emphasis added).   
 182  Epps supra note 2, at 1108. 
 183  JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE 
ANCIEN RÉGIME (1977). 
 184  DEUT. 19:15, ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 1100 (2001).  
 185 In addition, the theological roots of continental procedure, and the fears of professional 
judges, who may have taken holy orders, of eternal damnation, is a further reason for why 
torture was used on the continent and was not a feature of English common law trials where 
decisions were made by a group of laymen who gave no reasons for their verdict.  See JAMES 
Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL 
TRIAL (2008) [hereinafter WHITMAN, ORIGINS].  
 186  LANGBEIN, supra note 183, at 78.  When judicial torture was applied under Henry VIII 
and under Elizabeth, it was applied in a warrant procedure occasioned by state trials of alleged 
enemies of the crown by the Privy Council, and not in ordinary criminal trials.  Id. at 81-128.  
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for proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a workable standard. 
Langbein is not the only scholar to link the contemporary pressures on 
defendants in plea-bargaining to the torture regime.187  Epps admits that 
“[w]hile rules justified by the Blackstone principle are not the only force 
making trials costly, they certainly contribute to those costs and thus could 
contribute to this phenomenon.”  Whatever pressure to plead guilty may be 
exerted by reasonable doubt, far greater weight is accorded to the rise of 
caseloads and a bureaucratic justice system and the ratcheting up of harsh 
penalties.188  Epps does not draw on plea-bargaining scholarship to 
substantiate his abstract, theoretical point.  Again, the evidence for a dynamic 
effect of the plea-bargaining is thin to the point of vanishing. 
In short, all of Epps’s reasons for claiming a “dynamic” effect of the 
BP are based on thin evidence and theoretical reasoning that is abstracted 
from empirical analyses that describe the way that police, prosecutors, courts 
and other justice personnel and institutions operate.  I find his rationale for a 
dynamic effect unconvincing.189  Anti-Blackstonians may take heart from 
Epps’s lengthy assessment of the positives and negatives of the Blackstone 
principle,190and alternative justifications,191 but I think that his 
jurisprudential analyses must make better sense in social practice. 
B. Laudan and Allen on Blackstone 
I address two major related themes and arguments in Laudan and 
Allen’s works: (i) that the Blackstone ratio works injustice by allowing too 
many false acquittals, and (ii) that the effects of the Blackstone ratio 
increases violent crime, suggesting that violent crime can be reduced by 
convicting a larger number of defendants and sentencing them to longer 
terms.  I have already responded in part to their anti-Blackstonian thesis in 
my review of Forst’s “Blackstonian” analysis192 and in my argument against 
Epps.193  I do not address the empirical and numeric calculations in Laudan’s 
 
“[T]he systematic use of torture to investigate crime never established itself in English 
criminal procedure” Id. at 73.   
 187  See Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting 
Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1009 (2011).  
 188  See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 205-30 (2003) (discussing the balance of power between 
prosecutors and judges mediated by sentencing structures accounts for much of the 
prosecutor’s power in plea bargaining); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, 
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014) http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-
innocent-people-plead-guilty/. (commenting on draconian penalties).   
 189  Epps, supra note 2, at 1121-24. 
 190  Epps, supra note 2, at 1110-21.  
 191  Epps, supra note 2, at 1124-43. 
 192  Infra Part II.C.   
 193  Infra Part III.A.   
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symposium paper and book that leads him to assert that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt should be replaced by clear and convincing evidence for 
repeat offenders or any legal issues arising from that conclusion, except 
insofar as it relates Laudan and Allen’s crime reduction theory.194  I also do 
not directly address his challenge to many procedural protections including 
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.195  Nor will I 
comment on Laudan’s proposals regarding bail, sentences, probation, and 
parole.196 
1. Laudan and Allen’s Blackstonian Analysis 
Their first argument—that the Blackstone ratio (or a ratio variation or 
at least the Blackstone principle) causes too many false acquittals—is traced 
in Allen and Laudan and The Law’s Flaws.197  They begin by stating the 
Blackstonian view that only by “strict adherence to this principle” “keep[ing] 
the error-ratio of false acquittals to false convictions. . .very high. . . can we 
protect the principle that false convictions are much more egregious than 
false acquittals.”198  Mathematical manipulation of various Blackstone ratios 
show that driving down false conviction levels drives up false acquittal 
levels, and, based on a formula and attendant proof, a possible false 
conviction rate and overall conviction rate produces rates of false acquittals 
far above the ten to one Blackstone ratio.199  Next, Blackstonians hold “that 
the false conviction rate (understood as the proportion of the convicted who 
are innocent) must be minimized as much as possible.”200  But Blackstonians 
fail to account for the apparent reciprocal effects of the ratio that determines 
the false conviction rate as a product of the number of trials by the conviction 
rate by the false conviction rate.201  If Blackstonians did, they would see that 
 
 194  For a critique, see Koppl, supra note 1.   
 195  For a critique, see Findley, supra note 1.  
 196  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 110-72.   
 197  My analysis of their core argument cuts through or ignores other issues including their 
critical analysis of the rate of wrongful convictions in Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, 
especially their review of Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 26.  The interweaving of 
arguments about wrongful conviction rates and the Blackstone ratio made their points about 
the Blackstone ratio hard to disentangle and follow.  Similarly, Risinger’s reply, Tragic, supra 
note 10, at 991-97, also addresses issues related to the incidence of wrongful convictions.   
 198  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 75.   
 199  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 75-77, 90-92.  Their calculations are similar to those 
conducted by FORST, supra note 80, at 57-65; see Part II.C.2, supra.  
 200  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 77.  This assumes that Blackstone took the ratio 
seriously, as Bushway asserted, rather than using the number as a way to emphasize the 
Blackstone principle.  If his starting premise is wrong, then the analytic edifice built by 
Laudan and Allen collapses.  This is a major premise of my critique and will be reiterated 
infra.   
 201  The product is stated in formulaic terms in Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 78; the 
characterization of their position is my own and forms a basis of my internal critique. It is not 
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“[w]ithout accounting for the frequency of convictions and the frequency of 
trials, we can infer nothing from the false conviction rate regarding whether 
we are convicting too many of the innocent.”202 
Allen and Laudan then assert, “neither the Blackstone ratio nor the false 
conviction rate approach seems to be a promising vehicle for protecting the 
innocent from false conviction[.]”203  I am not sure I understand why this is 
so.  Nevertheless, they propose to “step[] back to look at the larger context” 
because “[w]hat matters is how many innocent persons in the general 
population are falsely convicted—the risk that an ordinary citizen has of 
being falsely convicted of a serious crime.”204  Notice that this shifts the 
focus from measuring errors in trials (where the error rate might be small but 
worrisome, say from three to five percent) to dividing those errors by the 
total population (where the error rate becomes infinitesimal).  I pause to 
insert a critical comment.  The innocence movement focuses on justice 
system problems and seeks to correct them.  Trial processes that fail to screen 
out erroneous prosecutions constitute a worrisome problem.  Making trials 
more accurate should reduce the number of wrongful convictions and 
perhaps factually erroneous acquittals as well.  Innocence reforms are not 
aimed at reducing the crime rate or ameliorating society beyond reducing 
wrongful convictions.205  Allen and Laudan’s shift makes the problem of 
wrongful convictions (at trial) a small one when the number is compared to 
the issue of crime in society, because far more serious crimes than wrongful 
convictions exist.  Yet, I assume they take this path because they believe and 
assert that by convicting more defendants at trial (and having prosecutors 
dismiss fewer) violent crime will be substantially reduced.206  Because I 
believe that Allen and Laudan’s crime-reduction thesis is wrong, I see their 
shift from a trial-error rate to a societal-error rate as meretricious. 
 
 
clear to me if Laudan and Allen view the effects of the Blackstone ratio, or perhaps the 
Blackstone principle, as determinate in the manner of the effects of laws of physics or 
chemistry.  Some language seems to imply this and other language does not.  
 202  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 78. 
 203  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 78. 
 204  Id.  (emphasis added).  I found some of the language used on this page cloudy, making 
it difficult to extract the gist of their points.  For example, their reference to “causal 
surrogates” left me puzzled, and “stepping back to look at the larger context” seemed like 
advertising language.  I present a broader context herein that I believe is relevant. 
 205  We might hope that by confronting system officials with evidence-based approaches, 
innocence reforms will make the system’s culture more transparent, but that is not a necessary 
part of the innocence program.  For justice system resistance to change, see DAVID HARRIS, 
FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE (2012).   
 206  But see Epps, supra note 2, at 1128.  Epps seems to say that extending an anti-
Blackstonian argument to a crime prevention rationale is mistaken: “The Blackstone principle 
can prevent only those harms that are caused by the adjudicative system itself.”  Id.   
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Next, in theory, an acceptable Blackstone ratio can be achieved by 
having very few trials and leaving criminals to run amok, but this is not 
acceptable to society.207  Thus, false convictions can be reduced by “either 
decreas[ing] the rate of convictions per trial, decreas[ing] the false 
conviction rate, or both.”208  This can be done by making it more difficult to 
convict guilty people.209  Thus, a “deadly dilemma” arises because “[e]very 
failure to convict the guilty means additional crimes undeterred and bad guys 
who, when left to their own devices, will almost certainly commit additional 
crimes.”210 
Why did Allen and Laudan switch focus from the trial-false-conviction-
error rate to a societal-false-conviction-error rate?  They assert, “[t]he social 
contract obliges the state to minimize the aggregate cost innocent citizens 
face, which consists of exposure to false conviction as well as criminal 
victimization.”211  This formulation of the social contract, in my words, 
requires that total costs of becoming a crime victim or a wrongful conviction 
victim be minimized.  Allen and Laudan state these goals as resulting from 
trials: “[t]his thesis implies that the standard of proof and other rules of trial 
should be set at that point where the total cost of being victimized or falsely 
convicted is minimized.”212  They then calculate the risk of being the victim 
of a serious crime in the United States as “significantly more than 300 times 
greater than the lifetime risk of being falsely convicted of a serious crime.”213 
I do not dispute that the overall risk of becoming a crime victim is much 
higher than being wrongfully convicted.  It might be off by a bit, as Risinger 
noted in his response to Allen and Laudan, but any informed understanding 
of the way that crimes are reported and responded to would see this as 
 
 207  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 78.  I believe the proper name for this argument is 
“straw man” or “red herring,” but that depends on the degree to which one takes the 
Blackstone ratio seriously.  Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 999, made this point.  
 208  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79. 
 209  This can be done by “[r]aising the standard of proof or “making the rules of evidence 
more acquittal-prone[.]”  Id. at 79.  The “upstream” corrections to police and forensic science 
investigation methods, which are central to the innocence movement, seem to have no place 
in this argument, although Laudan injects a loophole into his argument.  See discussion infra 
at notes 252-253.   
 210  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79. Strictly speaking, this sentence encapsulates the 
second Laudan argument, which is elaborated in The Law’s Flaws and which I address 
separately. 
 211  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79.  This is unobjectionable, as far as it goes, but its 
seeming limit (i.e., the social contract consists in nothing other than this) can create real 
problems.  In this Article, I avoid the intricacies of Laudan and Allen’s reliance on Laplace 
for their social contract discussion. Risinger responded to this matter, Tragic, supra note 10, 
at 1004-14. 
 212  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79 (emphasis added). 
 213  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79–80. 
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roughly correct.214  As noted, Bushway came up with a similarly large 
ratio.215  My critique does not challenge this imbalance as such (which is 
probably empirically correct) but challenges its source and the policy 
conclusions drawn by Allen and Laudan.  In brief, Laudan and Allen say that 
this imbalance results from trial rules that produce too many acquittals and 
prosecutors who dismiss too many cases.  Some errors of impunity have to 
result from this, but the larger impunity results from crimes not detected or 
reported, or as I will show in Part IV, by the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion that devalues certain kinds of convictions.216 
To expand on my comments regarding Bushway’s Blackstone ratio 
calculations,217 the main reasons for the impunity of so many unconvicted 
offenders walking free have little to do with false acquittals at trial.  The 
problems of non-reporting and flawed investigations are major reasons why 
serious crimes go unpunished.218  Laudan provides data on the criminal 
justice process or “funnel” that is familiar to every criminologist/criminal 
justice scholar.219  There were 1.7 million victims of completed violent 
crimes in 2008; of these 790,000 were reported to police.  Thus, Laudan 
really has nothing to say about 910,000 victims who were too afraid, 
confused, or nonplussed to report these crimes.220  These are police 
problems, and however effective are the courts, they will not be able to bring 
justice to those victims.  Of the 790,000 victimizations reported to police, 
542,000 suspects were arrested and charged, leaving a quarter of a million 
 
 214  Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 1016–17.   
 215  Supra Part.II.B.1.  So did Forst: he noted that 9 million felonies reported to police each 
year do not end in conviction and assumes a 1 percent erroneous conviction rate (10,000 
defendants), creating a ratio of 900 to 1, FORST, supra note 80, at 45, n. 2.   
 216  Infra Part IV.B.1.   
 217  Supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.   
 218  Concern with unreported crime goes back many decades.  See Wesley G. Skogan, 
Dimensions of the Dark Figure of Unreported Crime, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 41 (1977).  The 
research has continued.  See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, The Relationship between Crime 
Reporting and Police: Implications for the Use of Uniform Crime Reports, 14 J. QUANT. 
CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1998).   
 219  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 48; Different Strokes, supra note 3. 
 220  Laudan, Different Strokes,supra note 3, at 13. Perhaps Laudan and Allen believe that 
increasing the number of convictions will cut into the number of unreported felonies, but this 
is speculative.  The figure is derived from national victimization surveys, which are the best 
crime data we have, but still is an estimate of the reality of crime and victimization.  On the 
penultimate page of LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 177, Laudan does assert that the 
demands of the social contract requires that “citizens” report more violent crimes that occur 
and the police need to arrest a higher proportion of reported crimes.  However, he says nothing 
about the social reality of these complex matters.  For example, crime reporting depends on 
whether “citizens” trust the police.  I assume that Laudan used “citizen” innocently to mean 
“civilian,” but undocumented aliens may not report serious crime or fear of being deported.  
See Marjorie S. Zatz & Hilary Smith, Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and 
Reality, 8 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 141 (2012). 
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victims (248,000) without justice.  Of the 542,000 violent victimizations 
reported, 179,000 had charges dropped by prosecutors, 333,000 pleaded 
guilty,221 30,000 were convicted at trial, and 15,000 were tried and acquitted.  
When Laudan assess the number of false negatives he looks to the 15,000 
who were tried and acquitted and the 179,000 whose charges were dropped 
by prosecutors.222 
The next important step in Laudan’s program is to assess the possible 
number of factually guilty people among the 15,000 who are acquitted at trial 
and among prosecutors’ dismissals.  A trial exoneration means “legal 
innocence” and to Laudan is “vastly different from factual innocence.”223  
Citing several studies estimating the incidence of wrongful convictions, he 
adopts three percent as an approximate wrongful conviction figure, a number 
that “will loom very large in [his] arguments . . .since that percentage is the 
lynchpin for numerous interesting inferences.”224  He also argues that the 
false positive rate for convictions obtained by plea-bargaining may be much 
lower.225  He then attempts to measure false negatives.  “Conventional 
wisdom has it that most defendants acquitted at trial are probably factually 
guilty.”226  Laudan plays with estimates and suggests that an “apparent guilt” 
range “from about 70% to 90%” of those acquitted is reasonable, suggesting 
that trial evidence did not support convictions.  He then muses “that  about 
half of those 15k acquitted at trial are guilty giving us 7.5k false 
negatives[.]”.227  Then, after considering verdicts in Scotland, which include 
a “not proven verdict,” and the results of the famous Kalven and Zeisel 
study,228 he settles on a false-acquittal-at-trial rate of seventy-five percent or 
11,200 of the 15,000 acquittals.229  He concludes this section by alluding to 
 
 221  Laudan, Different Strokes, supra note 3, at 13. Laudan labels these “confessions.”  For 
a reasoned explanation of why plea bargains differ from confessions, see Brandon L. Garrett, 
Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1415 (2016) (discussing 
that plea bargains lacks essential facts of case, complicate sentencing, where explicit sentence 
not bargained for,  do not preclude factual challenges in subsequent proceedings).  
 222  Laudan, Different Strokes, supra note 3, at 13.  In LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 
3, at 48 the figure of dismissed cases is given as “217k.”  Laudan’s reasoning is provided at 
greater length in LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 56–66. 
 223  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 52.   
 224  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 54.   
 225  Recent attention to guilty pleas and wrongful conviction suggests that the wrongful 
conviction rate is as high for guilty pleas as for trial verdicts, see infra Part IV.B.3.  
 226  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 57; see Epps, supra note 2, at 1127 (footnote 
omitted) (“[G]iven that prosecutors have been known stubbornly to insist on the guilt of 
previously convicted defendants despite exonerating DNA evidence, it would be surprising if 
prosecutors took jury acquittals as reason to conclude that they had charged the wrong 
person.”).   
 227  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 58.   
 228  HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).  
 229  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 59.   
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the Givelber and Farrell study “devoted to trying to make the case that the 
factually innocent are abundant among those acquitted at trial” but then 
castigates their conclusion that they cannot establish the claim empirically 
even though their data are consistent with the possibility.230 
Following this section that estimates a trial-acquittal-false-negative 
rate, Laudan turns to prosecutorial dismissals which he labels acquittals, 
reviews two studies offering some sense of the reasons for dismissals, and 
concludes that they point to an estimate “that about 56% of the dismissed 
and dropped arrestees were probably factually guilty.”231  He then states his 
estimate that seventy-five percent of those acquitted at trial “are probably 
truly guilty” and then notes that two-thirds of all who went to trial were 
convicted and states that this provides “a plausible rationale for saying that, 
among those defendants who had the charges against them dropped for non-
evidentiary reasons, approximately two-out-of three (and probably more) are 
highly likely to be guilty.  Hence we shall assume that about 37% to 38% 
(that is two-thirds of the 56% of those whom were booted out of the trial 
system for non-evidentiary reasons) are factually guilty (and, if they had 
gone to trial, would have been convicted).”232  This translates to 81,000 out 
of 217,000 dismissed cases, and when added to 12,000 probably guilty 
defendants acquitted at trial, puts 93,000 “guilty” criminals into society. 
What to do about these 93,000 unconvicted criminals?  At one point 
Laudan alludes to the possibility that better police investigation can increase 
the proportion of convictions but does not explore that path.233  Allen and 
Laudan fear that “the remedies usually proposed for the ‘excessive’ levels of 
false conviction involve measures that further increase the already grave risk 
of criminal victimization.”234  As a result the main devices proposed for 
having prosecutors charge more defendants and for juries to convict more is 
to lower the standard of proof and eliminate many of the defendant’s 
procedural protections.235 
 
 230  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 60.  See DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, 
NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED INNOCENT? (2012). 
 231  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 63–64.   
 232  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 64 (emphasis in original).   
 233  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 36–37. 
 234  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 80. 
 235  The rules Allen and Laudan might excise include the constitutional prohibition on 
double jeopardy, exclusionary rules that favor defendants, the exclusion of evidence from trial 
that is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant where a judge rules that the prejudice outweighs 
its probative value, privileged testimony of the defendant’s lawyer, doctor, etc., the rule that 
a jury will be instructed to not infer guilt from a defendant’s decision to not testify, and more.  
My assumption is based on a chapter in THE LAW’S FLAWS that lists rules that Laudan would 
change to favor the prosecution.  Ronald Allen may or may not agree with the list, but from 
Deadly Dilemmas he was probably on board with modifying the standard of proof.  See 
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 110–37.   
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
2018] THE ANTI-BLACKSTONIANS 1363 
2. Laudan and Allen’s Crime Reduction Thesis 
Laudan andAllen claim that higher conviction rates and more 
incarceration will reduce violent crime.236  “[T]his book will argue that there 
are effective methods for lowering the rate of serious crimes.  Basically, 
these hinge on convicting and incarcerating a higher proportion of the guilty 
than we now convict.”237  Laudan fleshes out this point as follows: 
 
In general, rates of conviction prove to be good predictors of rates 
of serious crime (far better than any other, including the severity 
of sentences). If, for whatever reasons, a society begins convicting 
a smaller and smaller proportion of those charged with committing 
serious crimes, more and more people will evidently find the 
commission of such crimes worth the risk. Contrariwise, if the 
courts raise conviction rates, fewer crimes will be committed. This 
general correlation is borne out across the full spectrum of serious 
crimes and across a broad range of countries with different legal 
systems.238 
 
Laudan’s evidence for this conclusion is found in two graphs showing 
inverse relationships between serious felony (Figure 1) or murder (Figure 2) 
rates from 1950 to 1998 along one axis and expected punishment measured 
in days in prison (for serious crimes) and years in prison (for murders) for 
each known crime along the other axis.239  These measures of punitiveness 
depend on penalties meted out to convicted criminals (whose total 
convictions constitute a small proportion of known crimes) against all crime, 
possibly including crimes not reported to police, never leading to 
apprehension, and leading to dismissals—a very large number.240  I am not 
 
 236  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 44 (“[I]t is empirically true that incarcerating 
more perpetrators of serious crimes reduces the future frequency of those crimes.”).  This 
claim is worked out most fully in Chapter 2 of THE LAW’S FLAWS, extending the argument in 
Deadly Dilemmas.  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 18-45.   
 237  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis in original).  
 238  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 37.  The hypothetical argument has 
something of the straw man quality observed in my review of Epps, supra at note 2, by hinting 
that conviction rates could fall to ridiculously low rates.  In extreme cases, like police strikes 
or major riots and disorder, there can be a quick increase in opportunistic crimes, including 
murders.  This aside, Laudan does use contemporary crime and justice system data to analyze 
the routine operation of the justice system.   
 239  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 35-36 (Figures 2 and 3).  The figures seem 
approximately correct but might be a bit impressionistic, as Figure 2 has the murder rate in 
1998 as at slightly below 1 per 100,000 which is off by a factor of five.  See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS: BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 247060, THE NATION’S TWO 
MEASURES OF HOMICIDE, (2014) (showing the homicide rate to hover around 6 per 100,000 
from about 1998 to around 2008 and declining to slightly above 5 per 100,000 by 2011).  
 240  One problem with the graphs going back to the 1950s is that the use of victimization 
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sure that this is a fair way correlate crime and punishment, but it is not 
standard.241  His two graphs also begin counting crime rates from 1950, when 
most men in the high-crime-prone groups were World War II veterans or 
being shipped off to fight in Korea— experiences that reduced the number 
violent crimes in the United States. Also the oldest members of the post-war 
baby bulge, who started committing larger number of crimes in the 1960s, 
were about three years old in 1950 and most were not yet born.  Figure 2 
shows the rise and fall of the murder rates against years in prison from 1950 
to 1998, a subject studied closely by criminologists. 
When criminologists disaggregate crime rates by age and other factors, 
much of the crime drop since 1990 has been attributed to the aging of the 
population and changes in illicit drug markets.242  The simple correlations 
that constitute the results in Figures 1 and 2 cannot be taken at face value as 
explaining causal relationships in light of other knowledge about the effects 
of punishment on crime and what is left out.  Laudan is not entirely 
insensitive to the concept that crime might be affected by factors other than 
conviction and incarceration.  Before presenting Figures 1 and 2 he alludes, 
dismissively, to the idea that factors like “poverty or unemployment to 
inequitable distribution of wealth or a bad educational system or a 
demographic spike in the number of young males in the population” 
influence the frequency of crime.243  Thus, he seems aware of some of the 
social factors that to criminologists explain much crime.  Laudan is clearly 
unimpressed by criminological explanations of crime, but he does not seem 
to refer to the empirical studies of the “great crime drop” that, I think, 
undermine his base argument about the scope of the effect of imprisonment 
on crime rates.244 
To return to Laudan’s argument, he prefers incapacitation as a rationale 
and policy for crime reduction over deterrence because the evidence of 
higher conviction rates reducing crime via deterrence is weak: “[a] much 
 
surveys began in the 1970s so that the crime rates in Figures 1 and 2 are presumably taken 
from the Uniform Crime Reports.  
 241  His statement that “[i]n general, rates of conviction prove to be good predictors of 
rates of serious crime” does not appear accurate if we were to examine the rising prison rates 
after 1990 with dropping crime rates. I think it is wise, however, to withhold judgment on the 
idea if it were limited to the kinds of violent crime that is the focus of The Law’s Flaws: 
murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault.  Less discretion is exercised in either dismissing 
or criminalizing such behavior, in comparison to other crimes.   
 242  Bruce Johnson, Andrew Golub & Eloise Dunlap, The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, 
Drug Markets, and Violence in Inner-City New York, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 164-
206 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, eds., 2000); James Alan Fox, Demographics and 
U.S. Homicide, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 288-317 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, 
eds., 2000).   
 243  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 29-30.   
 244  Blumstein & Wallman, supra note 138; ZIMRING, supra note 138.   
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surer route to decreasing crime is, I believe, by incarcerating wrong-doers, 
especially serial offenders.”  He then asserts that the conviction rate can be 
increased either by the police identifying and arresting 
 
a larger proportion of those likely to have committed a serious 
crime and/or . . . increase[ing] the rate of convictions among those 
who are arrested and probably guilty. . . . The second 
mechanism . . . depends almost entirely on the efficiency of the 
courts in identifying and convicting those truly guilty arrestees 
who are actually arrested. 
 
He indicated that “[m]uch of the rest of the book will be focused on the latter 
issue” rather than discussing the ability of police to arrest a higher proportion 
of offenders. 245 
At this point in the book he does not specify what the courts have to do 
to identify and convict more arrestees, but later he proposes eliminating 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials and replacing it with a 
lower standard (in Chapter 5) and eliminating a number of procedural 
safeguards for defendants (in Chapter 6).  He calculates the lower standard 
of proof from his assumption-based estimates of the costs of false positives 
and false negatives as 0.65, or roughly equivalent to the “clear and 
convincing” standard, which he proposes to replace the ninety or ninety-five 
percent certainty commonly associated with proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.246 
Laudan’s crime-fighting argument rests importantly on the known high 
recidivism rates of convicted offenders.247  Two large NIJ surveys of 1983 
and 1994 cohorts of released offenders showed that rearrest rates were about 
two-thirds in both cohorts “although the incarceration rate had roughly 
doubled between 1983 and 1994.”248  Because “most serous [sic] felons sent 
to prison are serial offenders” “incarcerating sizeable numbers of offenders 
 
 245  LAUDAN,  LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 38-39.  I suppose that as a philosopher 
Laudan is free to label convicted offenders in his own way, but his application of the term 
“serial” to repeat violent and and property is what criminologists would label “career” 
criminals.  For a standard definition of serial criminals see Marvin Zalman & Matthew Larson, 
Elephants in the Station House: Serial Crimes, Wrongful Convictions, and Expanding 
Wrongful Conviction Analysis to Include Police Investigation, 79 ALB. L. REV. 941, 977-81 
(2015). 
 246  These calculations are found in Chapter 4 of LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3.  
 247  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 40-45.   
 248  Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn, eds., The Growth of Incarceration in 
the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences 151 (Washington, DC: National 
Research Council) [hereinafter, NRC, Growth]; Laudan, Different Strokes, supra note 3.  
 248  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 40-45.   
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lowers the crime rate.”249  Thus, he calculates, for example, that “increasing 
the conviction rate for aggravated assault by 15% (from 148,000 to 170,000 
per year), one could reduce the frequency of violent crimes by about 17,000 
per year.”250  He also bolsters his argument by citing a 1999 article by crime 
statistician Daniel Nagin to the effect that incapacitation substantially 
contributed to crime reduction.251 
For all his boldness in asserting that changing the burden of proof in 
the small percentage of cases that go to trial (and in a larger number 
dismissed by prosecutors) will reduce crime, Laudan does allow a loophole, 
which he mentions in passing: 
 
The moral of the story seems clear: increasing the conviction rate 
generally lowers the violent crime rateFalse That is not to say that 
the only way of lowering the crime rate is by convicting more of 
the guilty. Increasing sentences would doubtless have done 
something to lower the homicide and rape rates via longer 
incapacitation; so would decreasing the number of murders and 
rapists who eluded police detection. It is no part of my brief to 
argue that raising conviction rates is the only way to control 
serious crime. It is important to my later arguments to show, 
however, that it is a way, and an effective way at that, to reduce 
the ordinary citizen’s risk of ending up a violent crime victim.252 
 
This loophole implies that any effective critique of Laudan and Allen’s 
incapacitation thesis should lead them to rationally modify their extreme 
position and to pay more attention to the various ways in which the kinds of 
social, economic and justice system inputs that Laudan cavalierly dismisses 
ought to be treated with greater respect.253  In any event, my internal critique 
 
 249  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 40 (emphasis in original) (“If delinquents 
were not serial offenders, incapacitation would not be a very promising strategy.”).   
 250  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 43.  
 251  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 43.   
 252 LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, 36-37 (emphasis in original).  
 253  Listing some “fashionable hypotheses” of variables related to crime, Laudan tells the 
reader to “choose your favorite, according to your political predilections.”  I could be over 
reading this quip, but Laudan seems to be saying that you are ideological if you disagree with 
his evidence, but that he is scientific.  My understanding is that every person, however 
unlettered, carries an ideology (i.e., a political preference), although even for those of us who 
think about these things, we may never be able to entirely fathom what drives our views.  It 
is also possible to recognize and to mitigate predilections and to observe empirical evidence 
as an important guide to action (which, I suppose is also an ideological predisposition, but 
any further discourse will lead to infinite regress).  Every lawyer should read JUDITH N. 
SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1986) to better grasp the 
professional ideology she calls “legalism.”  There is also a conventional difference between 
understanding one’s political predilections (i.e., “ideologies”) and acting or thinking in rigidly 
doctrinaire ways that are labeled “ideological.”   
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will challenge their overreliance on incapacitation.254 
3. Internal Critique of Laudan and Allen Regarding the 
Blackstone Ratio 
If I understand Laudan andAllen’s position correctly, they attribute 
most—if not all—false negatives and/or false acquittals in trials and “false” 
cases dismissed by prosecutors to the rules that flow from the Blackstone 
principle, especially proof beyond a reasonable doubt and procedural trial 
rules that formally advantage defendants.255  In addition, their writing at 
points seems to attribute to the Blackstone ratio an intrinsic power to force a 
high rate of false positives.  Unlike Forst, whose Blackstone ratio 
calculations were an abstract exercise informed by normative concerns, 
Laudan and Allen seem to say that all failures to convict guilty defendants 
and all “false” prosecutor dismissals result from the effects of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt and defense-oriented trial rules.  If this means that their 
formulas determine the outcomes of trials in the same way that fixed inputs 
in a high school physics or chemistry “experiment” designed to show how a 
law of nature works, then it seems to me that they are engaging in magical 
thinking. 
It may be, however, that their formula essentially boils down to a way 
of expressing the Blackstone principle.  In any event, on the basis of 
available data Laudan calculated that the justice system annually produces 
93,000 false negatives, 12,000 false acquittals and 81,000 dismissals of cases 
against factually guilty defendants.  Lowering the standard of proof will 
result in more of them being convicted. 
How solid are his figures?  Although they seem to be in a plausible 
range, they are estimates based on several assumptions.  The most serious 
challenge to his numbers is Givelber and Farrell’s analysis.  Laudan 
dismisses their work because they honestly note that “[i]n the end, we cannot 
establish through empirical research with certainty that many (or indeed 
most) of the acquitted are innocent. We can only point out that the data are 
entirely consistent with this possibility.”256  Just because Laudan attaches 
numbers to his guesses does not make his estimate stronger than theirs.  What 
lies behind their caveat is a careful analysis of data on judge and jury decision 
making in 401 noncapital felony jury cases collected by the National Center 
on State Courts (NCSC) that were decided in four municipal courts.  Their 
book successfully challenges Kalven and Zeisel’s “liberation hypothesis,” 
which analyzed judge-jury disagreements over proper verdicts, and held that 
jury decisions to acquit where the facts were close were based on “sentiment” 
 
 254  Infra Part III.B.4.   
 255  Excepting for the “loophole” references, see discussion supra at notes 252-253.  
 256  GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 143.  
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rather than evidence.257  As for the relationship between acquittals and 
innocence, Givelber and Farrell offer convincing challenges to the 
assumptions that support the conventional wisdom that (all) acquitted 
defendants are guilty.258  Their close analysis weakens the bases for 
conventional wisdom, and should weaken the confidence one has in 
Laudan’s assumed rate of false negatives.  Moreover, their data analysis 
shows that factors consistent with innocence are correlated with acquittals.  
Defendants with no criminal records are more likely to be innocent, and 
acquittals were twice as great for defendants with no known arrests or 
convictions (45.0%) than those with records that the jury learned of or did 
not learn of (21.2% and 23.8%, respectfully).259  In a large number of 
exoneration cases prisoners consistently maintain their innocence, even at 
the cost of forfeiting parole.260  In the NCSC data, acquittal rates were more 
than twice as high for defendants who claimed innocence to their lawyers 
(45.7%) than for defendants who went to trial because plea-bargaining failed 
(18.2%).261  Finally, consistent with the reasonable thesis that innocent 
defendants have more information about their case than the prosecutor, the 
acquittal rates of defendants increased as they entered progressively more 
evidence, from having no defense witnesses testify (16.7%), to the defendant 
alone testifying (21.6%), to one defense witness testifying without the 
defendant testifying (34.9%), to the defendant and at least one other witness 
testifying (41.4%).262  Because researchers can almost never know the 
ground truth of verdicts it is incautious to make definitive statements about 
innocence or guilt.  Givelber and Farrell’s caveat at the conclusion of their 
book is the kind of caution one expects from good scholars and scientists. 
For all of Givelber and Farrell’s evidence, Laudan may be right about 
the false negative rate, but his estimate should not be seen as a sufficiently 
strong basis for radical policy changes in the trial process.  Before dismissing 
acquittals as inherently false we should consider that defendants are brought 
to trial by police who typically make decisions about guilt quickly and by 
partisan prosecutors.  “Juries are typically the first remotely neutral decision 
makers to hear the defendants’ stories from the defendants, or, more 
 
 257  GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 5, 71-79, 95.   
 258  These assumptions are the belief that prosecutors proceed only against the guilty, that 
prosecutors are better at evaluating evidence, that the reasonable doubt burden of proof causes 
the acquittal of a guilty defendant (data supports the view that judges and juries differed 
mainly because of differing interpretations of evidence), that some information is not 
available to the prosecution.  GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 53-63.   
 259  GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 58.   
 260  See, e.g., Maurice Possley, Everton Wagstaffe, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS (June 14, 2017) http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/cased
etail.aspx?caseid=4725.  
 261  GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 64. 
 262  GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 65. 
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
2018] THE ANTI-BLACKSTONIANS 1369 
importantly, other witnesses. The simplest explanation for acquittals may be 
that it is only at trial that defendants can actually tell their stories.”263 
Aside from Givelber and Farrell’s important research suggesting that a 
higher proportion of acquittals represent actually innocent defendants than 
generally thought of, Laudan and Allen miss another element: that a 
wrongful conviction in wrong person cases264 allows a possibly recidivist 
criminal to go free, so that repressing false positives at trial enhances crime 
control.265  Forst and Huff used Innocence Project (IP) and National Registry 
of Exonerations (NRE) databases to estimate “the magnitude of wrongful 
conviction in violent crimes” and the implications for victimization caused 
by actual perpetrators not brought to justice.266  Among the IP cases, almost 
none of which are “no crime cases,” 147 perpetrators were not initially 
brought to justice, but when discovered were shown to have committed 146 
additional crimes.  They then totaled the number of NRE cases for violent 
crime (1,125 out of 1,851 exonerations at the time of their analysis).267  They 
then estimated that an assumed wrongful conviction rate of 1 percent of 
339,093 convictions in 2014 would yield 3,391 false convictions.  A 3 
 
 263  GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 55.   
 264  One third of exonerations reported by the National Registry of Exoneration are “no 
crime” cases, including arsons that were accidental fires (David Lee Gavitt); “Shaken Baby 
Syndrome” cases where children’s’ symptoms were caused by underlying medical condition 
or accidental falls (Julie Baumer); false accusations of child sex abuse, common in divorce 
cases (Ronnie Mark Gariepy); corporate malfeasance in charging employees with theft 
(Cheryl Adams); the misidentification of substances as drugs (Mariah Simmons); mistaking 
a statement intended as a joke as a threat (Thomas Shreve); no conspiracy to bribe a foreign 
head of state occurred when undercover agent fabricated story that actions were approved by 
the U.S. State Department (Haim Geri); no threat against the President occurred when fellow 
jail inmates fabricated charge against defendant to get better deals in their own cases (Daniel 
Cvijanovich); no burglary–complainant fabricated “crime” our of anger (Michael Waithe); no 
assault occurred– sheriff’s deputy fabricated charge against teen-ager (Jonathan Dominguez); 
death accidental and not vehicular homicide when audio statement to police, heard by 
appellate court, corrected erroneous transcript (Sierra Rigel); no money laundering by defense 
attorney defendant where testimony against him by criminal clients inconsistent, and no proof 
of specific intent in advising woman to purchase a home  with funds that were drug sale 
proceeds (M. Donald Cardwell); no theft–money deposited in bank night drop was stuck in 
the vault (Robert Farnsworth).  The names in parentheses are examples of the reason for a “no 
crime” exoneration and are found in the NRE.  On August 4, 2017, the NRE reported 2,074 
exonerations and 713 “no crime” cases (34.38%).  See also Personal Identity, 10 People Who 
Were Wrongly Convicted Of Nonexistent Crimes, (contemporary and historic “no crime” 
wrongful convictions), https://listverse.com/2014/07/21/10-people-who-were-wrongly-conv
icted-of-nonexistent-crimes/.(last visited May 20, 2018).  
 265  Laudan does build the crime-committed-by-the-true-perpetrator into his support for 
the Blackstone principle, but his thinking does not extend to the Forst-Huff analysis.   
 266  BRIAN FORST & C. RONALD HUFF, Preventing Violent Crimes by Reducing Wrongful 
Convictions, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION, 2ND ED. 
(Vazsoni, Flannery & DeLisi, 2017) 
 267  These were 742 murders, 287 sexual assaults, and 96 robberies)  FORST & HUFF, supra 
note 266.  
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percent wrongful conviction rate “would translate to an estimated 10,173 
cases of wrongful conviction in violent crimes in that year.”  Thus, allowing 
for only one crime by the criminals who were free to commit them because 
an innocent person was convicted, would generate 3,000 to 10,000 “excess” 
crimes each year.  Forst and Huff note that those crimes account for only one 
cohort of convictions in one year and “does not include the 57 percent of 
DNA exonerations reported by the Innocence Project for which no actual 
perpetrators were identified.”268  This conservative estimate is even lower 
than Laudan would allow, for if assumptions of recidivism were applied to a 
portion of those who escaped justice, the excess crimes resulting from 
wrongful convictions for violent crimes would be higher.  Thus, at the least, 
the crimes prevented by lowering the number of false convictions should be 
factored into Laudan and Allen’s crime reduction analysis, which necessarily 
increases the number of wrongful convictions. 
Of course, requiring a prosecutor to prove a case beyond a reasonable 
doubt makes the prosecution more difficult and as a result some factually 
guilty defendants will be acquitted.  My critique of Laudan and Allen’s 
proof-shifting idea, as well as Epps’s position, includes two interrelated 
points that pick up on my comments on Bushway’s analysis.269  The first part 
of my argument is that a verdict depends on more than the standard of proof, 
and that abstracting away from a verdict such factors as the strength of 
evidence (which might reflect the quality of police investigation work) 
overvalues the effect of proof-standards and rules of trial procedure.  The 
kind of “Blackstone ratio” found by Bushway and the number of the errors 
of impunity that result are more logically the failure upstream processes and 
decisions.  If these upstream decisions place weak evidence before jurors, as 
Givelber and Farrell show, the prosecution is logically more likely to fail.270  
What Laudan and Allen’s abstract analysis does not account for, then, is that 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and defense-friendly procedures on trial 
outcomes are part of a mix of elements that go into a verdict.  These elements 
include many of the built-in prosecutorial advantages in plea bargaining and 
the conduct of trials, the array of evidence collected by the police 
investigation and forensic science process, the way in which that evidence is 
shaped into usable trial evidence by prosecutors before trial, and the entirety 
of defense preparation.271  Once trial preparation is concluded, the outcome 
depends on the complex execution of the trial by prosecution and defense; 
the guidance, evidentiary decisions, and instructions by the judge; and the 
composition and deliberations of the jury.  The Blackstone ratio is only one 
 
 268  FORST & HUFF, supra note 266. 
 269  Supra Part II.C.1. 
 270  But see GOULD, CARRANO, LEO, & HAIL-JARES, infra note 373.   
 271  Some of this will be discussed in Part IV.   
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factor in this mix. 
The second part of my argument is the moral hazard that a change in 
the burden of proof will likely have effects on actors and decisions 
throughout the criminal justice system.  In a thought experiment one can hold 
everything constant in the justice system except the standard of proof.  In 
this thought experiment the number of convictions will probably rise and in 
accord with Laudan’s calculations result in many true convictions at a cost 
of a small increased number of wrongful convictions.  But, perhaps, in light 
of Givelber and Farrell’s analysis, the shift might not be as strong.  Still, 
were the burden dropped from reasonable doubt to clear and convincing, it 
is highly unlikely that system actors would not react to it.  Instead of showing 
greater concern for weaknesses in police investigation and forensic science 
(as does the innocence movement), Laudan and Allen would make it easier 
for a poorly resourced, or lazy, or poorly trained, or even corrupt criminal 
justice system personnel to convict defendants they assume are guilty by 
making the trial less of a screen and more of a conduit.  Lowering the 
standard of proof would likely have a dynamic effect on police investigators 
and prosecutors by creating a moral hazard of indicting and bringing to trial 
weaker cases.  Weaker cases produced by an uneven criminal justice system 
(see, infra, Part IV) will likely include far more false positives than now get 
through police investigatory screens.  When these weaker cases are filtered 
through a trial process with a less stringent screen (clear and convincing 
evidence) a far larger proportion of false positives will pass through, possibly 
a far larger number than now result in wrongful convictions.  Of course, we 
cannot be sure if the proportion of false positives to false negatives will be 
much worse for innocent defendants, and not so beneficial to potential crime 
victims than Laudan calculates. 
Some evidence for this argument is found in Gould et al.’s empirical 
study of the causes of wrongful convictions.  Perhaps the least explicable 
factor that was significantly correlated with wrongful convictions was a 
prosecutor’s weak case.272  With the assistance of an expert panel whose 
majority included police and prosecution professionals,273 the researchers 
concluded that when prosecutors are dealt a weak hand in a case that is later 
shown to be a wrongful conviction, this also means that the defense has less 
evidence with which to challenge the prosecution.  As for the moral hazard 
argument, 
 
 
 272  GOULD ET AL., infra note 373, at 491, 494, 501-02 (“Of all the statistically significant 
factors that harm an innocent defendant, a weak prosecution case is hardest to explain. 
Intuitively, we might expect the opposite-that cases with weaker evidence against the 
defendant would be more likely to end in dismissal or acquittal.”).  Id. at 501.   
 273  GOULD ET AL., infra  note 373, at 505 n.84. 
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Weak facts may also encourage prosecutors to engage in certain 
behaviors designed to bolster the case, which our statistics show 
help predict an erroneous conviction. In several of our erroneous 
convictions, a prosecutor, convinced of the defendant’s guilt 
despite a lack of conclusive proof, failed to recognize and turn 
over exculpatory evidence or enlisted a snitch or other non-
eyewitness to provide dubious corroborating testimony. These 
types of actions compound, rather than rectify, previous errors or 
misconduct in the case.274 
 
The “need” to prevail where prosecutors subjectively believe in defendants’ 
guilt despite the lack of solid evidence led prosecutors in Gould et al.’s 
national sample of wrongful convictions and near misses to rely on weak 
evidence.  This tendency of prosecutors to win even with weak evidence, a 
statistically significant factor, was not spurious according the panel of 
experts enlisted to assist Gould et al. to interpret their statistical results.  “To 
a large extent, the panelists attributed tunnel vision in our cases to a police 
and prosecutorial culture in which questioning and independent thinking are 
not valued, procedures are not designed to probe already gathered evidence, 
and little or no concern is given to learning from past errors.”275 
Laudan and Allen’s serious concern for crime victims might have 
produced its own form of tunnel vision, leading to exuberant claims that may 
overstate the extent of false acquittals, brush the larger criminal justice 
system out of their analysis, disvalue counter-research without giving it full 
consideration, ignore the strongest research on the causes of wrongful 
convictions, and fail to consider the likely effects that their proposed changes 
would have on actors in the justice system.276  Their analysis is valuable as 
an academic challenge to innocentric thinking, ideally producing a dialectic 
to improve how we think about issues of guilt and innocence and the trial 
process.  However, as a foundation for drastically changing the decision rules 
 
 274  GOULD ET AL., infra note 373, at 501.  
 275  GOULD ET AL., supra note 373, at 505. 
 276  For what it’s worth, in my interactions with innocence advocates, including attendance 
at annual Innocence Network meetings where exonerees are valorized, I have often noticed 
real concern for the well-being of the initial crime victims, and concern for the double 
victimization that occurs when a rape victim or the family of a murdered person learns of the 
wrongful conviction.  Sometimes, these victims react by denying the truth, at whatever 
psychic cost.  See TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE 
CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008).  More recently, the innocence movement has 
expanded to include an organization founded by Jennifer Thompson who herself underwent 
the double trauma of a rape and coming to grips with her innocent misidentification of Ronald 
Cotton.  Their story is told in JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON, & ERIN 
TORNEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009).  The 
organization, Healing Justice, works to assist crime survivors or the families of murder 
victims who have doubly suffered upon learning of the wrongful convictions in their cases.   
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for something as weighty as verdicts in criminal cases, even in a system as 
problematic as the American adversary system, Laudan and Allen’s work 
falls short.  Perhaps all these weaknesses can be forgiven if implementing 
their thinking will sharply reduce crime. 
4. Internal Critique of Laudan and Allen’s Crime Reduction 
Thesis277 
In any event, the central theme running through Laudan and Allen was 
labeled as the most serious of the deadly dilemmas: “Every failure to convict 
the guilty means additional crimes undeterred and bad guys who, when left 
to their own devices, will almost certainly commit additional crimes.”278  It 
should be kept in mind that Laudan’s focus is on four violent crimes: murder, 
rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.279  Criminologists have come to 
recognize the intellectual trap held out by the promise of incapacitation.280  
Incapacitation requires no behavioral hypothesis, as does deterrence theory, 
and it is beyond doubt that a prison inmate cannot commit four violent crimes 
(murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) addressed by Laudan and Allen 
outside the prison walls.  The best thinking in criminology, however, is that 
any broad program of incapacitation has inherent limits.  I base my 
conclusions on a recent and authoritative volume of the Committee on 
Causes and Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration of the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences published in 2014.  
I draw specifically from Chapter 5, “The Crime Prevention Effects of 
Incarceration.”281  Laudan bolstered his incapacitation argument by 
referencing an endorsement of that concept by Daniel Nagin.  The first 
footnote in Chapter 5 indicates that it “draws substantially” on more recent 
work by Nagin and Durlauf.282  That chapter separately evaluates the 
research on deterrence, incapacitation, and recidivism for most crimes and 
 
 277  The sections follow Part III.B.2, supra.   
 278  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79. 
 279  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3; Laudan, supra note 3; Different Strokes, supra 
note 3, passim.   
 280  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 130–31 (“There is of course a plausibility to the 
belief that putting many more convicted felons behind bars would reduce crime.” Yet, for the 
first two decades of massively increasing incarceration in the United States after 1974, “there 
was no clear trend in violent crime rates.”).   
 281 NRC, Growth, supra note 248.  It is referred to in the text as “the NRC report” or “the 
NRC Committee” depending on context.   
 282  The chapter draws on S.N. Durlauf & D.S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both 
Be Reduced? 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13 (2011); S.N. DURLAUF & D.S. NAGIN, The 
Deterrent Effect of Punishment, in CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 43-94 
(P.J. Cook. L. Jens, & J. McCrary, eds., 2011); D.S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the 
Evidence by a Criminologist for Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 83 (2013); and D.S. Nagin, 
Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century: A Review of the Evidence, in 42 CRIME & JUSTICE: 
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 199-262 (M. Tonry, ed., 2013).   
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treats the research on the effect of incarceration for drug offenses on drug 
prices and drug use separately.283  National Academy reports draw on the 
most noted scholars in any field, and although possibly subject to groupthink, 
the report analyzes published research, has been carefully vetted, and at the 
least is not the spurious product of an eccentric scholar.284 
The overall conclusion of the NRC chapter highly qualifies Laudan and 
Allen’s incapacitation hypothesis.  Incapacitation necessarily has a crime 
suppressing effect.  However, studies, such as those including analyses on 
the role played by incarceration in the great crime drop after 1990, have 
shown that incarceration played a limited role, despite the significant 
increase of imprisonment.  The NRC report concludes that “[m]ost studies 
estimate the crime-reducing effect of incarceration to be small.”285  Why 
should this be so?  Focusing only on incapacitation, the NRC committee 
reviewed econometric research beginning in the 1970s that found small 
decreases in crime rates in response to increases in the imprisonment rate.  
As more econometric studies of the relevant elasticity— “the percentage 
change in the crime rate in response to a 1 percent increase in the 
imprisonment rate”—were conducted, it was found that the results varied 
widely, from no reduction in crime to “a reduction of –0.4 or more.”286  As 
a result the NRC committee concluded that it “cannot arrive at a precise 
estimate, or even a modest range of estimates, of the magnitude of the effect 
of incarceration on crime rates.”287  The reasons for this conclusion give 
some support to a modified version of Laudan and Allen’s enthusiasm for 
incapacitation.288  Among the reasons are that the incapacitation studies may 
 
 283  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at v, vii, 435–44.  
 284  The chapter was authorized by the 18-member Committee on Law and Justice of the 
National Research Council.  The committee included notable criminological researchers, 
including Nagin, three economists, and the former director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
and other noted scholars. The volume is also sponsored and vetted by the 20-member 
Committee on Causes and Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration. The memberships 
of the two committees overlap somewhat. The latter committee included Nagin, two 
economists, an epidemiologist and other distinguished scholars. NRC, Growth, supra note 
248, at v, vii, 435-44. 
 285  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 155. 
 286  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 140. 
 287  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 141. 
 
Many factors contribute to the large differences in estimates of the 
crimes averted by incapacitation. These factors include whether the 
data used to estimate crime averted pertain to people in prison, people 
in jail, or nonincarcerated individuals with criminal histories; the 
geographic region from which the data are derived; the types of crimes 
included in the accounting of crimes averted; and a host of technical 
issues related to the measurement and modeling of key dimensions of 
the criminal career.  
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include a variety of crime types.  As I’ll cautiously suggest below, targeted 
incapacitation programs may have greater crime reduction effect. 
Even a targeted incapacitation program is limited by two factors related 
to criminal career research that have emerged from incapacitation research.  
These matters are not mentioned by Laudan and Allen, who treat criminals 
and defendants more like colorless physical entities, with unchanging 
characteristics, than human beings who vary in behavior, respond to 
incentives, and who experience change over time.289  Although the research 
base for estimating criminal careers is limited, it has been shown that the 
mean annual rate of offending over a criminal career, designated λ, is not 
constant and is highly skewed among different populations.290  The two 
major limits of general incapacitation programs are that incapacitation has 
diminishing returns and that λ diminishes with age. 
Recent research has identified “stochastic selectivity” as a factor that 
implicates diminishing returns for incapacitation. 
 
Stochastic selectivity formalizes the observation that unless high-
rate offenders are extremely skillful in avoiding apprehension, 
they will be represented in prison disproportionately relative to 
their representation in the population of nonincarcerated 
offenders. This is the case because they put themselves at risk of 
apprehension so much more frequently than lower-rate 
offenders.291 
 
Thus, beyond a certain point, incarcerating more offenders is likely to 
capture low-rate offenders resulting in diminishing crime-reduction returns 
for every person incarcerated and for every year of incarceration.  The NRC 
Report indicated that self-report surveys of the number of crime committed 
per inmate overstate the benefits of increase incarceration “because most of 
the high-rate offenders will already have been apprehended and 
incarcerated.”292  It seems that Laudan’s analysis in The Law’s Flaws made 
the same assumptions of recidivism uniformity as did the earlier 
incapacitation studies.  After the theoretical exposition on stochastic 
 
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 141. 
 289  Although I focus my critique on Chapter 2 in LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, no reference to 
the effects of diminished returns or aging out of crime is made in Chapter 8, dealing with bail, 
sentences, and probation and parole.  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 153-72.   
 290  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 141-43.  A technical implication of skewedness is 
that “as a matter of accounting, the estimated size of incapacitation effects will be highly 
sensitive to whether the mean, median, or some other statistic is used to summarize the 
offending rate distribution.”  Id. at 142.   
 291  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 142–43. 
 292  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 143. 
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selectivity was developed, other analyses have supported it along with an 
empirical a study of sentencing in the Netherlands.293 
The other factor that limits the effectiveness of general incapacitation 
programs is that violent crime is highly age-dependent, with rates peaking in 
“the late teenage years for violent offenses, followed by rapid declines.”294  
This factor is better known in criminology than stochastic selectivity and it 
is a bit surprising that it is not alluded to by Laudan and Allen.  The growth 
of “geriatric prisons” with tens of thousands of prisoners whose likelihood 
of reoffending is very low attests to the willingness of American society to 
punish severely without achieving crime-reduction effects.295  In any event, 
the research strongly suggests that imprisoning large numbers of offenders 
and sentencing them to longer terms dependent on their having substantial 
prior criminal histories will have a smaller effect on crime rates because 
many such offenders have “aged out” of crime; this would be a form of false 
negative incarceration and sentencing. 
The NRC Report covers other issues that are germane to Laudan and 
Allen’s analysis.  Regarding recidivism, it concludes that research shows no 
deterrent or rehabilitative effects of imprisonment alone, but that recent 
research indicates that some rehabilitative programming is shown to reduce 
reoffending.296  On the question of whether prison is a school for crime, 
research shows “either no effect or a criminogenic effect.”297  Given their 
preoccupation with trade-offs, in my estimation Laudan and Allen’s view of 
the social contract that does not take into account the harms of prison on 
offenders, their families, their home communities, and the kinds of 
employment that prison work provides in economically devastated rural 
towns is a cramped view.  In our society prison is strong but necessary 
“medicine,” but unlike responsible medical regimens (or penal policies in 
other democratic countries), prison is “prescribed” in reckless doses that do 
harm to the “patient.” 
My critique admits that incapacitation has a place.  “Policies that 
effectively target the incarceration of highly dangerous and frequent 
offenders can have large prevention benefitsFalse”298  But Laudan and 
Allen’s blunderbuss approach is the opposite of a targeted program, which 
can, in terms of the NRC report, “. . . have a small prevention effect or, even 
 
 293  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 143. 
 294  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 143. 
 295  See TINA CHIU, VERA INST. OF JUST., IT’S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS, INCREASING 
COSTS, AND GERIATRIC RELEASE (2010) https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/dow
nloads/Publications/its-about-time-aging-prisoners-increasing-costs-and-geriatric-release/leg
acy_downloads/Its-about-time-aging-prisoners-increasing-costs-and-geriatric-release.pdf.   
 296  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 297  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 150. 
 298  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 155. 
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worse, increase crime in the long run if [their policies] have the effect of 
increasing postrelease criminality.”299  It should also be noted that a good 
deal of research on selective incapacitation, greeted with enthusiasm in the 
1970s, cooled off when the ability to identify high-risk offenders with 
precision was found to be limited.300  Laudan and Allen would create a 
permanent, wide-scale, and indiscriminate incapacitation program, with 
limited if not counterproductive effects, if their proposal to lower the 
standard of proof were ever taken seriously. 
I’ll end with a note about targeted programming aimed at high-risk 
offenders that seems to have had real effect.  The program known as 
“Operation Ceasefire,” which began with the Boston Gun Project in 1996, 
targets young, high-risk gang members, threatens them with prosecution and 
severe sentencing if they reoffend, and then offers job, educational and other 
services to reorient their lives.301  A cautious, methodological review of what 
police researchers call “lever-pulling” operations provides some support for 
the effectiveness of the program.302  Again, this approach, which combines 
the threat of legal force with a generous and humane provision of services, 
represents the kind of social contract that makes sense to me, although I 
understand that in our polarized society many people hold radically differing 
views about state-civil-society-individual relations including crime and 
punishment.303 
▪ 
This is an appropriate place to add a postscript to my review of Laudan 
and Allen, or better, my review of Laudan, as we transition from the work of 
a philosopher, self-taught in slices of law, evidence, and proof, to the analysis 
of two writings by Paul Cassell, a conservative legal warrior.  Laudan had 
already staked out most of the positions made in Laudan and Allen in a well-
received book, which includes an engaging short Preface on how he was 
intellectually drawn to issues of legal theory, a new field for him.304 His 
 
 299  NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 155. 
 300  Shawn Bushway, Incapacitation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 2447 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd, eds., 2014). 
 301  DAVID M. KENNEDY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: THE 
BOSTON GUN PROJECT’S OPERATION CEASEFIRE, DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING OPERATION 
CEASEFIRE (2001); ANTHONY A. BRAGA ET AL., MEASURING THE IMPACT OF OPERATION 
CEASEFIRE (2001); DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, 
AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA (2011). 
 302  See Cody W. Telep & David Weisburd, What is Known About the Effectiveness of 
Police Practices in Reducing Crime and Disorder?15 POLICE Q. 331, 338-39 (2012).  
 303  See Jaweed Kaleem & Kurtis Lee, Atty. Gen. Jeff Sessions Wants to Get Tough on 
Crime. These People Think He’s Got It All Wrong, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-doj-crime-district-attorneys-20170623-htmlstory.html. 
 304  LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY xi-xiii (2006).  For an acute review, see Michael S. Pardo, On Misshapen 
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plunge into the study of law brought him into contact with scholars of 
superior intellect and acquainted him with aspects of the continental/
inquisitorial system.  A complete analysis of Laudan’s work should probably 
parse any shifts from his 2006 volume to Laudan and Allen’s writings, but 
as my focus is on Laudan in the context of other anti-Blackstonians, I might 
be doing injustice to his ideas.  Yet, the notion that Laudan has never been, 
or has never given any consideration to what it might be like to be a 
practicing lawyer, representing clients (whether individual, corporate, or the 
state), grubbing a living from the law, gives rise to something that has 
bothered me in my review of the anti-Blackstonians.  I note at several points 
in this article that the anti-Blackstonians abstract too much from the 
empirical reality of criminal justice and the court process.  Without denying 
the value of different levels of abstract thought, at some point the analysis of 
law needs to connect to the empirical world.305  A quick skim presents Truth, 
Error, and Criminal Law as a work of jurisprudence that analyzes legal 
concepts, judicial opinions, and the writings of other scholars and with a 
selective connection to “real world” issues.306  Though fair enough, the 
strengths of abstract thought in the law need to be balanced with 
considerations of the possible effects and unintended consequences of 
turning the products of jurisprudence into practical law. 
Some of my concern is seen in Pardo’s generally favorable review of 
Truth, Error, and Criminal Law.307  Pardo’s main points of his critique of 
Laudan’s error reduction analysis are that error reduction rules should not 
simply distribute error, should be shown to reduce error in the long run, and 
should show that the rules are not justified on nonepistemic grounds.308  By 
raising nonepistemic grounds, Pardo betrays his roots as a person trained in 
 
Stones and Criminal Law’s Epistemology, 86 TEX. L. REV. 347, 347-84 (2007) (book review).   
 305  That, at least, is my view.  A standard survey of “western legal theory” closely tracks 
political theory and is related to changing notions and realities of the state, implicating ways 
that the rule of law is understood.  See Kelly, supra note 26.  Thus, even at the highly abstract 
level of legal theory, links to material and ideational changes in the nature of governance 
cannot be avoided.  I fail to understand how theorizing about criminal law cannot at some 
point link to policy preferences.  A tired analogy to the relationship of mathematics and 
physics to engineering comes to mind; there is a place for jurisprudence but at some point law 
is more a practical endeavor like engineering (some might say plumbing).   
 306  Laudan, Truth, supra note 304, at 2, notes that “whatever else it is, a criminal trial is 
first and foremost an epistemic engine, a tool for ferreting out the truth from what will often 
initially be a confusing array of clues and indicators.”  This is an appropriate starting place 
for a book on legal epistemology. Yet, when it comes to recommending changes to legal trial 
rules, like the standard of proof, attention must be paid to “whatever else it is.” I argue, infra 
Part IV, that the narrow focus on trial rules is a misplaced effort in comparison to the work of 
scholars who explore ways to realign the American adversary process in ways that are more 
“inquisitorial.”   
 307  Pardo, supra note 304.   
 308  Pardo, supra note 304, at 371.  
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a law school and who practiced or entertained the idea of practicing law.  
Even as a legal scholar, his mind travels to thoughts about the law’s wider 
field of interests that if tickled would probably draw on empirical and 
historical evidence.  Such “external” evidence does cloud the reductionist 
tendency of the kind of jurisprudential field that Laudan traverses.  
Nevertheless, at the point of making changes to law and policy based on 
theoretical analysis, empirical effects must be considered.  It seems that the 
major externality that animates Laudan and Allen is crime victimization, 
offset by wrongful convictions, and all their analysis and calculations go to 
that trade-off.  Yet Pardo seriously complicates this focus.  “As an analytic 
matter, there is no reason why the benefit of the doubt must be isolated in 
the standard of proof rather than divided between the standard and one or 
more other prodefendant rules.”309  Laudan does not do this and his, 
 
[R]eason for locating [the proper ratio of false positives to false 
negatives] solely within the standard of proof is that it will be 
easier to calibrate. This is most likely true, and it makes for a 
simpler and more elegant theory of the epistemology of legal 
proof. While it may be easier to calibrate, however, it will still be 
an incredibly difficult task.310 
 
This critique can be applied to Laudan’s The Law’s Flaws, where his model 
is based on issues of standards of proof, but his challenge to procedural rules 
are dealt with seriatim.311  The messiness of the entire mix of values and 
processes that go into the adjudication process (to say nothing of the criminal 
justice system) may be beyond the ability of a simple model to describe, and 
may instead require a mix of legal, empirical, historical, and analytic 
scholarship to fathom, all of which wise judges and legislators need to 
consider.312  As Pardo notes, referring to understanding jurors’ beliefs in 
relation to evidence in cases, “[e]ven if we knew what ratio we were looking 
for, developing a standard that would produce roughly this ratio across all 
categories of criminal cases may be virtually impossible.”313  If this is so in 
the case of juror decision-making, I think it applies even more to a macro-
analysis of the adjudicatory or the criminal justice system.  Admittedly, one’s 
belief in this conclusion might depend on one’s affinity for reductionist or 
 
 309  Pardo, supra note 304, at 372. 
 310  Pardo, supra note 304, at 373. 
 311  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, 110-37.  
 312  See, for example, the variations that have been played on Packer’s two models, Hadar 
Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model, 36 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 237 (2011). 
 313  Pardo, supra note 304, at 373. 
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
1380 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1319 
contextualist analyses of social phenomena.314 
Judges tend to think contextually.315  I’ll pluck out one more feather 
from Truth, Error, and Criminal Law.  In a chapter on “dubious motives for 
flawed rules,” Laudan joins the conservative judicial critique of Miranda on 
the ground that exclusion of evidence against a guilty person in order to 
discipline the police weighs “a known and serious cost against an uncertain 
and probably modest gain.”  To him, joining Justice Rehnquist’s pre-
Dickerson view of the Miranda rule “should be an easy call.”316 
In a little noticed aside in the key paragraph in Weeks v. United 
States,317 the case that found an exclusionary rule necessary to the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment,318 Justice Day commented that: 
 
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the 
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and 
enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting 
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights 
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the 
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the 
support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions 
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental 
rights.319 
 
“Enforced confessions”?  This sloppy writing, injecting a due process or 
Fifth Amendment matter into a Fourth Amendment case,320 would never 
occur after first drafts of opinions came to be written by justices’ clerks.  The 
truth is that by 1914 the use of “third degree” police methods was well 
 
 314  See Forst’s comments on economists’ reductionist approaches to criminology, supra 
note 80, at 126, quoted supra at footnote 126.   
 315  Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 
1275, 1276 (1999) (“[T]he particular decisions courts make are neither inevitable nor 
mechanically made. These decisions are influenced, explicitly and implicitly, by factors that 
are political, social, psychological, and cultural. There are many such factors that lead courts 
to mask or discount systemic harm.”).   
 316  Laudan, Truth, supra note 304, at 275.  Laudan relies on the reasoning of Justice 
Rehnquist in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), back in the day when as an Associate 
Justice he was pedaling the “Miranda is a prophylactic device” theory and before his 
realpolitik about face, as Chief Justice of the United States, in Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000).   
 317  232 U.S. 383 (1914).  
 318  See William C. Heffernan, Foreword: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as 
a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L. J. 799 (2000).  
 319  232 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added). 
 320  Although the Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) concept of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments “running into one another” was still alive, it only seemed to apply in cases 
involving writings, like the lottery tickets in Weeks.   
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known,321 and the fact that torture was practiced routinely by police 
throughout the United States, and not only in the Jim Crow South,322 was a 
national scandal.  Perhaps the movement to constitutionalize rules of 
criminal procedure in order to protect defendants’ rights was a romantic fling 
by liberal justices responding to nonepistemic grounds.323  Perhaps not.  A 
page and a half description of the kind of treatment doled out by Cleveland 
police to Tony Colletti in 1930 over 26 hours has none of the elegance of a 
formal proof,324 but this kind of raw empirical and historical evidence is 
factored into calculations of judicial intervention.  Of course, police torture 
is no longer routine.  Still, routine and egregious torture went on for more 
than a decade from the 1970s to the 1980s in a Chicago station house, applied 
against more than 100 suspects, all African American.325  In Chicago, the 
courts were aware of these abuses and by the context of Chicago-style 
judging, enabled the torture regime to continue through their rulings.326 
In significant ways, the innocence movement’s empiricism, based in 
part on psychological science327 and other empirically grounded legal 
research,328 has exposed the limits of procedural legal liberalism and thus 
provided some support to the conservative critique of “nonepistemic” 
rulings, like Miranda.  We now know that false confessions in proven 
 
 321  RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 68 (2008) (discussing 
third degree subject of U.S. Senate hearings in 1910).  
 322  Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see Michael J. Klarman, The Racial 
Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000).   
 323  Proponents prefer to view the incorporation movement as a process of perfecting of 
American constitutionalism, and incorporation has been finally accepted by conservative 
justices.  See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).   
 324  Colletti was “questioned nonstop, lied to, threatened, screamed and cursed at, deprived 
of food and water, and made to stand for hours. He was slugged with bare fists, stripped naked, 
and beaten with a rubber hose. . . . [Detectives] slapped him whenever he appeared to fall 
asleep. . . . They jolted him whenever his knees sagged or he sought support from the wall. 
Detective Welch repeatedly punched him just below the ribs on both sides and slapped him 
in the back of the head, causing Colletti’s face to strike the wall.”  He confessed.  LEO, supra 
note 321, at 41-43.   
 325  Methods included “suffocating the suspect, placing a revolver in the suspect’s mouth, 
squeezing the suspect’s testicles, and playing Russian roulette,” —methods which leave no 
bodily marks.  Other methods included electroshocks with a cattle prod and being forced 
against a hot radiator.  Bandes, supra note 315, at 1290, 1294.  See Juleyka Lantigua-
Williams, A Digital Archive Documents Two Decades of Torture by Chicago Police, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/10000-
files-on-chicago-police-torture-decades-now-online/504233/.   
 326  Bandes, supra note 315.  
 327  The error reduction reforms regarding lineups come mainly from the work of cognitive 
psychologists.  See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: 
ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014).   
 328  Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in 
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585 (2005); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 288-89 (2011). 
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wrongful convictions are almost always generated by police feeding 
incriminating information to suspects, which occurs in and seems to be a 
byproduct of the psychological pressure methods that describe contemporary 
American police interrogation.329  And if video recording and more 
enlightened police administration makes the revival of police torture unlikely 
in 2016, a constitutionalist with a sense of history should consider that 
anything is possible after 2017.  If, thanks to innocence reforms, the criminal 
justice system can reduce wrongful convictions without increasing impunity, 
it would be potentially tragic to lose sight of the nonepistemological factors 
that continue to raise concerns for defendants’ rights.  Pardo gets this: “It 
would be a step in the right direction to try to reduce errors, not only by 
revising current truth-thwarting practices but by developing new ones that 
improve the accuracy of outcomes—such as better forensic-science 
techniques, more reliable (and visible) interrogation practices, more reliable 
lineup procedures, and more open and available discovery.”330  Simply 
abolishing Miranda, although it is on life-support, does nothing to improve 
the accuracy of interrogation-induced confessions. 
C. Cassell on Criminal Justice 
Paul Cassell’s historic role in innocence scholarship was set off by 
Bedau and Radelet’s1987 Stanford Law Review article identifying 350 
capital miscarriages of justice and claiming that 22 resulted in wrongful 
executions.331  His response with Stephen Markman challenged Bedau and 
Radelet’s somewhat subjective method of assessing a wrongful conviction 
by carefully reviewing case facts.332  Markman, then an Assistant Attorney 
General under Edwin Meese in the Reagan Administration, and Cassell, a 
former Department of Justice Associate Deputy Attorney General, aimed to 
squelch death penalty challenges, which they defended as a deterrent to 
homicide.  This high-visibility exchange occurred on the eve of the first 
DNA exonerations.  Although DNA exclusions forcefully placed the fact of 
wrongful convictions beyond challenge, the widely read exchange alerted 
innocence advocates that assertions of actual innocence were subject to close 
observation and criticism by crime control advocates if there was any doubt 
about the innocence claim.  As a result, the innocence movement has 
become, in Richard Leo’s words, an exoneration movement.333  Michael 
 
 329  Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 Stanf. L. Rev. 1051(2010); 
Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395 (2015).   
 330  Pardo, supra note 304, at 372 (footnote omitted).  
 331  Hugo Adam Bedau, & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L, REV. 21 (1987). 
 332  Markman & Cassell, supra note 21. 
 333  Richard A. Leo, Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration Movement? 
The Risks and Rewards of Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA 
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Radelet acknowledged the role played by Cassell and Markman in forcing 
innocence advocates to be more parsimonious in defining wrongful 
convictions.334 
Cassell moved from academe to the federal bench and back to 
academe.335  Professor Cassell’s 2011/12 article and 2017 chapter include 
several recommendations for better getting to the truth in criminal cases that 
are drawn from a coherent approach to criminal procedure that is grounded 
in reversing most Warren Court decisions.  These include abolishing the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, overruling Miranda and requiring 
videotaping of custodial interrogation, and barring habeas corpus petitions 
except on colorable claims of factual innocence.  This “conservative” 
approach returns readers to the great clash in constitutional criminal 
procedure that played out over the decades since 1961, as a more or less 
conservative Supreme Court after 1970 whittled down defendant’s 
procedural rights established in the 1960s.336  It reminds us that conservatives 
viewed Warren Court rulings, including expanded access to federal habeas 
corpus by state prisoners, as truth-thwarting protections for the guilty.337  The 
 
REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 57-83 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 
2017).  The concern with defining wrongful convictions parsimoniously can be seen in the 
National Registry of Exonerations’ definition of an exoneration, Glossary, THE NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossar
y.aspx (last visited May 15, 2018).   
 334  Michael L. Radelet, How DNA Has Changed Contemporary Death Penalty Debates, 
in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING 
THE INNOCENT 138, 141 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017).  Since the concept of trade-offs is 
central to the Blackstonian debate, note that the more parsimonious the definition of a false 
conviction, the fewer errors of justice will be acknowledged.  Leo, supra note 321 (discussing 
definitions of exonerations that are even more parsimonious than the National Registry of 
Exonerations’ conservative definition).   
 335  As a law professor, he promoted the cause of abolishing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966) on the grounds that the decision increased crime by reducing the number of 
confessions.  Cassell engaged in a series of academic debates on the subject.  See, e.g., Paul 
G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s 
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV.1055 (1998); Richard A. Leo & 
Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth 
About False Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 293 (2001).  The 
debate continues: Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review 
of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 
B. U. L. REV. 685 (2017).   
 336  Any contemporary law school criminal procedure casebook traces this monumental 
history.  E.g., YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (14th ed. 2015).  As 
explained below, Herbert Packer’s “crime control” and “due process” models are preferable 
statements of ideological predilections on crime subjects than “conservative” and “liberal.”  
See PACKER, LIMITS, supra note 61; infra text at footnote 560; Marvin Zalman, A Brief Reply 
to Professor Cassell, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1493 (2018).  
 337  Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 143 (1970). 
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“innocence factor,” that was mobilized by criminal procedure conservatives 
in opposition to expanded procedural protections is highlighted by a series 
of eight essays labeled “Truth in Criminal Justice” that were internally 
published by the Justice Department in 1986.338  These well researched legal 
briefs were drawn up under Stephen Markman’s direction.  In a preface to 
the reports he wrote that little of the voluminous legal writing on criminal 
procedure “concerns increasing the system’s effectiveness in bringing 
criminals to justice, or doing justice for the actual and potential victims of 
crime.”339 
The conservative crime agenda, of which limiting constitutional rights 
was only a part, and which was later supported by President Clinton, 
succeeded in pushing incarceration rates to unprecedented heights.340  
Labeled mass incarceration, this policy is now disfavored even by 
conservatives and is undergoing partial revision.341  It seems in retrospect 
that the conservative crime agenda of advancing capital punishment, harsh 
punishment, and prison building, despite its rhetoric about factual accuracy, 
 
 338  The reports were later re-published in volume 22, numbers 3 & 4 of the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Spring & Summer 1989.  See generally Preface, 22 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 393 (1989).  The reports discuss the law of pretrial interrogation, search 
and seizure exclusionary rules, Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases regarding 
interrogation, admission of criminal histories at trial, judiciary’s supervisory power, double 
jeopardy, habeas corpus review of state judgments, and drawing adverse inferences for 
silence.  Each report was a brief for overruling pro-defendant Warren Court rulings and 
expanding prosecutorial power.  See generally id.  
 339  Stephen J. Markman, Foreword: The ‘Truth in Criminal Justice’ Series, 22 U. MICH. 
J. L. REFORM 425 (1989).  In fairness, it should be noted that as a Justice of Michigan’s 
Supreme Court, Markman has voted to grant new trials in post-conviction cases that led to 
exonerations.  See e.g., People v. Moldowan, 643 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. 2002); People v. Swain 
878 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. 2016).   
 340  ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW, supra note 157; OLIVER, supra note 50; TRAVIS C. 
PRATT, ADDICTED TO INCARCERATION (2009); ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE 
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2011).   
 341  A leading voice for a conservative turn toward liberal penal ideas (up to a point) has 
been the think tank Right on Crime, which may be the oldest such organization.  See RIGHT 
ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/ (last visited May 15, 2018).  It is, according to its web 
site, a “project of the Texas Public Policy Foundation, in partnership with the American 
Conservative Union Foundation and Prison Fellowship.”  See id.  The Texas Public Policy 
Foundation is a think tank that supports and is supported by the “establishment” or monied 
sector of the conservative movement.  See TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION, 
https://www.texaspolicy.com/ (last visited May 15, 2018).  See AVIRAM, supra note 47; 
DAGAN & TELES, supra note 47.  This conservative shift to more measured criminal justice 
and sentencing policies has not been uniformly adopted by all lawmakers and under Attorney 
General Sessions the federal government seeks to revert to the tough on crime and drug 
policies that generated mass incarceration in the first place.  Editorial, The Right Way to Fix 
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/20/opinion/trump-
prison-reform.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module
=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-re
gion 
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was not much concerned with actual innocence.  Wrongful conviction was 
not recognized as a problem by leading conservative jurists and did not 
become a major policy issue until the innocence movement and DNA 
exonerations put it on the public policy agenda.342 This background places 
Cassell’s proposals in context. 
1. Overview of Cassell’s Perspectives on Innocence Reforms 
Cassell’s 2011/12 article appeared in a symposium addressing trial 
procedures and wrongful conviction, a topic that had been ignored in the first 
wave of innocence scholarship.343  In Part I of his article, Cassell challenged 
Tim Bakken’s proposal for a novel trial process that would allow a defendant 
to plead “innocent.”344  As noted above, Bakken’s article and four other 
thought experiments suggested modifying trial procedures to improve 
verdict accuracy.345  Given their novelty, such proposals call out for review 
and Cassell’s critique of Bakken is the most valuable part of his article.  The 
merits of those articles and Cassell’s thoughtful critique are not germane to 
the present article.  My focus is on Part II of Cassell’s article, which proposed 
changes to reduce wrongful convictions and increase justice system 
accuracy.  His arguments are reiterated in a shorter chapter which adds an 
appreciation of Allen and Laudan’s “Deadly Dilemmas.”346 
Cassell’s list of accuracy-increasing criminal justice reform proposals 
is embedded in his proto-anti-Blackstonian vision: “the goal of innocence 
protection must proceed against a backdrop of a few needles—innocents 
wrongfully convicted—in a comparatively big hay stack—the vast pool of 
guilty defendants.  Reform proposals designed without an awareness of these 
trade-offs can end up presenting far more problems than they would 
solve.”347  As with my assessment of Laudan and Allen’s writings, this 
 
 342  Marvin  Zalman & Nancy E. Marion, The Public Policy Process and Innocence 
Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 11-38 
(M. Zalman & J. Carrano, eds., 2014). 
 343  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5; Tim Bakken & Lewis M. Steel, Exonerating the 
Innocent: Pretrial Innocence Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 825-1096 (2011-12).   
 344  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1065-80.  
 345  See discussion supra at notes 73-74.  The articles reviewed in Zalman and Grunewald, 
supra note 73 , are: Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: 
Beyond the Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547 (2008); Keith A. Findley, 
Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911 
(2011-12); Gross, Pretrial Incentives, supra note 187; D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: 
The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1281 (2004); Christopher Slobogin, Lessons From Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 699 (2014).   
 346  “Rather than try to reinvent the wheel here on quantitative assessments of the trade-
off, I want to simply take the Allen and Laudan calculation as accurate.”  Cassell, Protect, 
supra note 5, at 266.  
 347  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1080.  
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generalization is not wrong but is overstated.  How the trade-offs are 
assessed by researchers and managed by decision makers, however, can 
expose ideologies and political calculations that can muddy any rational 
choice.348  Getting public policy right is an arduous and continuous task. 
Cassell’s article seems to include a sleight-of-hand.  I’d assume that an 
author would list his or her most potent argument first.  In Part II Cassell lists 
and analyzes eight accuracy-enhancing proposals, but buries the most 
powerful point in position four only to dismiss it. 
 
[T]he root cause of wrongful convictions is probably lack of 
resources devoted to the criminal justice system. Whatever 
individual causes might be pinpointed in particular cases, more 
resources would often have enabled defense counsel (or police and 
prosecuting agencies) to locate persuasive evidence of innocence. 
If this diagnosis is correct, then the true solution to the wrongful 
conviction problem is devoting additional resources to the 
criminal justice system. 
 
Given the fiscal realities of the world we live in, however, it would 
truly be an academic proposal to call for significant new funding 
for defense attorneys, for example. At a macro level, the funds 
devoted to the criminal justice system are probably roughly fixed 
and not much is likely to change in the near term. What is needed, 
then, is to prioritize innocence over other criminal justice 
expenditures. Fortunately, for those who truly believe 
innocentrism, there are ways to do this.349 
 
 348  For example, relatively minimal government expenditure under the Obama 
administration established the Attorney General’s National Commission on Forensic Science 
(NCFS) in 2013 as a joint effort of the Department of Justice and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology.  National Commission on Forensic Science, JUSTICE.GOV 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs (last visited May 15, 2018).  Attorney General 
Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III in the Trump administration allowed the NCFS charter to 
expire on April 23, 2017, a decision generally met with dismay.  See, e.g., Erin Murphy, 
Sessions Is Wrong to Take Science Out of Forensic Science, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/opinion/sessions-is-wrong-to-take-science-out-of-for
ensic-science.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=
opinion-c-col-right-region&region=opinion-c-col-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right
-region&_r=0.  Given the critical assessment of the forensic sciences, the NCFS was an 
appropriate vehicle to improve services that are vital to accuracy in criminal investigation and 
prosecution.  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).  Sessions’ call for a new evaluation of forensic 
science will either “reinvent the NCFS wheel” (while losing momentum) or hinder the 
advance of a more accurate criminal justice system.  It is possible that Sessions’ decision was 
political, animated in part by a visceral antipathy to any policy that originated under President 
Barak Hussein Obama.   
 349  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1086 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).  
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Cassell’s stark realism can’t be wished away.  His observation, however, 
could, and depending on one’s values or interests, should raise questions 
about the capacity of the criminal justice system to create efficiencies with 
current resources.350  A deep flaw in his overall argument on this point is 
exposed when at one part of his article he takes Bakken to task for proposing 
a right to demand police investigation by defendants claiming innocence, 
which Cassell claims is beyond the capacity of police.351  Later in his article, 
he would require all defense attorneys to “truly attempt to learn whether their 
clients are guilty or innocent.”  Forgetting his observation that the criminal 
justice system is strapped for cash, he asserts that defense attorneys will 
“adequately investigate the claim” because, as he blithely remarks, 
“[p]resumably adequate defense investigation happens in most cases, 
regardless of whether a defendant claims to be innocent or guilty.”352  
Overlooking this glaring internal inconsistency, Cassell’s other “low cost” 
proposals that “prioritize innocence over other criminal justice expenditures” 
are admittedly second-best solutions. 
First on Cassell’s list is “more research on the frequency and causes of 
wrongful convictions.”353  He acknowledges considerable prior research but 
urges more research to pinpoint the number of factually erroneous 
convictions, a figure that most experts acknowledge is an estimate and 
cannot be known with mathematical precision.  Researchers should take a 
random sample of filed felony cases and “track them through the system to 
see what happens.”  As I will indicate in my critique, an empirical project 
completed after Cassell’s article was published that focused on the causes of 
wrongful convictions and not on the difficult and arguably impossible task 
of assessing the precise proportion of wrongful convictions outside of death 
penalty cases. 
 
 350  To that end see Geoffrey T. Burkhart, How to Leverage Public Defense Workload 
Studies, 14 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 403 (2017); Andrew Lucas Blaise Davies & Alissa Pollitz 
Worden, Local Governance and Redistributive Policy: Explaining Local Funding for Public 
Defense, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 313 (2017).   
 351  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1075 (arguing that Bakken’s proposal does not assess 
the adequacy of police investigation and would “divert[] both police and judicial resources 
into many wild-goose chases.”).   
 352  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1093-94.  I am not aware of social scientific studies 
that assess whether “adequate defense investigation happens in most cases” so Cassell’s 
assertion may be correct; however, legal scholarship on the resources available to indigent 
defense has been decrying the lack of resources for decades, and in that light this casual 
assertion by Cassell should not be accepted at face value as accurate.  See Stephen B. Bright, 
Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice, 75 MO. L. REV. 
684 (2010); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A 
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L J. 1031 (2006).   
 353  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1080-83 (italics and capitalization deleted).  
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Next on Cassell’s list, he approved of Samuel Gross’s proposal that 
defendants’ relinquish trial rights in return for innocence procedures.354  
With Ralph Grunewald, I commented on these experimental trial processes 
and do not address them herein.  I would add that Laudan and Allen and 
Cassell allude to inquisitorial approaches to adjudication but do not expand 
on many of the features of continental justice systems or inquisitorial tweaks 
to our adversary system that would offer other ideas for improving system 
accuracy. 
Cassell urged implementing the prosecutor’s Brady requirement of 
disclosing exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants.355  He described a 
case before him as a federal judge involving inadvertently withheld 
exculpatory evidence where he ordered a new trial based on doubts about the 
defendant’s guilt.  He proposed information-sharing technologies as a 
possible solution.  He also supported a reciprocal discovery proposal in the 
same symposium issue by Michael and Lesley Risinger.356  This is one area 
where Cassell’s ideas seem to be in sync with those of the innocence 
movement and might be more appealing to defense attorneys than to 
prosecutors. 
Cassell next turns to proposals, based on the conservative criminal 
procedure agenda, which would free up attorney time and resources that 
could be invested in trying cases: abolishing the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule and replacing it with civil damage remedies; replacing “the 
Miranda regime” with videotaped custodial interrogation; and barring 
prisoners from filing for habeas relief without a colorable claim of actual 
innocence.  The Fourth Amendment argument rests on analysis by William 
Stuntz that “a system with limited resources that emphasizes procedure over 
substance will give short shrift to factual claims of innocence.”357  The same 
argument applies to interrogation and the Miranda issue.  Viewing Miranda 
as a “triumph of formalism,” he would shift the limited resources of “defense 
attorney time and attention away from claims of innocence” and divert 
judicial attention away from the reliability of confessions—positions 
 
 354  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1083-84; see Gross, Pretrial Incentives, supra note 
187 (one of the five articles proposing innovative trial procedures analyzed in Zalman and 
Grunewald, supra note 7376, at 203-206, passim).  Gross’s proposal is part of a carefully 
calibrated set of trade-offs that would replace the traditional adversary trial with an 
inquisitorial-like process; to be clear Gross did not suggest that defendants give up existing 
constitutional rights in the present adversary process.   
 355  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   
 356  See D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking 
Innocence into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 886-
90 (2011-12). 
 357  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1087 (citing William Stuntz, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 37-40 
(1997)).  
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supported by both liberal and conservative academicians.358  The argument 
for restricting habeas corpus, which I will not evaluate, rests on commentary 
going back to the 1960s,359 and is a current debate among leading habeas 
scholars.360 
Cassell’s last proposal would require defense attorneys to directly ask 
their clients if they are actually innocent.361  I have already alluded to 
Cassell’s internally contradictory notion that resource-strapped defense 
attorneys have the resources to carefully investigate all cases (while police 
do not have the resources to investigate all the permutations of a suspect’s 
leads).  To Cassel, this requirement would give defense attorneys a role to 
play in preventing wrongful convictions.  If a client convinces an attorney 
that he or she is innocent, Cassell’s advice amounts to this: “Within [the] 
traditional structure [of a criminal trial], defense attorneys have many tools 
that they can employ in the defense of innocent clients.”362 
Cassell’s 2017 chapter adopts Allen and Laudan’s position and adds 
other interesting points.  He raises concerns about the comparative moral 
worth of some exonerees depending on their prior criminal status and plea-
bargaining behavior, given that the innocence literature seems to show that 
“many of those wrongfully convicted were convicted because they had 
committed other crimes.”363  Reflecting on a case in which he served as an 
expert witness for law enforcement officers defending a civil suit resulting 
from a wrongful conviction, Cassell asserts that where factually innocent 
defendants plead guilty without entering an Alford plea, they make “a 
decision to mislead the Court and enter a guilty plea [which] produces a 
wrongful conviction that is, at least to some extent, the result of illegal 
choices on their part and presumably entitled to somewhat less weight in a 
social harm calculus.”364  He also suggests that eyewitness identification and 
false confession reforms can increase the number of criminals who escape 
justice.  This has a kernel of truth but avoids countervailing arguments.365  
 
 358  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1089 (citing Welsh S. White, False Confessions and 
the Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
105, 156 (1997) and JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 206-16 (1993)).  
 359  Friendly, supra note 337.  
 360  Compare Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State 
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791  (2009) with John H. Blume et al., In Defense of 
Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435 (2011). 
 361  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1092-95; Cassell Protect, supra note 5, at 277-80.  
 362  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1094; Cassell Protect, supra note 5, at 279-80 
(similar quote).  
 363  Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 268. 
 364  Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 270. 
 365  The conservative view was that the Warren Court criminal procedure reforms were 
truth-defeating.  See footnotes and accompanying text at 337-339.  The liberal view is that the 
failure to adhere to the constitutional procedural dictates as shaped by the Warren Court’s 
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Cassell also proposes to study exonerees’ prior criminal histories on the 
supposition that a prior conviction may be a source of wrongful convictions. 
2. Critique of Cassell’s Innocence Reforms 
i. Research the Frequency and Causes of Wrongful 
Convictions.366 
There appears to be nothing objectionable to calling for “more 
research.”  Cassell seems fixated on the number of wrongful convictions and 
suggests taking a random sample of cases from one jurisdiction and 
following them up.367  It should be noted, however, that scientific research is 
subject to the same issues of limited resources and trade-offs that confront 
all enterprises.  Poorly conceived research creates lost opportunity costs for 
better research and may set analysts off on unproductive research paths.368  
That is why funded scientific research is subjected to close scrutiny by peer 
reviewers before scarce research dollars are allocated.369  What we know 
about the incidence of wrongful convictions we know from a small number 
of empirical studies that offer precise estimates, other empirical studies with 
less precise estimates, and a smattering of works that try to make sense of 
this inherently challenging issue.370  Aside from issues of costs, the time 
needed to follow cases through appeals, and the confounding problem of 
knowing the ground truth, Cassel’s proposed sketch of a research project 
misses Risinger’s important observation about the substructure of wrongful 
convictions.371  This suggests, among other things, that wrongful conviction 
 
reforms increase the number of false convictions, see Forst, supra note 80, at 13-18. A 
narrower scientific debate has arisen over whether error-reducing innocentric reforms may 
fail to identify the guilty, see discussion infra at notes 424-426.   
  366  Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 271; Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1080-83.   
 367  Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassessing the 
Conventional Wisdom About the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions (unpublished 
manuscript).  
 368  As the late John Stulson, a Nobel-winning geneticist noted, “There is no point in 
wasting good thoughts on bad data.”  Gina Kolata, Obituaries John E. Sulston, 75, Dies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018)  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/obituaries/john-e-sulston-
75-dies-found-clues-to-genes-in-a-worm.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftoday
s-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper&region=rank&module=p
ackage&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection 
 369  See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FUNDING, https://www.nsf.gov/funding/ 
(last visited May 15, 2018).   
 370  Some of the research is discussed in Marvin Zalman, Measuring Wrongful 
Convictions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (G. Bruinsma & D. 
Weisburd eds., 2014); see also Samuel R. Gross, Barbara O’Brien, Chen Hu, & Edward H. 
Kennedy, Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants who are Sentenced to Death, 11 
PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20 (2014).   
 371  Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 26, at 783.  Cassell may have understood 
what can be called a subjective sense of substructuring of wrongful conviction, because he 
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
2018] THE ANTI-BLACKSTONIANS 1391 
rates can (and likely do) vary considerably from one jurisdiction to another, 
but the methods and metrics for assessing such variation is at the present time 
underdeveloped or even non-existent.  Until the field of wrongful conviction 
develops techniques parallel to those of geologists who can make cost-
effective guesses of where to dig, Cassell’s proposal could produce a dry 
well. 
Given his (and Laudan and Allen’s) concern with cost-effectiveness, a 
decision to fund a proposed study about the proportion of wrongful 
convictions would have to evaluate its likely success and the lost opportunity 
costs of other kinds of research.  The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is at 
present wisely putting its money into sentinel event initiative research and 
programming, a concept that arose from James Doyle’s thinking about 
wrongful convictions and that has promise for correcting errors throughout 
the criminal justice system.372  For lawyers unfamiliar with this area, 
consideration might be given to the NIJ funding of the Gould-Carrano-Leo 
study on wrongful convictions causes that has generated useful information 
and should be more widely disseminated.373  In passing, note that the general 
field of wrongful conviction scholarship is packed with empirical or 
experimental studies in psychology journals, law reviews, and forensic 
science journals.  The diverse nature of the field does make it challenging to 
keep up, and several recent anthologies are valuable resources.374 
 
stated that he did not detect one wrongful conviction among a sample of 173 filed criminal 
cases in a study he conducted.  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1082.  It would be wise to 
consider Gross’s point that “False convictions are not merely unobserved, but in most cases 
are also unobservable.”  Gross, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 71, at 175.  Given the 
great challenges involved in assessing involved in post-conviction, Cassell’s confidence in 
not finding any wrongful convictions may be correct but should be taken with caution.  
Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 1014 (observing that Allen and Laudan also “failed to 
account for the substructuring of risks generally” by relying on general statistics).   
 372  James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010); James M. Doyle, An Etiology of Wrongful Convictions: Error, 
Safety, and Forward-Looking Accountability in Criminal Justice, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 56–72 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano eds., 
2014).  See NIJ’s Sentinel Events Initiative, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://www.nij.gov/topics/j
ustice-system/Pages/sentinel-events.aspx (last visited May 15, 2018).   
 373  JON B. GOULD, JULIA CARRANO, RICHARD LEO & JOSEPH YOUNG. PREDICTING 
ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS: A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 
(2012)  The results have been published in at least two places: Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, 
Richard A. Leo & Katie Hail-Jares, Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471 
(2014); Jon Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard Leo & Katie Hail-Jares, Innocent Defendants: 
Divergent Case Outcomes and What They Teach Us, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 73-89 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano eds., 2014).   
 374  CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (B. L. 
Cutler ed., 2012); FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM: PROTECTING THE INNOCENT (W. J. Koen & C. 
M. Bowers eds., 2017); WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT (Daniel Medwed ed., 2017). 
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ii. Implement Existing Rules on Disclosing Exculpatory 
Evidence375 
The greater disclosure of evidence in prosecutors’ hands to defense 
attorneys is high on the list innocence movement reforms.376  While Cassell 
is to be commended for advocating the issue, his tone differs from innocence 
advocates who were heartened by Judge Kozinski’s claim that “Brady 
violations have reached epidemic proportions in recent years.”377  Cassell 
characterizes the quantum of Brady violations as having occurred “in a few 
cases” and wrongful convictions resulting from failures to discharge Brady 
obligations “in some smaller subset of these cases.”378  He might be right.  
The generally held view is that most prosecutors act professionally.  Yet, the 
bulk of legal academic writings raise concerns about the Brady materiality 
standard and other critiques report on Brady violations including the famous 
exoneration of Senator Ted Stevens, compare American disclosure practice 
to that in England, discuss weak internal administrative practices, and the 
like.379  A recent article commissioned by California prosecutors challenged 
Judge Kozinski’s conclusion; it carefully reviewed the 29 Brady-violation 
cases Kozinski cited and concluded that some cases were negligent, although 
more than half were intentional or reckless.380  As is the case with most 
 
 375  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1084-86.  
 376  Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56 N.Y. L. 
SCH. L. REV. 969 (2011-12). 
 377  United States v. Olson, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc, Kozinski, C.J. 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. 
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, viii-ix (2015) (challenging 10 accepted ideas about criminal 
law, including “prosecutors play fair”).   
 378  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1084.  
 379  Griffin, supra note 376; Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek 
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379 
(2000); Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33 
(2004); Robert Cary, Not Guilty: The Unlawful Prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens ( 
2014); Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois 
Disclosure, 68 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695 (2007); DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: 
AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 35-51 (2012).  
 
[T]he statistical presence of these categories of manner of suppression 
among the total population can be discerned as follows: thirteen cases 
(45%) comprise intentional suppression, which occurs where the 
prosecution was aware of exculpatory or impeaching evidence, yet 
willfully withheld it from the defense.  Four cases (14%) can be fairly 
characterized as reckless, where the trial prosecutor was not personally 
aware of the favorable evidence, but willfully ignored his duty to 
search out such evidence in the files of his own office or partner 
investigative agencies.  Another four cases (14%) were simply too 
unclear to make a definitive conclusion as to manner of suppression. 
Seven cases (24%) represent mere negligent suppression, meaning the 
prosecution was unaware of the favorable evidence, which was either 
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important criminal justice and court practices, the data are very hard to come 
by.  I conducted a “back of the Internet” analysis that suggests that 6.5% of 
all NRE exonerations were infected with Brady violations, but I wouldn’t bet 
the farm on that figure.381  Given this lack of data it is difficult to make 
overarching conclusions about the way in which prosecutors operate.  Good 
scholarship, like that of Angela Davis, identifies numerous problems while 
not demonizing prosecutors as a group.382  A recent assessment by 
experienced scholars on these issues suggests that the clamor about Brady 
violations and other misconduct is beginning to make a dent in practice.383 
iii. Replace Miranda with a System of Videotaping Custodial 
Interrogation.384 
Ridding the world of the Miranda decision has been Cassell’s lifelong 
quest.  Hoping to kill off the ruling, he had a hand in maneuvering the 
Supreme Court case that decided in 2000 that Miranda was good law, 
although hobbled in many ways.385  Without buying into Cassell’s 
contentious theory that the Miranda decision reduced confessions and 
increased crime, after a half century of endless writing and research it is wise 
to rethink some of the police processes addressed by Warren Court decisions.  
Cassell cites criminal procedure scholars who think that Miranda and other 
Warren Court rulings have directed criminal lawyers to argue procedural 
 
actively withheld from it by a law enforcement partner or the evidence 
was hidden in a totally-unrelated investigation. Finally, one of the 
Kozinski 29 cases (3%) was reversed on appeal after Judge Kozinski 
noted it in his Olsen dissent (the final court to rule on the matter found 
no suppression by the prosecution, i.e., no Brady violation). 
 
Jerry P. Coleman & Jordan Lockey, Brady “Epidemic” Misdiagnosis: Claims of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Sanctions to Deter It, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 199, 207-08 (2016) 
(footnotes omitted) (twenty-nine cases cited at U.S. v. Olson, supra note 377, at 631-33).  
 381  On July 29, 2017, the NRE listed 2,069 exonerations.  Of those 1,070 indicated OM 
(official misconduct) under the “Contributing Factors Display.”  Using the NRE filter, only 
four narratives included the term ‘Brady violation’ in the narratives, and only 12 included 
‘Brady.’  I searched for ‘withheld exculpatory evidence’ and found 55 cases, and 134 with 
the term ‘withheld evidence.’  The larger number, 134, is 6.48% of 2,069 exonerations.   
 382  ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 
(2007). 
 383  Griffin, supra note 376; Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other 
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961 (2010).  
 384  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1088-90; Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 275-77.  
 385  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see Roger Parloff, Miranda on the 
Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 1999) http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/26/magazine/mira
nda-on-the-hot-seat.html (describing Cassell as “an indefatigable, ideologically driven young 
law professor at the University of Utah” and reprising his “seven -year crusade” to bring a 
case before the Supreme Court that would test the constitutionality of a 1968 law that 
purportedly “overruled” the Miranda decision.  
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issues rather than the facts of cases, an argument that clearly has merit, 
although like Epps’s arguments, are empirically untested.386  What we seem 
to be learning from innocence movement fallout is that some of the Warren 
Court’s goals in cases involving interrogation and identification procedures 
may be better achieved through changes in police management of 
interrogations, lineups, and other critical investigative procedures.  Without 
overruling Miranda, I observe that procedures like video recording and 
shifting from the psychologically coercive Reid technique to investigative 
interviewing can be instituted. 
Cassell is to be commended for having supported the video recording 
of confessions from an early date.  It demonstrates a desire to effectively 
curb abusive police practices while promoting accuracy in the justice 
process.  Given the large number of guilty interrogated suspects, video or 
audio recording will more often help police solve a case rather than free an 
innocent suspect, a point that innocence advocates accept without any 
qualms.387  However, as video recording policy is spreading it is becoming 
apparent that recording is not a panacea to end psychologically abusive 
interrogation; something more is needed.  When video recording was 
proposed in 1992 by the Police Executive Research Forum, the goals were 
to improve police administration and public relations.  Video recording came 
to be seen as a way to reduce the number of false confessions only after 
innocence movement activity raised consciousness that false confessions 
occur in significant numbers.  Cases exist where entire interrogations that 
produced false confessions were video recorded, and yet were nevertheless 
deemed true confessions by prosecutors, judges, and juries who later 
observed the videos.388  The limits of video recording are apparent when 
 
 386  STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 328.  
 387  Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, Recent Developments: The Consequences of 
Law Enforcement Officials’ Failure to Record Custodial Interviews as Required by Law, 99 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215 (2009).  
 388  In some cases, downstream observers have watched or heard confessions, later proven 
false, that were taken to be true by prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and jurors.  See, 
e.g., Michael Scott, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3622 (last visited May 15, 2018); Robert 
Springsteen, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoner
ation/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3658 (last visited May 15, 2018); see also BEVERLY 
LOWRY, WHO KILLED THESE GIRLS? COLD CASE: THE YOGURT SHOP MURDERS (2016).  The 
practice of audio or video recording only a confession after a lengthy and possibly 
psychologically coercive interrogation is inherently biasing and was a target of cognitive 
psychologists and innocence reformers.  See Saul Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: 
Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010) (APLS Approved White 
Paper).  The preferred practice of recording the entire interrogation is designed to discourage 
abusive practices and to providing an accurate record. See Saul Kassin et al., Police Reports 
of Mock Suspect Interrogations: A Test of Accuracy and Perception, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 
230 (2017) (transcripts or audio recordings of interrogation capture more police tactics than 
police reports written soon after interrogation).  A valuable Netflix documentary, “The 
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compared to a new method known as the investigative interview, which 
replaces the psychologically coercive methods of interrogation allowed 
under American law with non-coercive, fact-based questioning.  The 
investigative interview has become the preferred, sanctioned method of 
pretrial examination of suspects in England and a number of other nations, 
where police officials partnered with psychologists to develop more effective 
and more human ways of questioning suspects.  Research has shown that the 
method, under the PEACE acronym,389generates the same number of 
admissions by suspects and is far less likely to pressure a weak suspect into 
a false confession.  The replacement of the more abusive Reid method with 
investigative interviewing methods by some training companies presages not 
simply a technological fix, but a shift in the culture of policing that values 
case facts and evidence-based methods for questioning rather than the kinds 
of bluffing and bullying that is now supported by law.390 
iv. Abolish the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule and 
Replace it with Civil Remedies391 
Cassell does not observe that the exclusionary rule has been rendered 
less than mandatory by the Supreme Court.392  But that aside, search and 
seizure has not concerned innocence advocates.  Perhaps it should, because 
the kind of police impunity that was unleashed by the Supreme Court’s 
virtual “drug exception” to the Fourth Amendment,393 which has enabled 
 
Confession Tapes” “presents six cases of possible false confessions leading to 
murder convictions of the featured people.  In each case, the documentary presents alternate 
views of how the crime could have taken place and features experts on false confessions, 
criminal law, miscarriages of justice and psychology.” The Confession Tapes, WIKIPEDIA 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Confession_Tapes (last visited May 15, 2018).   
 389  PEACE stands for ‘Preparation and Planning’; ‘Engage and Explain’; ‘Account, 
Clarify and Challenge’; ‘Closure’; and ‘Evaluation.’  See Dave Walsh & Ray Bull, What 
Really is Effective in Interviews with Suspects? A Study Comparing Interviewing Skills 
Against Interviewing Outcomes, 15 LEG. & CRIM. PSYCH. 305 (2010) (finding interviewers 
who attain the PEACE standard significantly more likely to to obtain full comprehensive 
account or confession).  A comprehensive anthology of suspect questioning methods around 
the globe indicates that thee prevalent methods are torture, psychological interrogation (e.g., 
the Reid method common in the United States) and investigative interviewing.  See David 
Walsh et al., INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PRACTICES IN INVESTIGATIVE 
INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION: VOL. 2: SUSPECTS (2016).   
 390  See Marvin Zalman, Laura Rubino & Brad Smith, Beyond Police Compliance with 
Electronic Recording of Interrogation Legislation: Toward Error Reduction, CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. (2017); JAMES L. TRAINUM, HOW THE POLICE GENERATE FALSE CONFESSIONS: AN 
INSIDE LOOK AT THE INTERROGATION ROOM (2016). 
 391  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1087-88; Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 274-75. 
 392  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).  
 393  Steven Wisotsky, Essay: Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of 
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L. REV. 889 (1987); Juan R. Torruella, Deja Vu: A Federal Judge 
Revisits the War on Drugs, or Life in a Balloon, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167 (2011); Paul 
Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. 
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America’s war on drugs and its consequential racialized mass 
incarceration,394 may have indirectly led to thousands of false convictions.  
As Ralph Grunewald and I wrote: 
 
As a matter of logic, eliminating the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule cannot lead to wrongful convictions, because 
possession of contraband signals guilt and the exclusionary rule 
itself allows the guilty to escape justice. Is this so in practice? 
Some legal scholarship has linked defendants’ rights to inaccurate 
verdicts and to that end the Burger Court created a hierarchy of 
constitutional rights related to factual truth, “with those rights that 
are trial related at the top, the [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege in 
the middle and the [F]ourth [A]mendment right with its unpopular 
remedy of exclusion at the bottom.”  One consequence of the 
exclusionary rule is widespread police perjury covering illegal 
searches, but even then one may argue that the police are using the 
evidence against “bad guys”—or so it seems from applying the 
abstract logic of single cases to mass action. Extravagant fears of 
crime and drugs have led to a four-decade massive increase in 
prisoners generated by harsh sentencing laws, police incentives, 
bipartisan political support, a runaway prison-building program, 
and an enabling role by a conservative Supreme Court that 
shredded Fourth Amendment protections. It is no longer possible 
to fall back on brittle logic to support believing that every 
convicted drug possessor was factually guilty. In too many cases, 
the war on drugs has corrupted or overwhelmed American police 
departments, leading to a rise of police corruption and wrongful 
convictions both in pleaded-to drug convictions and tried 
homicide convictions.395 
 
As it turns out, there is useful empirical support for the proposition that 
corrupted drug law enforcement has led to a large number of false 
convictions.  The National Registry of Exonerations (NRE) has collected 
data on what it calls “group exonerations,” or exonerations “of innocent 
defendants who were falsely convicted as a result of large scale patterns of 
police perjury and corruption,”396 a phenomenon first identified in Gross’s 
 
L. REV. 1389 (1993); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s 
Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35 (1998).  
 394  ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROWN, supra note 157.  
 395  Zalman & Grunewald, supra note 76, at 252-253 (footnotes omitted) (typographical 
error corrected).  
 396  SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012 (2012), https://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf   
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pioneering exoneration study in the early 2000s.397  Gross and associates 
located three group exonerations (previously labeled “mass exonerations”) 
by 2005: the well-attested Rampart scandal in Los Angeles,398 the Tulia, 
Texas debacle,399 and the Dallas sheetrock cases.  Since that time the NRE 
has uncovered more group exonerations, up to 12 in 2012.400  “Those group 
exonerations included at least 1100 additional exonerated criminal 
defendants who are not listed in the Registry itself.”401  Given the widespread 
use of militarized policing to enforce drug laws in rural areas, the quasi-
private association of some law enforcement drug task forces, and the large 
sums of money involved, the NRE’s 12 group exonerations may be the tip 
of a corruption iceberg.402 
These corrupt and blatant Fourth Amendment violations were 
undeterred by the exclusionary rule, providing an occasion to rethink the 
control of illicit police behavior with methods that go beyond the rule. Police 
shooting of civilians in the news today and the seeming failure of criminal 
prosecution in blatant cases of abuse suggests that controlling police 
misbehavior is an intractable issue.403  At the least, Cassell and other 
innocence skeptics might consider rethinking some assumptions about the 
relationship of police search and seizure activity and errors of due process.404 
 
 397  Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 533-35 (2005). 
 398  Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1133 (2013). 
 399  NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND CORRUPTION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN 
(2005).  
 400  GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 396, at 80-90. 
 401  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, Update: 2012 1 (2013), http://www.law.um
ich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE2012UPDATE4_1_13_FINAL.pdf.  
 402  See MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES 
OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE (Peter B. Kraska ed., (2001); BLAKESLEE, supra note 
399, at 201-13; Rush v. City of Mansfield, 771 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ohio 2011); Jennifer 
Gonnerman, How One Woman’s Fight to Save Her Family Helped Lead to a Mass 
Exoneration, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2018) (describing first Chicago mass exoneration of 32 
people falsely convicted because of corrupt Chicago P.D. officer planting drugs) 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/28/how-one-womans-fight-to-save-her-
family-helped-lead-to-a-mass-exoneration.   
 403  See, e.g., Justin Nix et al., A Bird’s Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015, 16 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 309 (2017) (reviewing 990 fatal police shootings compiled by 
the Washington Post and calling for federal data on subject); Roger Dunham & Nick Peterson, 
Making Black Lives Matter: Evidence-Based Policies for Reducing Police Bias in the Use of 
Deadly Force, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 341 (2017); Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, Here’s 
How Many Cops Got Convicted of Murder Last Year For On-Duty Shootings, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions
_us_5695968ce4b086bc1cd5d0da (based on data from Assoc. Prof. Philip Stinson at Bowling 
Green University, no police convicted in 2015 and only 13 convictions of 18 charged from 
2005 to 2013).   
 404  Even impressive efforts by leading legal scholars to re-think issues related to policing 
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Hauling out jurists’ well-intentioned but ideologically-driven proposals from 
the 1980s to control police misconduct that have had little traction is not an 
adequate approach.  Legal scholars seeking genuine attempts to curb police 
excesses through civil and administrative measures need to engage more 
with criminological and criminal justice policy research.405  Any such 
overtures are welcome at a time when the nation’s chief magistrate has 
publicly encouraged police to be “rough.”406 
v. Require All Defense Attorneys to Ask Clients if They 
Committed the Alleged Crime and Aggressively 
Investigate Claims of Actual Innocence407 
This proposal envisions a radical change to the adversary model of 
adjudication.  Whether a defense attorney should know or be concerned 
about a client’s guilt is a perennial ethical issue, but one which, given long 
adversary system traditions, resolves by allowing attorney indifference to 
factual guilt or innocence. The attorney’s role is to put the prosecution to its 
proof so as to insure prosecutorial integrity. Cassell justifies a radical threat 
to the adversary system by asserting that “[i]nnocent persons ensnared in the 
criminal justice system have a stronger claim to our attention than do the 
guilty.”408 Leaving aside the difficulty of assessing whether a client is 
guilty,409 this position might be arguably correct from an ethical position and 
may indeed be felt, psychologically, by attorneys who are representing a 
palpably innocent client,410 but it is not a correct statement of my 
understanding of the law. The adversary system, as an objective and imperial 
(and even imperious) entity, is concerned with procedural integrity and 
counts on proper procedure to get the substance right.411 
 
proceed almost entirely within the world of law reviews, talking only to other legal scholars 
and not engaging with police researchers.  See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: 
Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016); 
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016).   
 405  See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (2005). 
 406  Philip Bump, Trump’s Speech Encouraging Police to be ‘Rough,’ Annotated, WASH. 
POST (July 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/28/tr
umps-speech-encouraging-police-to-be-rough-annotated/?utm_term=.1427973f2bcb. 
 407  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1092-95; Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 277-80.   
 408  Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 278.  
 409  Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 410  This is stated plaintively by attorney Patrick McGuinness on the night before trial in 
the documentary film MURDER ON A SUNDAY MORNING (Direct Cinema 2001).   
 411  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 27-49 (describing development of this ethic 
and rule among the Church Fathers who were confronted with the need to judge, and thus to 
draw blood, as power to govern shifted from the Roman Empire to the Church).  “The history 
of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.”  McNabb v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).   
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Debating the merits of the adversary system is fair game and is a well-
established tradition of legal scholarship.412  Were Cassell to flesh out his 
argument, as have other scholars, with some thought given to his proposal’s 
possible negatives and better detailing the operation of such a novel 
approach,413 I would respect the product as an interesting innocentric trial 
procedure innovation.  However, given his inconsistency between the limited 
resources in criminal justice and an assertion that defense attorneys have the 
capacity to fully investigate cases, and the total lack of any “innocentric” 
procedures as a tradeoff for an attorney’s obligation to inquire into 
innocence,414 I have to view this proposal as a provocation.  The proposal 
could become a talking point for prosecutors opposed to innocence reforms.  
Were such a proposal to be enacted, with no other changes to the adversary 
model, and without erecting some of the accuracy-enhancing elements in 
modern, European, inquisitorial systems, 415 its effect would be to make 
defendants’ lawyers structurally subservient to prosecutors, at least by 
limiting the scope of defense cross-examination of witnesses. 
vi. Arguments Raised in “Can We Protect the Innocent Without 
Freeing the Guilty?” 
As noted above, Cassell added a few points in his Chapter in Medwed’s 
anthology.  He raises an interesting criminological point about the number 
of exonerees (and by proxy the proportion of the wrongfully convicted) with 
prior criminal records.  Innocence movement legal scholarship is not 
concerned with the question but at least two valuable criminological studies 
have explored pre- and post-exoneration offending.  Gould et al.’s study of 
what factors cause erroneous prosecutions to become wrongful convictions 
identifies a prior criminal record as a statistically significant variable.416  A 
study of post-conviction offending found a correlation between high 
monetary exoneree awards and lower levels of offending, suggesting that 
 
 412  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, SECOND EDITION (Craig M Bradley ed., 
2007); articles abound, see e.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide 
to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should 
We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 542 (1990); James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The 
Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 119 (2009). 
 413  This is a point Cassell makes in his somewhat positive appraisal of Gross’s 
“investigative trial.”  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 56.   
 414  “Within [the] traditional structure [of a criminal trial], defense attorneys have many 
tools that they can employ in the defense of innocent clients.”  Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, 
at 1094. 
 415  In the part of our article that focused on German trial procedures, my colleague Ralph 
Grunewald specified the ways that German criminal procedure protects defendants rights, 
“often much more broadly than in the United States.”  Zalman & Grunewald, supra note 7376, 
at 226.   
 416  Jon Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 498-99 
(2014).  
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crimes by exonerees are driven by economic factors.417  These factors are 
relevant to certain kinds of innocence policies, including exoneree 
compensation, but should not be relevant to adjudication under existing 
adversary system theory.  However, one of the eight proposals that came out 
of the Justice Department’s Reagan-era “truth in criminal justice” series 
advocated that defendants’ criminal histories be admitted at trial.418  A 
defendant’s full background is made available to judges and jurors in French 
criminal trials, but a French defendant is entitled to request extensive police 
reinvestigation of facts (as was proposed by Bakken), and another significant 
material trade-off is that criminal penalties are far less draconian in France 
and Europe generally.419  Cassell’s intellectual career suggests that his 
proposals derive from a conservative, crime control model420 vision of 
criminal justice that would depart from the present adversary system with no 
countervailing civil liberty protections. 
Nevertheless, police investigators are not wrong to question people 
with certain prior criminal histories as possible suspects (as they are not 
wrong to question family members in suspicious deaths).  The danger, 
however, arises when investigators stupidly turn a probabilistic factor into a 
categorical one.421  Cassell pokes holes in the rectitude of some or many 
exonerees by raising the reality that some have been involved in criminal 
activity.  A balanced inquiry about the criminal conduct of those involved in 
wrongful conviction cases would also examine the degree to which wrongful 
convictions are caused by the criminal misconduct of police, forensic 
examiners and prosecutors, and not only among the group exonerations 
identified by the NRE.422  The bulk of wrongful conviction scholarship 
examines justice system errors, and although many exoneration narratives 
expose criminal wrongdoing, very few scholars have systematically studied 
criminality by system actors as a source of wrongful conviction.423  
 
 417  Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 353 (2014). 
 418  Office of Legal Policy, A Report to the Attorney General on the Admission of Criminal 
Histories at Trial [1986], 22 J. L. REFORM 707 (1989).   
 419  See Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527 
(1997); Richard Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 
171(Richard Vogler & Barbara Huber eds., 2008). 
 420  As described by PACKER, LIMITS, supra note 61.   
 421  See, e.g., CALVIN C. JOHNSON, JR. WITH GREG HAMPIKIAN, EXIT TO FREEDOM (2003). 
 422  See e.g., BLAKESLEE, supra note 399.  GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD 
MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA 230-33 (2012) 
(discussing the impunity murder of prisoner Samuel Shepherd and shooting of prisoner Walter 
Irvin by Sheriff Willis McCall); THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT, VICTIMS OF JUSTICE: 
REVISITED (2005) (discussing prosecutors tried and acquitted for acts in the prosecution of 
Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez).   
 423  See MICHAEL NAUGHTON, THE INNOCENT AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 15-69 (2013) (adopting the term 
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Exploration of this topic by Prof. Cassell, with his finely tuned sensibility 
for injustice, would be welcomed. 
Cassell raised a concern that eyewitness identification reforms might 
allow guilty criminals to escape prosecution, but does not flesh out the issue.  
He follows the empirical challenge to eyewitness reforms by Steven Clark 
and others demonstrating in laboratory studies that reducing the selection of 
innocent perpetrators increases the number of guilty perpetrators not 
identified.424  Clark’s work is in contrast to the kind of global anti-
Blackstonianism reviewed in this article, and his challenge to every 
eyewitness reform was answered by Wells, Steblay and Dysart.425  Further 
analysis of this more precise debate is beyond the scope of this article.  It is 
worth noting, however, that National Research Council (NRC) of the 
National Academy of Sciences has reviewed the debate, and has supported 
most eyewitness reforms generated by the work of psychological scientists, 
which should go far to reduce identification errors without “deadly dilemma” 
tradeoffs.  The reforms supported by the NRC include instructing 
participants that the perpetrator may not be in the lineup, blind 
administration, fair procedures for filler-selection so that the suspect does 
not stand out, immediately taking the witness’s confidence estimate if an 
identification is made, video recording the lineup, and insuring that only one 
suspect is included in a lineup.426  The procedure neither supported nor 
dismissed by the NRC is the sequential lineup procedure.  Although 
substantial research shows greater accuracy with sequential lineups,427 the 
concern that they result in fewer overall picks, which in turn reduces the 
number of guilty suspects being picked and ultimately convicted, has not 
been resolved.  As a result of methodological and substantive concerns, the 
NRC did not recommend that police departments adopt sequential lineups at 
this time.428 
 
 
 
 
 
“abortions of justice” for wrongful convictions generated by police illegality).   
 424  Clark, supra note 37.   
 425  Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Reforms: Are Suggestiveness-Induced 
Hits and Guesses True Hits?, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCH. SCI. 264 (2012). 
 426  See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reform, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615 
(2006).  
 427  Nancy K., Steblay et al., Seventy-Two Tests of the Sequential Lineup Superiority 
Effect: A Meta-Analysis and Policy Discussion, 17 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y AND L. 99-139 (2011). 
 428  National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness 
Identification, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. (2014).   
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IV. AN EMPIRICAL CRITIQUE AND ARGUMENT FOR THE 
BLACKSTONE PRINCIPLE―THE REAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
Part III presented “internal” critiques of the anti-Blackstonians.  The 
“external” critique in this Part does not propound a systematic theory of 
adjudication or the criminal justice process. Its empirical sketches of 
criminal justice show several things.  “The Prosecutor as a Source of 
Impunity” shows that prosecutorial practices can allow serious crime to go 
unpunished and unjustly distribute public safety.  “Recidivism and 
Rehabilitation” offers research findings that weaken Laudan’s insinuation 
that once convicted a person is a continuous, inveterate recidivator who can 
be stopped from committing crime at every turn only by perpetual 
imprisonment.  “Plea Bargaining” provides evidence to undermine the idea 
that convictions obtained by plea must be more factually accurate than 
convictions obtained by trial.  “How Courts Operate” draws on an 
ethnography which shows one of the busiest criminal courts in the country 
to operate in ways that are poles apart from the idealized vision held by many 
and weakens one’s confidence that all criminal courts can routinely deliver 
accurate verdicts or pleas.  “Murder, Race, and the State” argues that the 
source of high black-on-black serious crime rates is the withdrawal of state 
protection in poor minority communities that has existed at least since the 
mid-nineteenth century.  The anti-Blackstonians’ programs appear oblivious 
to this and would only continue or exacerbate this sorry state of affairs.  
Many more sketches could be offered, but together they display an uneven 
justice process in which crime control relies on more than convictions and 
prison.  They imply that an anti-Blackstonian agenda would possibly 
increase the number of wrongful convictions, perhaps substantially, without 
offering greater protection against crime victimization, a consideration that 
offsets crime increases hypothesized by anti-Blackstonians as a result of 
innocence reforms. 
A. Introduction 
Epps and Laudan and Allen’s jurisprudential analyses are applied to 
rules of criminal procedure, justice system statistics, Supreme Court 
decisions, and evidence theories.  These approaches, by abstracting too much 
from the quotidian reality of adjudication and criminal justice, undermine or 
at least weaken their conclusions.  Criminological insights and a gritty 
picture of contemporary practices drawn from legal scholarship and 
investigative journalism depict a justice system favoring the prosecution, and 
in which, oddly, errors of impunity are sometimes generated by prosecutors 
and not only by the criminal defense.  Cassell’s approach is more empirical 
and grounded in a coherent conservative approach to criminal procedure that 
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grew out of a backlash to Warren Court rulings.429 
Before offering an exposé, I need to state a belief that most system 
actors act professionally and usually get correct results.430  This belief is 
based on readings, research, and interactions with system actors.  American 
criminal justice is no longer the “third degree” system of a century ago,431 
and for all the real problems of racial friction, is not the kind of “old” Jim 
Crow era system that was a thriving reality in my lifetime.432  Academic 
writings describe positive changes in policing, forensic science, prosecution, 
defense lawyering, and the education of judges about forensic science, 
although all justice institutions fall short of achieving attainable ideals.433  
Innocence movement leaders never claimed that the American criminal 
justice system is so thoroughly corrupt that it is irredeemable.434  Indeed, the 
systemic innocentric reforms proposed reflect a paradox: while a nontrivial 
number of wrongful convictions occur because of serious justice system 
problems, reform is possible because of systemic improvements and a high 
 
 
 429  Most legal criminal procedure scholarship is “liberal,” fueled in part by a realization 
that the Supreme Court’s decisions enabled the “war on crime and drugs,” which imposed 
enormous burdens on society.  See ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW, supra note 157; FORMAN, 
supra note 157.  Recently, the conservative position on crime policy, silently accepting the 
liberal critique, has moved away from the “war on crime/drugs” trope (although the Trump 
administration has revived the tough on crime position for federal prosecutors).  See DAGAN 
& TELES, supra note 162; AVIRAM, supra note 162; PFAFF, supra note 147.  Whether 
conservative Supreme Court justices will align their constitutional criminal procedure 
decisions to accommodate a new position remains to be seen.  A sign of internecine 
conservative conflict is the conflicting positions taken by Justice Clarence Thomas and 
Attorney General Sessions on asset forfeiture.  See Damon Root, Clarence Thomas vs. Jeff 
Sessions on Asset Forfeiture, REASON (July 20, 2017) http://reason.com/blog/2017/07/20/clar
ence-thomas-vs-jeff-sessions-on-civi.   
 430  We need to pay attention to genres.  I observed in a chapter about detective work that 
the kind of narrative writing that extols the acuity and success of police investigators (the true 
crime genre) leads readers to be in awe of the ability of detectives.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, articles and books about wrongful convictions (some of which falls into the true 
crime genre) almost uniformly paint a picture of police incompetence, tunnel vision, or 
malfeasance.  Between these factually accurate but incomplete genres, social science research 
about police investigation depicts a less glamorous and less “noir” world of deadlines, heavy 
caseloads, resource limitations and bounded rationality.  See Marvin Zalman, The Detective 
and Wrongful Conviction, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: 
MAKING JUSTICE 147-63 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano eds., 2014). 
 431  ERNEST JEROME HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE: A STUDY OF THE UNLAWFUL 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW (1931).  
 432  S. JONATHAN BASS, HE CALLS ME BY LIGHTENING: THE LIFE OF CALIPH WASHINGTON 
AND THE FORGOTTEN SAGA OF JIM CROW, SOUTHERN JUSTICE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
(2017); KING, supra note 422.   
 433  See, e.g., Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity 
and Change: Into the Twenty-First Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55 (2010).  
 434  This characterization of the innocence movement is implied in Hoffman, supra note 
53.  
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level of professionalism and self-awareness among today’s criminal justice 
leaders compared to the past.435 
The anti-Blackstonians’ “crime and punishment” perspective fastens 
analysis on substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, trials, evidence law 
and imprisonment.  Except for the hangman and transports to Australia, this 
was the institutional context of the debate about justice system trade-offs 
between Rev. William Paley and Samuel Romilly around 1800.  An 
empirical criminological focus on how the justice system operates today 
draws on a wider slice of reality.  The burden in this Part is to provide 
empirical evidence that the system is stacked against defendants, that justice 
systems errors arise from a variety of sources that have little or nothing to do 
with standards of proof and criminal procedure, that anti-Blackstonian 
reforms would do little to diminish most errors of impunity, and would likely 
increase wrongful convictions with little crime-reduction effect.  The 
intuition that the deck is normally stacked against the defendant, requiring 
non-symmetrical pro-defendant procedures, is prominent in common law 
countries but less so in liberal democracies with so-called inquisitorial 
justice systems.436  As it seems impossible to finely calculate the state’s 
advantage,437 the Blackstone principle and asymmetric rules like reasonable 
doubt seem to be intuitive attempts to even the scales that has been noticed 
in many justice systems.438 
 
 435  I’ve made a case for this proposition in Marvin Zalman, Edwin Borchard and the 
Limits of Innocence Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS & MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: 
CAUSES AND REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 329-
55 (C. R. Huff & M. Killias eds., 2013).  
 436  The notion that wrongful convictions occur very rarely in inquisitorial countries is 
beginning to change.  See UNDERSTANDING WRONGFUL CONVICTION: THE PROTECTION OF THE 
INNOCENT ACROSS EUROPE AND AMERICA (Luca Lupária ed., 2015).   
 437  FORST, supra note 80, at 45-56.  
 438  The Talmudists understood this.  Rabbis were granted power to regulate Jews’ daily 
lives under the Romans and their successors after the Temple was destroyed and the Jewish 
commonwealth crushed in 70 CE.  They asserted the need for effective criminal justice.  In 
Pirke Avot, the “ethics of the fathers,” a fundamental collection of basic Talmudic principles, 
“Rabbi Chanina, the Deputy High Priest, says: Pray for the welfare of the government, for 
were it not of the fear of it, people would swallow each other alive” REUVEN P. BULKA, 
CHAPTERS OF THE SAGES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON PIRKEY AVOTH 93 (Jason 
Aronson, 1993) (Pirke Avot [PA] chapter & verse 3:2).  Yet, the Rabbis knew that their 
governing overlords were essentially despotic.  “Be cautious with the ruling authorities, for 
they befriend a person only for their own needs. They appear as friends when it is to their 
advantage, but they do not stand by the individual at the time of that person’s distress” (PA 
2:3) Id. at 57.  Nevertheless, when they had the ability, the Rabbinical authorities were 
enjoined to conduct trials aimed at achieving the truth.  “Rabban Shimon, the son of Gamliel 
says: The world is preserved through three things: truth, justice, and peace, as it is said: 
‘Administer truth and the justice of peace in your gates’ (Zechariah 8:16)” (PA 1:18) Id. at 
47.  
          With these injunctions in mind, the Talmudists created decidedly “Blackstonian” 
criminal procedure rules.  While a civil tribunal consists of 3 judges, a criminal tribunal was 
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B. Sketches 
1. The Prosecutor as a Source of Impunity — Amy Bach, 
Ordinary Injustice439 
Under a district attorney for four Mississippi counties, the conviction 
rate in one county dropped from about 90 percent to only 15 percent over a 
period of years.  The District Attorney was not corrupt but exercised his 
discretion to focus on what he saw as major cases.  Amy Bach listed 16 
proper factors that a prosecutor could use to decide whether to not prosecute 
a case, from doubt about guilt to the mental status of the accused.  
Admittedly, factors like restitution or undue hardship to the accused will play 
little or no role in the serious crimes addressed by Laudan (homicide, rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault), but the Mississippi prosecutor’s pattern of 
decisions led to systematic impunity that withdrew legal protection from 
victims of serious domestic abuse (many of whom were seriously assaulted), 
storeowners subject to theft and embezzlement, children victimized by 
statutory rape, and people assaulted by those with severe mental problems.  
The D.A. even refused to prosecute a large-scale illicit drug manufacturing 
operation.  One reason for the lack of effective prosecution in the county was 
underfunded and inadequate policing. 
It is not clear whether Bach’s in-depth investigation in one locality is 
representative of other rural prosecutors.  It may be an outlier, but we cannot 
know how far from the norm without better county-level criminal justice data 
 
comprised of 23.  In a civil case the opening argument can favor or oppose the defendant; in 
a capital case the opening statement must favor the defendant.  A civil case can be decided by 
a simple majority as can a capital acquittal.  But no execution can be had on a unanimous vote 
as it is presumed corrupt, but only by a super-majority.  A civil verdict may be reversed 
whether the defendant was held liable or absolved, but in capital cases an acquittal may not 
be later reversed.  In a capital cases, some must argue for the defendant, while in a civil case 
all judges could argue against a defendant.  A person who argued for acquittal in a capital 
case cannot thereafter change his position.  Civil cases are discussed in daylight and may be 
decided during the nighttime, but in capital cases the merits are argued in daytime, and the 
verdict must be reached in the daytime, either an acquittal on the same day, but a guilty verdict 
must be decided on the following day.  In civil cases the senior judges are polled first, but in 
capital cases the junior judges are polled first, so as not to be swayed by seniority.  A capital 
verdict of guilt is based only on direct evidence and not on hearsay.  Witnesses in capital cases 
are admonished that they will be cross-examined severely.  A witness who saw the defendant 
committing a murder had to warn him that his act was sinful and unlawful.  The testimony of 
witnesses who contradict one another becomes invalid.  Composition is not allowed in capital 
cases as it is in civil cases. Capital guilt is followed by execution, normally by stoning.  The 
site of execution must be far from court (the judges must remain in the courthouse) to give 
time for a convicting judge to change his mind (officers at the court and with the execution 
procession remain in eye contact).  If the rules of procedure disallowed the execution (e.g., if 
a witness did not warn the perpetrator to desist) but there were witnesses to intentional murder, 
provisions for life imprisonment existed.  HYMAN E. GOLDIN, HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE, MISHNAH: SANHEDRIN—MAKKOT 106-26 (1952).  
 439  AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 130-90 (2009). 
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and analysis, the kind that Measures for Justice made public for the first time 
in 2017.440  It is reasonable to assume that poorly funded rural county justice 
systems operate below par, leading to injustices of impunity that ought to 
drive anti-Blackstonians to distraction and focusing their attention on 
improving and strengthening prosecutorial professionalism.  This sketch 
does not alone undercut an anti-Blackstonian message, but suggests that 
before seeking to weaken defendant’s rights, analysis should explore 
whether prosecutors contribute to errors of impunity. 
2. Recidivism and Rehabilitation— Cullen and Jonson: 
Change is Possible441 
Offenders’ high persistent recidivism rates were used by Laudan as 
support for reducing the standard of proof.  Recidivism rates are problematic 
and need to be factored into sound crime reduction policies.  The surveys 
Laudan relied on were taken during America’s mass incarceration binge 
when rehabilitation programs were at low ebb.442  While no criminologist 
claims that rehabilitation can eliminate recidivism, evidence-based 
rehabilitation programs do reduce recidivism.  It would be negligent for 
policy officials (or criminal law scholars) to consider diminishing legal or 
constitutional rights of defendants as a way to (ultimately) reduce crime 
without considering recent scientific evidence on rehabilitation.  Francis 
Cullen, a leading criminologist, and Cheryl Jonson thoroughly review more 
than 200 research articles tracing the trajectory of rehabilitation studies. 
Until about 1970 rehabilitation was the reigning criminological theory 
of punishment, included in the Model Penal Code as a valid punishment 
rationale.443  Reviews of recidivism research around 1970s showed that many 
programs were not effective.  A famous article by researcher Robert 
Martinson declared that “nothing works.”  That anti-government mantra was 
picked up both by left-leaning academics wary of discretion used by justice 
 
 440  Bach diagnosed lack of county level data as a source of errors of justice in her book 
and has worked to rectify this with an organization that is providing usable data.  MEASURES 
FOR JUSTICE, https://measuresforjustice.org/ (last visited .May 17, 2018); see discussion supra 
in note 154 .   
 441  Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs, in 
CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 293-330 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011).   
 442  I do not mean to imply that the timing of those surveys alone means that the reported 
recidivism rates were necessarily higher than at other times, although it is a hypothesis worth 
testing.  To the degree that imprisonment is a criminogenic factor, avoiding the unnecessary 
use of imprisonment for less serious felonies is a factor in reducing the number of recidivists 
even if rates are uniformly high.   
 443  The Model Penal Code takes a utilitarian approach and includes rehabilitation along 
with deterrence as a general purpose for sentencing and treatment of offenders.  MODEL PENAL 
CODE, § 1.102 (2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2016).  This section also advances use of scientific 
knowledge as a desideratum aimed at future implementation by legislatures.   
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system actors to control offenders, and by right-leaning policy makers who 
saw rehabilitation as coddling inmates.  Rehabilitation rapidly declined as a 
reigning punishment philosophy, followed quickly by the elimination of 
many rehabilitation programs as prisons became overly crowded and 
community corrections became bloated.444  This change was consistent with 
America’s turn from a New Deal consensus and the denigration of 
government service by high ranking politicians who valorized business and 
the private sector, a process abetted by “wars” on drugs and crime that led to 
mass incarceration.445  Some criminologists supportive of weak state 
ideologies (anarchists on the left, libertarians on the right) favored “radical 
non-intervention” for many offenders.  A more prescient political theoretic 
analysis holds that unlike Switzerland, where prison is modeled as a place to 
make democratic citizens, in America’s “virtual” and “potential” democracy 
in which not more than half the electorate participates in elections, prison is 
relatively invisible.  As a result prison inmates and probationers and parolees 
have been turned over to criminological specialists who are “not concerned 
with issues of citizenship and democracy.”446 
Correctional programming did not disappear, but was held in low 
esteem by many criminologists.  A shift toward methods of multi-program 
analysis from narrative approaches to meta-analysis in the 1980s allowed for 
more robust studies of the average effect size of rehabilitation treatment, 
defined as “a planned correctional intervention that targets for change 
internal and/or social criminogenic factors with the goal of reducing 
recidivism and, where possible, of improving other aspects of an offender’s 
life.”447  Despite some limitations of meta-analysis, studies of heterogeneous 
programs showed decreases in recidivism of from ten to up to forty 
percent.448  Education and work programs were found to have positive 
effects, although measurement was limited by participant selection bias; 
more refined analysis suggested that treatment effect was modified by 
prisoner’s prior level of education and that to be effective a minimum 
exposure was required.  As for drug treatment, residential therapeutic 
 
 444  JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE 
UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990 (1993); JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A 
REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA (2014). 
 445  SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 157.  
 446  Bernard E. Harcourt, The Invisibility of the Prison in Democratic Theory: A Problem 
of “Virtual Democracy”, 23 GOOD SOC’Y 6, 14 (2014).  
 447  Cullen & Jonson, supra note 441, at 295 (italics in original deleted).  
 448  Cullen & Jonson, supra note 441, at 303. The authors cited a 2007 review of eight 
meta-analyic studies of correctional interventions on recidivism,  stated  that “they showed 
that treatment programs were consistently associated withreductiuons in offending.  In fact, 
they discovered that none of the meta-analyses ‘found less than a 10 percent reduction in 
recidivism,’ and that ‘most of their mean effect sizes represent recidivism reductions in the 
20 percent range, varying upward to nearly 40 percent” (internal citations omitted).  Id.  
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community programs were effective in reducing recidivism but group 
counseling and boot-camps had no effect.449 
States could put this scientific evidence about rehabilitation to use by 
investing in programs designed to partially reduce recidivism rates.  The way 
forward toward a more enlightened, evidence-based correctional policy is 
not entirely clear.  Since about 2010 conservative groups have supported 
milder criminal justice policies, the Obama administration took steps to 
reverse mass incarceration, and the Senate almost passed bi-partisan 
legislation to ease harsh federal sentences.  But the legislation stalled, overall 
prison rates have not fallen by much, and the present administration has 
ordered a reinvigoration of the war on drugs.450  In the states, the rhetorical 
move toward “smart on crime” policies continue, and both prosecutors and 
public opinion registers favorable opinions of rehabilitation.451  If an 
unwillingness to move beyond the low hanging fruit of releasing first time 
drug offenders becomes the norm,452 it is unlikely that a sustained program 
of rehabilitation will reach its potential effects.  In such a case placing low-
risk offenders into unnecessary rehabilitation programs might “increase the 
likelihood of future criminal justice involvement.”453  To the degree that anti-
Blackstonians focus on trial procedures as the main driver of crime attitudes 
or as the prime factor in crime reduction, studied ignorance of correctional 
programming and the prospects of rehabilitation (as a mitigator of  
recidivism, at least) is misguided. 
 
 
 
 
 449  Cullen & Jonson, supra note 441, at 312.  See also, David Weisburd et al., What Works 
in Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation: An Assessment of Systematic Reviews, 16 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 415, 419 (2017) (“It is time to abandon the nothing works idea.”).   
 450  Matt Ford, Jeff Sessions Reinvigorates the Drug War, ATLANTIC (May 12, 2017, 11:37 
AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/sessions-sentencing-memo/526
029/.   
 451  Fred Patrick & Meg Reiss, Criminal Justice Reform Starts with the Prosecutor, HILL 
(Aug. 10, 2017, 5:40PM) http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/346103-
criminal-justice-reform-starts-with-the-prosecutor (noting a diverse group of prosecutors 
agree that rehabilitation is a key determinant of public safety); Timothy Williams, Trump 
Wants to Get Tough on Crime. Victims Don’t Agree., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/crime-victims-poll-trump-agenda.html?&moduleD
etail=section-news-2&action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&region=Footer&module=Mor
eInSection&version=WhatsNext&contentID=WhatsNext&pgtype=article&_r=0.   
 452  PFAFF, supra note 147.   
 453  Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration To Mass Control, and Back Again: How 
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead To a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 125,139 (2017).   
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3. Plea Bargaining—Any Errors Are False Positives 
Allen and Laudan were forced to abandon the myth that innocents 
almost never plead guilty, but they maintained that pleaded false negatives 
were rare.454  Alas, in the year they published the pilot episode of their deadly 
errors series,455 Josh Bowers shook up the world of plea-bargaining 
scholarship by asserting that false guilty pleas are frequent and a good 
thing.456  A decade later Laudan applied a three percent false negative rate to 
 
 454  “Risinger makes the striking claim that the rates of error in plea-bargained cases could 
be as high as errors at trial. Such an unsubstantiated and highly improbable proposition stands 
in stark contrast to the commendably empirical cast to his article.”  Allen & Laudan, supra 
note 4, at 69 (footnotes omitted).  After more analysis, they write: “In short, extrapolating 
from error rates of trials to error rates in bargains involves a serious category mistake. There 
may be cases of false positives involving pleas, but there is no reason to think they are 
relatively plentiful.”  Id. at 71 (footnote omitted).  To determine the rate of plea-bargained 
false negative, they drew on data from Garrett and from Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra 
note 26, conducted numerology on their data, and produced a plea bargained error rate of 
0.84%.  See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COL. L. REV. 55 (2008).  Curiously, 
that rate is close to the error rate ascertained by Hoffman, supra note 53, and is greater that 
the lower qualitative estimate of wrongful convictions in my study, see Marvin Zalman, 
Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221 
(2012).  In my simple calculation, an error rate of .0084 in all plea-bargained cases (assuming 
one million felony convictions a year) produces 7,896 innocent people who plead guilty each 
year.  If 3 percent of the 95% of one million convicted who plead are innocent, the number 
rises to 28,500.   
 455  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, inaugurated a deadly dilemmas series: Larry Laudan & 
Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 23 (2010); Larry 
Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other 
Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493 (2011); Ronald 
J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive Detention, 
101 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 781 (2011). 
 456  Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U.  PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008).  The 
utilitarian/libertarian argument in favor of innocent guilty pleas is made succinctly by Albert 
Alschuler:  
 
It is better to be an innocent person on probation than an innocent 
person in prison. When an innocent defendant has been offered a 
beneficial deal, he should be permitted to take it.  . . . Convicting the 
innocent is not wrongful when the innocent want it to happen.  [Odds 
bargaining distributes aggregate punishment differently]. If ten 
innocent defendants were to stand trial, one might be wrongly 
convicted and sentenced to ten years. With odds bargaining, all ten may 
be convicted, but each may serve only one year. The number of 
wrongful convictions will increase, but not the number of years of 
wrongful imprisonment. Moreover, with costs bargaining added to the 
picture, the total quantum of punishment inflicted on the innocent may 
diminish. 
 
Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L. REV. 
919 (2015). 
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serious felony convictions whether convicted by trial or plea.457 
The innocence movement caused legal scholars and social scientists to 
look more closely at plea-bargaining.  Albert Alschuler summarizes this 
research in an article that advertised plea-bargaining as a “nearly perfect 
system for convicting the innocent.”  In brief, the innocent plead guilty 
because both “odds bargaining” and “cost bargaining” overbalances the 
defendant’s chance of acquittal.458  Alschuler critiques five arguments 
claiming to limit guilty pleas by innocence defendants.  First, although there 
are reasons why the innocent will plead guilty at lower rates than the guilty, 
psychological studies and economic reasoning support the idea that 
substantial numbers of innocent do plead guilty.  The enormous difficulty of 
obtaining exonerations from plea-bargained wrongful convictions explains 
why very few such cases show up in exoneration databases.459  Second, the 
obligation of courts to establish a factual basis for pleas does not mean that 
courts in fact carefully review the record or put the defendant to the ordeal 
of explaining what happened in his or her own words.460  Third, the 
desideratum that a prosecutor must be personally convinced of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt before accepting a plea is not a requirement, and evidence 
of prosecutorial opinion and behavior weakens that assertion.461  Fourth, 
evidence does not show that most defense attorneys would block a client who 
was believed to be innocent from pleading; in this condition some attorneys 
pressure innocent clients to plead guilty or withdraw to allow other counsel 
to represent such clients.462  Finally, Alschuler revisits the economic model 
undergirding guilty pleas (the prosecutor’s offer overbalances the 
defendant’s chance of acquittal) and proposes that the economic conflict of 
 
 457  LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, passim.  
 458  Prosecutors bargain “both to ensure conviction in doubtful cases and to save the costs 
of a trial.” Alschuler, supra note 456, at 919-20.  He bolsters his argument by drawing on his 
prior observational studies of plea bargaining and by an empirical survey of prosecutors 
conducted by Shawn Bushway, Alison Redlich and Robert Norris.  See Shawn D. Bushway 
et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial”, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 
(2014).   
 459  Alschuler, supra note 456, at 928-33. 
 460  Alschuler, supra note 4566, at 933-34.  “A defendant’s one-word answer to the 
question whether he engaged in the conduct described in the indictment establishes a 
sufficient basis.”  Id. at 934 (footnote omitted).  See the example by Gonzalez Van Cleve, 
infra note 479.  This factor is the point on which reform proposals could have the greatest 
impact.  See Gross, Pretrial Incentives, supra note 187; Christopher Slobogin, Plea 
Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution 
and Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1505 (2016) (arguing that a coherent plea bargaining scheme should be procedurally 
inquisitorial and substantively aimed at rehabilitation); Garrett, Why Plea Bargains, supra 
note 220.   
 461  Alschuler, supra note 4566, at 934-35. 
 462  Alschuler, supra note 4466, at 935-37.  Defense attorney behavior is also considered 
in the section on courtroom behavior, infra Part IV.B.4.   
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interest among private defense lawyers and the organizational pressures of 
the courtroom workgroup lead many lawyers to pressure clients to plead with 
little concern of innocence or guilt because “[a]dvising a guilty plea is nearly 
always the safe, secure, comfortable, and profitable course.”463 
Part of my argument contra-Laudan is that even if the the number of 
false negatives in criminal cases that go to trial are reduced, such a correction 
cannot influence the many crimes that are not reported to police, that do not 
lead to arrest, or that are dismissed by prosecutors.464  In addition, false 
negatives/wrongful acquittals simply cannot occur when defendants plead 
guilty, supporting Alschuler’s reasoning, which suggests that guilty plea 
false positives could be as high if not higher than trial verdicts.465 
Is change possible?  An empirically-based recent article by two leading 
criminal procedure scholars reports from the front lines of the judicial 
process that judicial involvement in plea bargaining is growing.  This may 
in turn be creating an invisible managerial revolution, which, ideally, may 
by squeezing efficiencies out of the medieval institution that is the court 
allow for more careful consideration of criminal cases.466  Nancy King and 
Ronald Wright interviewed 100 judges and lawyers in ten states describing 
how judges routinely engaged in settling criminal cases, much like the civil 
justice norm.  These programs are not haphazard but are allowed by law, rely 
on case management information technology representing cost-conscience 
docket management, and emphasize transparency.  This shift in judicial 
attitudes and practice might be achieving the substantive and procedural 
justice goals called for by plea bargaining reform advocates.  The 
respondents report that judicial involvement is producing better and not just 
faster pleas.  First, judges provide information and a reality check on cases 
where advocates have unrealistic views of their cases, and can focus 
discussion on important substantive issues: “how best to rehabilitate the 
defendant, how do we protect the public, what should we do to accommodate 
the particular defendant.”467  Second, although not all prosecutors were in 
favor, a number of prosecutor respondents agreed that judicial involvement 
helped moderate overzealous line prosecutors and that in sensitive cases 
 
 463  Alschuler, supra note 4566, at 939, see 937-39.  
 464  Supra note 456.   
 465  This idea is bolstered by the growing number and increasing rate of plea-bargained 
exonerations reported by the National Registry of Exonerations.  On November 10, 2017, the 
NRE reported 391/2120 or 18 percent guilty plea exonerations, a far higher rate than reported 
among DNA exonerations and earlier exoneration reports.  Given the fortuitous nature of the 
exoneration experience, it is a mistake to take these shifting figures as a clear reflection of the 
largely uncharted reality of conviction ground-truth integrity.  
 466  Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: 
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325 (2016).  
 467  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 368, generally, at 366–68.  
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
1412 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1319 
judges were willing to “take the heat” for unpopular pleas and sentencing 
decisions, or gave an assistant prosecutor a reason to buck an overly rigid 
office policy.468  Third, judicial involvement almost always produced more 
lenient sentences, making fans of defense lawyers.469  Fourth, defendants 
craved sentencing certainty, and “judicial input in . . . jurisdictions [with 
restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion] was valued for the certainty it 
provided about those aspects of punishment that the law left to the judge’s 
discretion.  And where the judge’s approval offered a way around sentencing 
restrictions or postsentence review, judicial participation became even more 
attractive.”470  Fifth, respondents indicated that judges are receiving plentiful 
information about the cases from the parties and from evidence-based risk 
reports with which to make informed decisions.  Judges’ requests for victim 
information pushed prosecutors to make efforts to obtain it.  The absence of 
presentence reports is largely seen as as a matter of less concern, as resources 
for report preparation is declining and the other sources of information, 
including prior history data, are routinely available.  This paints a 
considerably different picture from the view that defendants bargain in the 
absence of information and are at the mercy of prosecutors, which takes us 
to the next point.471  Sixth, judicial involvement increases discovery for the 
defense.  Although some lawyers in two states demurred, other respondents 
reported that judicial involvement “may actually prompt prosecutors to 
reveal more to defense counsel, and to reveal it earlier.”472  Also, settlement 
conferences served as discovery devices.  Seventh, judicial involvement 
helped defense attorneys with stubborn clients, where judges talked to 
defendants, to convince them that the plea offers were reasonable and that 
the sentence recommendations were real.  Respondents discounted the 
concern that judge involvement with defendants was coercive.  Defense 
attorneys said that judge involvement made an already coercive situation less 
so, and judges did not become involved until after defendants decided to 
plead guilty.  Judges talked to defendants in only five states.473  In sum, these 
reports about judicial involvement in plea bargaining commonly noted that 
“judicial settlement conferences provided better options for defendants, not 
worse.”474 
 
 
 468  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 368-71.  
 469  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 371-72.  
 470  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 376, generally, at 373-76.  
 471  Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 798 (2014).   
 472  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 380, generally, at 380-81. 
 473  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 381-87. 
 474  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 387 (emphasis in original). 
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The King and Wright study raises questions about generalizability.  
They note that “[l]ike the other self-serving claims about defendant 
perceptions we report here, our interviewees’ assertions deserve testing that 
this study cannot provide.”475  Still, the “consistency with which participants 
held [positive] view[s] was striking.”476  Judicial involvement may very well 
be a great corrective to the pressures and imbalance that led Judge Jed Rakoff 
to explain to a wide public “why innocent people plead guilty.”477  After 
repeating the various reasons to believe that the innocent plead guilty,478 he 
was “driven, in the end, to advocate what a few jurisdictions, notably 
Connecticut and Florida, have begun experimenting with: involving judges 
in the plea-bargaining process,” which was forbidden to federal judges.  He 
envisioned a process in which prosecutors would have to provide case 
evidence and both parties would meet with a magistrate.  The ten-state 
survey is encouraging news and may provide a key to reducing a source of 
procedural injustice and wrongful convictions.  King and Wright did not 
include the issue of false plea bargained decision in their report.  Additional 
empirical research to tease out information about possible pressures that 
generate false pleas in judge-involved plea-bargaining is called for. 
4. How Courts Operate—Racialized Justice in “Crook 
County” 
A startling omission in the anti-Blackstonians’ analyses is race.  In their 
highly abstract world not only are human actors like unchanging monads but 
they are colorless. 
Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve’s ethnography of prosecutors and defense 
lawyers in the Cook County criminal court presents strong evidence that the 
adjudication process in America’s largest criminal court is indelibly infused 
with racism, even as openly espoused racist views are no longer permissible 
in a nominally post-racial society.479  Actual innocence is not a main theme 
of Crook County, but Gonzalez Van Cleve’s description of attorney behavior 
shows that a sloppy and hyper-efficient justice system creates an 
environment in which wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals can 
flourish.  As a caution, most of her observations concern drug cases; to the 
extent that Laudan and the other anti-Blackstonians focus on more serious, 
 
 475  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 383. 
 476  King & Wright, supra note 466, at 383. 
 477  Rakoff, supra note 188.  For a detailed popular account of the problems of the guilty 
plea regime, see Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC MAG. (Sept. 2017), at 66.   
 478  The process is one-sided and the results dictated by prosecutors, who apply “inordinate 
pressures to enter plea bargains.”  Id.   
 479  NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S 
LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016).   
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violent crimes, her observations might be discounted.480 
Gonzalez Van Cleve asserts that Cook County’s court culture thrives 
on racism to function efficiently.  Details to support the thesis exposes an 
adjudication process rife with pressure tactics that silences witnesses and 
defendants, creating an environment that should produce more error than 
would be expected if due process norms were operative.  This court culture 
“exists as its own ecosystem, far from the oversight and accountability of the 
legal bar and the city at large.”481  Her book is infused with tales of racialized 
and class-based degradation ceremonies (e.g., a judge ranting at an African 
American woman being sentenced for the killing of her abusive husband) 
that undermine the motion-picture ideal of wise and sober judges.482  
Observed crude behavior by professionals both in public and private,483 
toward witnesses and defendants indicate a cultural norm that is not attuned 
to search strenuously for the truth.  Indeed, the message was made explicit 
in an overheard conversation: 
 
Given . . . the view that the paper pushing of plea-bargaining was 
not “real” legal work, fundamental due process protections are 
regarded as mere formalities, at best a type of ceremony without 
substance. This allows professionals to achieve a lowest common 
denominator of due process. 
 
Socialization was central to the institutional continuity of this 
belief system and practice. Experienced prosecutors and even 
judges taught new attorneys how to streamline processes to the 
bare minimum of legality or laughed at attorneys who were so wet 
behind the ears that they cited case law. For instance, two senior 
first- and second-chair prosecutors in one courtroom coached as 
their third-chair novice how to avoid doing plea bargains that 
“long way.” The third chair would naively read a detailed account 
of the facts of the case that the defendant was pleading guilty to 
when asked to do so by the judge. The attorneys told her that this 
detail was a complete “waste of time.” The first chair explained to 
the third chair that she should put fewer facts on the record. 
 
First Chair: All I say is “on such and such a date,” he was found 
 
 480  Still, if I have solid evidence that the culture in a hospital was negligent and biased in 
regard to minor ailments, I’d have my doubts about the quality of work in major surgeries.  
 481  GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 12.   
 482  GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 51-54.  Whites perceived as lower class are 
similarly degraded as “hicks” or “rednecks.”  Id. at 68.   
 483  GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 39-41 (discussing the sociological 
examination of “front-stage” and “back-stage” behavior in social settings and in the Cook 
County Court).   
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stealing. So stipulated? OK. Let’s move on. 
 
Third Chair: They [formal management] said I wasn’t putting 
enough facts. 
 
Second Chair: Mary, you can never put too little.484 
 
Errors of justice in Cook County’s “don’t rock the boat” environment 
could be errors of impunity.  In a telling episode, when Gonzalez Van Cleve 
was a prosecutorial intern she was tasked with organizing the next day’s 
cases, which she misinterpreted as meaning she had to read the files and 
absorb their content.  She became fascinated with a case of a twenty year old 
man who severely beat his grandmother “with a bat over the head” when she 
refused to give him money for drugs.  The file included gruesome 
photographs and the grandmother’s victim statement asking for a severe 
sentence.  Gonzalez Van Cleve “made the rookie mistake of studying the 
legal facts of the case while I managed the bureaucratic organization.”  At a 
pretrial conference the next day, the public defender (PD) counted on the 
“prosecutor’s lack of legal engagement in the case or, even worse, the lack 
of concern for another black victim, an elderly grandmother.”  The PD 
almost got away with downplaying the injuries and bluffed that the 
grandmother might not want to pursue the case to the fullest (the PD did so 
without positively stating an untruth).  The prosecutor was about to buy the 
PD’s suggested seven year sentence when Gonzalez Van Cleve violated her 
dual role as in intern and as an ethnographer by stepping out of the shadows 
to note that the victim was severely injured and asked for full prosecution.485 
 
I violated several norms: I spoke. I negotiated. I advocated for a 
black victim. I caught the public defender in a lie. I exposed my 
supervisors’ apathy and perhaps their negligence. The resulting 
silence hung in the room.486 
 
When the participants recovered their balance, the defendant was given a 
fourteen-year sentence.  Gonzalez Van Cleve understood that she had 
“muddied the cultural waters.”  “[M]y arrogance cost a man a decade more 
of his life.”  The prosecutors “came ‘prepared’ with simplistic moral rubrics 
ready to pursue the mope rather than legal evidence to pursue the case.”  She 
noted that the judge appeared animated, possibly because he was 
“actually . . . discussing the law rather than simply engaging in the common 
 
 484  GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 74.  
 485  GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 123-24.  
 486  GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 124.  
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name-calling and banter that defined most plea bargains.”  Yet, what 
Gonzalez Van Cleve identified as “discussing the law” amounted to the 
judge noting the existence of permanent physical injury and calculating that 
eighty-five percent of a seventeen-year sentence would amount to “14 years, 
5 months and 12 days” of imprisonment. 
As impunity includes not only false negatives but less than optimal 
sentences, Gonzalez Van Cleve’s anecdote suggests that errors of impunity 
may be as common as errors of due process.  The adoption of Laudan’s 
lowered standard of proof would perturb a plea bargaining ecosystem that is 
far from pristine.  In any event, the glimmers of racialized, lax, oppressive, 
and a production-oriented court system offer support for Alschuler’s analysis 
and weaken Lauadan’s implicit picture of a well-functioining plea-
bargaining process. 
5. Murder, Race, and the State 
Allen and Laudan properly express concern for serious crime victims, 
but their color-blind and ahistoric approach is unlikely to remedy the deeply-
rooted unconcern for black lives.487 
Historical criminology has contributed to the grand observation that 
state formation is associated with declines in interpersonal violence.488  
Steven Pinker’s thesis on the decline of violence brings much of this 
scholarship together, displaying a steady decline in European homicide rates 
in different regions from the high Middle Ages to the twentieth century as 
feudal principalities grew into consolidated nation states.489  The process 
continued in a steady fashion in Europe where the post-Enlightenment 
bureaucratic state applied many controls and the inducements of civilization 
led to sharp declines of violence among upper class men.490  These data are 
consistent with anthropological studies of warfare death rates in three kinds 
of non-state societies and in states, with average death rates far higher in 
non-state societies than in pre-modern and modern states.491  Pinker’s close-
in analysis of violence in the United States observes the much higher 
American homicide rate (fluctuating from 5 to 10 per 100,000 in the 
twentieth century) compared to England (steady at about 1 per 100,000 but 
 
 487  Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at Part III.B.1&3.   
 488  See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS AND STATE 
FORMATION AND CIVILIZATION 450-51 (1994).   
 489  STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 
63 (2011).  Pinker summarizes Elias’s theory.  See id. at 64-81 (“While Europe was becoming 
less murderous overall . . .”).   
 490  PINKER, supra note 489, at 81-82.  
 491  PINKER, supra note 489, at 49, Figure 2-2 (displaying data on 21 prehistoric 
archaeological sites, 8 hunter-gatherer societies, 10 hunter-horticulturalists & other tribal 
groups, and 8 pre-modern (Ancient Mexico, before 1500 CE) and modern states).   
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rising gently since 1970), and traces generally downward trends from 
colonial times to the present.492 
But the trends that most draw our attention are the different homicide 
rates between whites and blacks.  Somewhat surprising, from 1800 to the 
mid-nineteenth century homicide rates among black and whites were quite 
similar in New York City and Philadelphia but “the second half of the 19th 
century also saw a fateful change, . . . [when] a gap opened up, and it 
widened even further in the 20th century, when homicides among African 
Americans skyrocketed, going from three times the white rate in New York 
in the 1850s to almost thirteen times the white rate a century later.”493  Aside 
from economic and social factors, Pinker observes, “communities of lower-
income African Americans were effectively stateless, relying on a culture of 
honor (sometimes called “the code of the streets”) to defend their interests 
rather than calling in the law.”494  I’ll return to Pinker’s “statelessness” thesis 
after discussing the role of racism. 
Police officers who patrol lower-income black communities tend to 
comment on the high rates of violence they encounter in moralistic ways, 
according to their apparent levels of education and comprehension, but their 
expressions of frustration are understandable given that they often confront 
violence and disorder more or less on their own.495  I assume that they, and 
the mass of middle-class suburbanites who are entertained with accounts of 
inner-city violence on the 11:00 o’clock news, might be surprised by 
Pinker’s “statelessness” thesis.  The unnerving implication is that 
continuously broadcasting the raw data of black crime fuels deep currents of 
American racism.  The findings of modern genetics indicates that the “vast 
proportion of genetic diversity (85 to 90 percent) occurs within so-called 
races (i.e., within Asians or Africans) and only a minor proportion (7 
percent) between racial groups.”496  As Siddhartha Mukherjee puts it, “the 
genome is strictly a one-way street.”  A person’s ancestry can be assessed 
 
 492  PINKER, supra note 489, at 91-97. 
 493  PINKER, supra note 489, at 97. 
 494  PINKER, supra note 489, at 97-98 (emphasis added).  Id. at 85 (“Not surprisingly, 
lower-status people tend not to avail themselves of the law and may be antagonistic to it, 
preferring the age-old alternative of self-help justice and a code of honor.”).  Pinker notes that 
police observe and comment on this.  Id.  Pinker describes the violent basis of the honor 
societies of Homeric Greece, the Hebrew Bible, the Roman Empire and early Christendom, 
and the chivalrous era of medieval knights.  Id. at 40-41.  See also JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: 
A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 11 (2015).  
 495  See Peter Nickeas, What Cops Know: You Can Learn A Lot About a City by Seeing it 
Through the Eyes of Police Officers Who Patrol It, CHI. MAG. (June 26, 2017) 
http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/July-2017/What-Cops-Know/; see also 
David Couper, Behind the Badge: What Cops Think, IMPROVING POLICE (Jan. 12, 2017) 
https://improvingpolice.wordpress.com/2017/01/12/behind-the-badge-what-cops-think/.   
 496  SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 341-42 (2016). 
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with genomic tools, but knowing that yields very little knowledge about the 
person’s characteristics. “The geneticist goes home happy; the racist returns 
empty-handed.”497  Unfortunately for social observers, however, even as raw 
racism is fading,498 “[t]here is copious evidence that individuals of all races 
have implicit racial biases linking blacks with criminality.”499 
Several observations about black-on-black homicide are worth noting 
in light of Laudan and Allen’s expressed concern for “colorless” crime 
victims and their claim that more and longer prison sentences will reduce 
crime.  Jill Leovy, drawing on available research in Ghettocide, notes that 
many liberals in polite society are skittish about confronting the issue and 
being labeled as racists, leaving this critical issue oddly under-researched.  
“By the early twenty-first century, popular consensus held that any emphasis 
on high rates of black criminality risked invoking the stigma of white racism.  
So people were careful about how they spoke of it.”500  Nevertheless: 
 
Homicide had ravaged the country’s black population for a 
century or more. But it was at best a curiosity to the mainstream. 
The raw agony it visited on thousands of ordinary people was 
mostly invisible. The consequences were only superficially 
discussed, the costs seldom tallied. 
 
Society’s efforts to combat this mostly black-on-black murder 
epidemic were inept, fragmented, underfunded, contorted by a 
variety of ideological, political, and racial sensitivities. When 
homicide did get attention, the focus seemed to be on spectacles—
mass shootings, celebrity murders—a step removed from the 
people who were doing most of the dying: black men. 
 
 
 497  Id. at 342.  
 498  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 11 (“One of the enduring tropes of racist lore had been the 
‘black beast,’ the inferior black man who could not control his impulses and was prone to 
violence,”).  I won’t even try to assay the degree to which an ‘alt-right’ ideology brought in 
the current administration and its relation to “raw racism”—the picture is complex. 
 499  L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 
126 YALE L. J. 862, n.82 (2017) (Book Review).  In addition to the edgy topic of black-on-
black homicide, a recent data-based report makes the stunning finding that in 400,000 
homicides between 1980 and 2014, the killing was deemed justified in 2 percent of cases 
overall but in 17 percent of cases where a white person killed an African American.  Daniel 
Lathrop & Anna Flagg, Killings of Blacks by Whites Are Far More Likely to Be Ruled 
‘Justifiable’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/upshot/killi
ngs-of-blacks-by-whites-are-far-more-likely-to-be-ruled-justifiable.html?rref=collection%2
Fsectioncollection%2Fus&action=click&contentCollection=us&region=stream&module=str
eam_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=sectionfront.   
 500  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 11 (“Researchers describe skirting the subject for fear of 
being labeled racist. Activists have sought to minimize it.”).  According to James Forman, Jr., 
“progressives tend to avoid or change the subject”  Id.  
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
2018] THE ANTI-BLACKSTONIANS 1419 
They were the nation’s number one crime victims. They were the 
people hurt most badly and most often, just 6 percent of the 
country’s population but nearly 40 percent of those murdered.501 
 
Leovy, consistent with Pinker, notes that historians traced the high rates of 
black-on-black homicide to the late nineteenth century and observed that the 
trend continued in contemporary Los Angeles, with its relatively low African 
American population, even in mixed black and Hispanic neighborhoods.  
“[I]t was, as one young man put it, as if black men had bull’s-eyes on their 
backs.”502  Moreover, she also locates the root cause of high black violent-
crime rates on statelessness, but a kind of stateless that must be seen clearly.  
As she puts it, “Few experts examined what was evident every day in 
[detective] John Skagg’s working life: that the state’s inability to catch and 
punish even a bare majority of murderers in black enclaves such as Watts 
was itself a root cause of the violence, and that this was a terrible problem—
perhaps the most terrible thing in contemporary American life.”503 
High black violence rates reflecting injury to other African Americans 
is certainly a terrible thing, but “the most terrible”?  Perhaps Leovy is getting 
too close to her subject.  Or, perhaps not.  The statelessness of poor African 
Americans is not like the the formal statelessness of Jewish refugees fleeing 
Nazi Germany on the Hamburg-Amerika Line’s ship the St. Louis in May 
1939, who were refused entry to Havana and passed the shores of Miami on 
their return to Europe.504  The “statelessness” of African Americans is more 
precisely seen as the withdrawal of the normal benefits of citizenship.  To 
locate the place of weak police protection in this kind of statelessness, 
consider Richard Rothstein’s thesis that housing discrimination, which has 
done as much to separate the races as anything, has been a “consistent 
government policy that was employed in the mid-twentieth century.”505  
Housing segregation was enforced throughout the United States by explicit 
rules and laws at all levels of government that excluded African Americans 
from or relegated them to segregated enclaves in emergency housing built 
during World War II and in public housing, by racial zoning, by excluding 
 
 501  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 6. 
 502  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 10. 
 503  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 7-8.  
 504  Feelings against allowing more Jewish refugees to enter Cuba was fueled by the 
concern that they would compete for jobs against the native population.  A few were allowed 
entry but 908 others were returned to Germany, despite organized efforts to aid them, passing 
close to Miami on the return voyage.  Some of the 908 held German citizenship, for what it 
was worth, and others were formally stateless.  Voyage of the St. Louis, HOLOCAUST 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005267.   
 505  RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).   
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African Americans from federally subsidized mortgages, by allowing mass 
home building projects like Levittown to exclude blacks, by permitting 
private agreements of white home-owners associations to exclude African 
Americans, and by “the willingness of the Internal Revenue service (IRS) to 
grant tax exempt status to churches, hospitals, universities, neighborhood 
associations, and other groups that promoted residential segregation.”506  A 
variety of local initiatives like raising sewer fees, condemning land for parks, 
or “slum removal” to built interstate highways disrupted plans for proposed 
interracial housing or simply disrupted established African American 
neighborhoods.507  A result of this massive effort to segregate America was 
to suppress the job prospects and incomes of black Americans.508  And, 
always and everywhere these laws were backed up with the unwillingness of 
law enforcement to prevent “move in violence, what Rothstein called state 
sanctioned violence.509 
Few would deny the significant gains among African Americans in 
education, employment, and participation in American life in recent decades.  
And yet, despite the gains due in large measure to the reversal of legal 
segregation with the passage of civil rights laws in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
despite the growth of a significant black middle class and even elite class, 
the enduring legacy of segregation has left a seemingly unbridgeable gap.  A 
disproportionate number of African Americans live in poverty.  Middle class 
blacks lag in wealth even if incomes are comparable to whites.510  Schools 
have become resegregated because of divided housing patterns and for the 
most part poorly serve black students.  Many African Americans were not 
able to advance economically as the great economic shifts of globalization, 
automation, job-loss, and wage stagnation created the “new urban poor,”511 
a condition that has now claimed many white victims.  White backlash to 
affirmative action programs and the ominous advance of voter suppression 
have sought to maintain white advantage if not supremacy.512  A central 
factor in preserving a divided polity has been the war on drugs and mass 
 
 506  ROTHSTEIN, supra note 505, at 101.  
 507  See also THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND 
INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (2014). 
 508  ROTHSTEIN, supra note 505, at 153-71.   
 509  ROTHSTEIN, supra note 505, at 139-51.  Move-in violence continues to be a problem.  
See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS AND HATE CRIME 
(2002). 
 510  EUGENE ROBINSON, DISINTEGRATION: THE SPLINTERING OF BLACK AMERICA (2010); 
see A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 291-94 (Gerald David Jaynes & 
Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds. 1989).   
 511  See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW 
URBAN POOR (1996). 
 512  Carroll Rhodes, Federal Appellate Courts Push Back Against States’ Voter 
Suppression Laws, 85. MISS. L. J. 1227 (2016).  
ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:03 AM 
2018] THE ANTI-BLACKSTONIANS 1421 
incarceration, i.e., the “new Jim Crow.”513 
The toleration of black crime, then, is not another problem but an 
essential part of the deep fabric of anti-black racism that has stained 
American and holds on with a tenacious grip.  Leovy sketched its essential 
form in the old Jim Crow era, combining the heavy criminalization of 
African Americans for petty crimes as a gateway to peonage,514 while 
completely ignoring black-on-black violence, which according to Jim-Crow 
era anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker, “‘places the Negro outside the 
law.’”515  In the post-civil rights era, blindness to the needs of poor black 
communities, combined with fear of crime and drugs among African 
Americans mixed with conventional crime and punishment tropes, played 
out in a different way.  James Forman convincingly shows that while African 
American leaders and communities helped to initiate mass incarceration by 
supporting tough on crime measures; their more complete political desires 
encompassed “root cause solutions” to drug use that included better 
education and job training.516  As a newly emergent dominant political class 
in Washington, D. C. in the 1970s but not entirely in control of budgets, 
blacks sought better police protection and the kinds of social services that 
would make for more viable communities.  They only got the former: harsh 
drug enforcement and penalties instead of effective drug treatment,517 strict 
gun control while the national gun market saturated inner cities;518 and 
African American police who did not refrain from violence against 
suspects.519  While black police “executives joined many of America’s other 
black leaders in calling for root-cause solutions to crime, including 
socioeconomic reform and a health care overhaul, . . . they also demanded a 
“nationwide war on drugs” and—yes—”minimum mandatory 
sentencing.”520 
It is instructive that once African Americans gained a degree of political 
agency and control, although they sought to obtain needed social and 
economic benefits for their communities, in the political competition for 
resources they drew on a deep well of conventional thinking about crime that 
turned out to be a trap (although it was not so perceived at the time) but that 
fit with broader retributive tropes in America,521 and the growing reliance on 
 
 513  ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW, supra note 157.   
 514  See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE 
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996).  
 515  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 9.  
 516  FORMAN, supra note 157, at 29-30.  
 517  FORMAN, supra note 157, at 17-46.  
 518  FORMAN, supra note 157, at 47-77.  
 519  FORMAN, supra note 157, at 78-115.  
 520  FORMAN, supra note 157, at 115.  
 521  WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 168.  
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“law and order as a source of political legitimacy.522  They failed, however, 
to obtain an array of services and benefits from the state that were not in the 
narrow interests of controlling political elites. This pattern fits Lisa Miller’s 
analysis and conclusion that “[p]olicies widely supported by local officials 
and citizen alliances are sometimes thwarted by legislators representing 
much larger constituencies with little or no connection to local problems and 
much less connection to serious crime.”523  The crime problems faced by 
poor communities are embedded in a complex web of disadvantage that 
requires complex solutions.  The organizations that speak for such 
communities are more diffuse and less potent that the kinds of single issue 
lobbies, whether the NRA or the ACLU, that are better able to achieve 
legislative successes.  She argues “that state and national governments . . . 
operate under structural constraints that can sometimes promote a much 
narrower range of problem definitions and policy solutions than are apparent 
in cities.”524  As a result, problems that are intertwined at the community 
level, like transportation, jobs, blight, crime, health care and public services, 
get short-shrift.  The ultimate irony is that community requests for more 
police are rooted in dissatisfactions with the quality of life and are nuanced 
requests for reducing crime and disorder and improving communities, while 
among those who hold the purse strings of government, these pleas are 
turned into a “good cop, bad cop frame that polarizes much public 
discourse.”525  The decision makers advance policies that fluctuate between 
community-friendly policing incentives and “a blank check for aggressive 
policing styles that are largely distrusted in low-income, particularly black 
communities.”526 
Still, this kind of liberal mewling, even if backed up by solid policy 
analysis, does not get to the personal responsibility of the person committing 
the criminal act.  But when it comes to black-on-black violent crime and 
murder, what the government fails to provide gets closer to the placing part 
of the responsibility on the state.  It’s not just better schools and midnight 
basketball that are missing, but, to repeat, “the state’s inability to catch and 
punish even a bare majority of murderers in black enclaves such as Watts.”  
Leovy claims that her thesis is simple: “where the criminal justice system 
 
 522  SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 157.   
 523  LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLITICS OF 
CRIME CONTROL 4 (2008).   
 524  MILLER, supra note 523, at 7. 
 525  MILLER, supra note 523, at 163. 
 526  MILLER, supra note 523, at 164.  This tension played out in the monumental story of 
the rise and fall of zero-tolerance and stop, question and frisk policing in New York City.  See 
Michael D. White et al., Federal Civil Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural 
Experiment Exploring the Effects of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New 
York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9 (2016).   
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fails to respond vigorously to violent injury and death, homicide becomes 
endemic.”527  Well, perhaps this is just a fact of life and limited ability of 
human institutions that must be endured, like the lack of adequate defense 
resources accepted as a reality by Cassell.  But Leovy digs deeper.  In Los 
Angeles law enforcement is reasonably well resourced.  What the LAPD did, 
perhaps by default, was to marginalize homicide investigation, and doubly 
marginalize it in poor areas “south of I-10.”  Unlike the stereotype and 
perhaps the reality in other police departments that place homicide detectives 
at the top of the department’s pecking order, in Los Angeles, patrol work 
was valorized, reflecting the culture of aggressive control instilled in the 
department by Chiefs William Parker and William Gates that culminated in 
the Rodney King beating.528  Working south of I-10 for any length of time 
hurt an officer’s chances for promotion.  Plum assignments were sought in 
the Robbery-Homicide division located at LAPD headquarters where an 
officer might investigate an unusually complex or celebrity case that would 
help make his or her reputation.529  Murders south of I-10 did not make the 
news and in the high-crime era of the 1980s detectives were often 
overwhelmed with cases.  “According to the old unwritten code of the Los 
Angeles Police Department” the kinds of murders that went unsolved were 
“nothing murder[s].  ‘NHI—No Human Involved,” the cops used to say.”530 
This narrative account cannot prove with scientific precision that the 
state has withdrawn from places like south-central Los Angeles to a degree 
that renders its inhabitants “stateless.”  But a polity and a police department 
that in 1993 accepted a homicide rate of 368 per 100,000 for black men in 
their twenties without expending extraordinary resources to reduce it, as did 
Los Angeles County, should in any moral universe bear some of the 
responsibility for the killings.  As violent crime and homicide rates have 
generally declined in America in recent decades, the persistently high rates 
of murder in poor pockets of cities like Baltimore, Chicago and Detroit, point 
to problems that require serious action by the state. 
The anti-Blackstonians propose the simplest of solutions to the 
complex problem of chilling rates of intraracial violence in poor black 
communities.  Their laser-like focus on the Blackstone ratio  or Blackstone 
principle and trial verdicts can be seen as academic myopia, or more 
cynically, as a smokescreen that diverts thought among academicians from 
considering more potent solutions to a real crime problem.  Nothing they 
propose would raise the money and change the attitudes that would get the 
 
 527  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 8. 
 528  JOE DOMANICK, BLUE: THE LAPD AND THE BATTLE TO REDEEM AMERICAN POLICING 
(2015). 
 529  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 24-29, 38-39. 
 530  LEOVY, supra note 494, at 6. 
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police (responding to already committed crimes) and the state services 
(water, education, transportation, jobs, etc. that would lessen the 
environment for violence) to address the upstream process.  And nothing 
they propose would funnel more money and change attitudes about the day-
to-day working reality of indigent defense and the political climate within 
which resources are sought for an ill-funded fundamental right.531 
V. CONCLUSION 
The authors identified as anti-Blackstonians and challenged in this 
Article write from different analytic perspectives and with differing aims.  
What connects them is a mood that challenges Blackstonian legal orthodoxy 
of the the adversary criminal process and their disconnect from relevant 
empirical criminological knowledge.  Each author’s proposals claims to 
make contemporary criminal procedure law and the attendant judicial 
process more rational; each posits that their proposal would on average result 
in more accurate verdicts.  My critique challenges their assertions.  Although 
each proposal has reasonable kernel, I have shown that each rests on limited 
or flawed premises; the proposals would likely increase the number of 
wrongful convictions without increasing public safety, thereby producing 
less accurate verdicts. 
Epps’s thought experiment seeks to hermetically seal the Blackstone 
principle from its attendant rules (e.g., proof beyond a reasonable doubt) to 
show that a theoretically even playing field would better distribute 
punishments. I have shown that the empirical basis for his argument that the 
Blackstone principle is dynamic and results in lesser benefits to defendants 
is close to nonexistent. Epps draws on a grab bag of logical ideas that do not 
reflect the empirical reality of the contemporary criminal justice and 
adversary systems. Beyond the world of legal academics where a sort of 
economic rationality divorced from thick description is valued, I am 
concerned that Epps’s naïve foray would be used as ammunition by policy 
makers (including elected prosecutors who hold significant political power 
in their localities) who wish to preserve a harsh and punitive crime-control-
model ideology at a time when many across the political spectrum are calling 
for a more temperate justice system.532 
 
 531  Indigent defense is funded at the county level and competes with other demands; 
however, there may be ways to make indigent defense efficient and effective.  See Burkhart, 
supra note 350; Davies and Worden, supra note 350; Janet Moore & Andrew L. B. Davies, 
Knowing Defense, 14 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 345 (2017).  
 532  It is worth keeping in mind that in America’s fragmented political system, a great deal 
of criminal justice policy making occurs at the county level, where the prosecutor and the 
sheriff are likely to hold far greater sway over their nominal supervisors on the county 
commission.  When gathered together in politically engaged pressure groups, these officials 
have the potential to qualify if not erode constitutional rights.  See Walt Bogdanich & Grace 
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Epps is the only writer among the anti-Blackstonians who formally 
eschews the Blackstone principle. Laudan and Allen formally support their 
own estimate of the Blackstone ratio developed by formal reasoning and 
buttressed with mathematics to attack virtually every rule of criminal 
procedure that is associated with the Blackstone principle. I have challenged 
two of their arguments. First, their analysis that purports to show that the 
current system frees “too many” guilty violent criminals is flawed in 
attributing outcomes resulting from “upstream” criminal justice (i.e., mostly 
police investigation) to downstream prosecutorial decision-making and trial 
verdicts. Their analysis overly discounts the strong possibility that many 
acquitted at trial are factually innocent and undervalues the likelihood of a 
substantial number of innocent felony defendants pleading guilty. Second, 
they make assertions about the effects of incapacitation resulting from higher 
rates of prosecutors’ charges and guilty verdicts that would not hold up in a 
first-year graduate seminar in criminology. If taken seriously, their proposals 
would expand prison populations with very little crime suppression effect 
and possibly increase serious crime in the long run. 
Cassell, who supports the Blackstone principle, writes in a different and 
somewhat less abstract register than the other authors, and more directly 
addresses issues raised by the innocence movement. With the Blackstone 
principle as a starting point, each author necessarily writes in the shadow of 
the new understanding that a nontrivial number of innocent felony 
defendants are convicted every year. Nevertheless, Epps’s essay is 
unconnected to concerns raised by innocence movement writings. As for 
Laudan and Allen, one author was present at the birth of the innocence 
movement and apparently did not like what he saw.533 Thus, while 
Laudanand Allen can be seen in part as a reaction to an innocence movement 
agenda, the writings proceed along abstract planes that are in the tradition of 
philosophic inquiries into evidence law. 
Cassell’s essay and chapter, however, respond directly to innocence 
movement concerns. What is intriguing is that he proposes a mix of 
Blackstone principle (e.g., robust discovery) and anti-Blackstone principle 
(e.g., eliminate several constitutional protections) proposals that he claims 
will produce more accurate verdicts. Despite some formal areas of 
agreement,534 on the whole my evaluation of Cassell’s proposals are that they 
 
Ashford, An Alabama Sheriff, a Mystery Check and a Blogger Who Cried Foul, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/us/ana-franklin-alabama-sheriff.htm
l?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fus&action=click&contentCollection=us&region=
rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=8&pgtype=sectionfront.  
 533  Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 4, at 85-86 (expressing reservations 
about the Northwestern University conference on the death penalty in 1998).   
 534  A point of possible agreement with Cassell is that cases like Wade and Miranda, which 
expressed the desiderata of liberal Supreme Court justices, advanced ultimately ineffective 
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make unsupportable claims or are stalking horses for maintaining and 
strengthening a conventionally conservative approach to criminal procedure 
that was part of the conservative counterrevolution to Warren Court 
doctrines. The Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have in large measure 
succeeded in advancing a more or less conservative doctrinal agenda in 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law. This jurisprudence has enabled the mass 
incarceration that is plaguing in American criminal justice and society.535 
The connection between conservative constitutional criminal procedure and 
wrongful conviction is not clear, although it may have played a marginal role 
in increasing wrongful convictions.536 Beyond this, it is hard for me to see 
what beneficial practical effect overruling Mapp and Miranda would have. 
Cassell’s derivative thesis that defense attorneys freed from the potential 
need of filing boilerplate constitutional challenges would find the time and 
resources to mount vigorous, investigator-supported, time-consuming and 
fact-intensive investigations that, say, are conducted by innocence 
organizations or police investigating major crime, seems fanciful. It is 
supported by no empirical evidence. 
Empirically grounded adversary process critiques could help to move 
the mountain of the legal system’s entrenched culture.537 My concern is that 
anti-Blackstonian ideas, if adopted, would generate unintended 
consequences that could destabilize American adjudication in ways 
dangerous to the routine civil liberty that we too often take for granted; like 
the reality that for all their material and reputational advantages, American 
prosecutors in court are just another set of lawyers who have to prove their 
 
methods for improving the diagnosticity of police-conducted lineups and interrogations.  The 
innocence movement has advanced techniques devised by psychological scientists that have 
been shown to produce more accurate lineups and less abusive interrogation methods while 
generating accurate incriminating statements that tend to reduce the incidence of false 
confessions.   
 535  See DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS, supra note 340.  
 536  Laqueur et al., Wrongful Conviction, supra note 142.   
 537  The anti-Blackstonians could draw on inquisitorial justice systems research.  The 
substantial comparative legal literature offers many ideas that should attract anti-
Blackstonians.  Beginning at least with MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND 
STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986), a challenge 
to the adversary system can consider alternatives.  In a few places Laudan cherry-picks 
references to German procedure but that hardly makes for a consistent argument.  Epps and 
Laudan could have alluded to other ways of conducting trials before plunging into their anti-
Blackstonian models.  Concerns raised by STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 328; Brown, supra 
note 328 and WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (1999) about hyper-proceduralism, 
noted by the anti-Blackstonians, is worth following up.  Cassell does pay attention to this 
critique.  However, he uses it not to envision an efficient and rights-supportive inquisitorial 
model as now exists in Germany. Rather he is aimed at keeping the present system minus 
some procedural protections based on an unproven empirical hypothesis that eliminating a 
few constitutional rights would magically free up time and reorient defense lawyers attentions 
to finding cases of actual innocence.  
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cases.538 
So, I remain a wary Blackstonian in spite of agreeing with James Q. 
Whitman’s criticism of reasonable doubt. Whitman’s deeply researched 
intellectual history of two millennia of judging serious crimes in the Western 
world argues that reasonable doubt developed as a rule of moral comfort to 
ease the anxieties of judges and jurors faced with the obligation of ordering 
executions.539 This sense has been lost in the modern world. “Instead we treat 
reasonable doubt as a fact-finding principle, as a heuristic formula that can 
help guide the individual juror in the effort to achieve sufficient certainty 
about uncertain facts.540 But the rule, “a fossil, a misconstrued fragment of 
the Christian past,”541 does not work well to guide factual decisions. While 
jurors in earlier times had less doubt about case facts, they had reasons to not 
decide, including fear of reprisals. “Unlike their ancestors, modern jurors 
routinely decide cases in which there is authentic uncertainty about the 
facts.”542 The project of turning the old moral comfort rule into “a modern 
factual proof procedure” is “hopeless.”543 To make matters worse, 
exclusionary rules embedded in American law denies evidence to fact finders 
that may be critical to resolving the factual case accurately,544 and becomes 
“a form of systematic protection for the accused.”545 This should be music to 
the ears of anti-Blackstonians. However, they should read on. 
Whitman attributes false convictions to the adversary system with its 
reliance on reasonable doubt and exclusionary rules, but also raises a factor 
from “the old theology”—the theology of punishment.546 In earlier times 
 
 538  It is instructive that Italy’s curious decision to inject adversarial criminal procedures 
into their inquisitorial system was motivated in part by a desire to symbolically rid the country 
of a code drafted under the Fascist regime and to inject democratic principles into the law.  
Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 412, at 303.  This suggests that for major legal 
changes to ocur, as opposed to small, routine technical fixes, may need “external” crises may 
be necessary.  The “discovery” of actual innocence has provided just such a shock to the 
adversary system, forcing needed reforms.   
 539  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185.  The reasonable doubt scholarship is deep and 
extensive.  See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in 
the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1165, 1168-69, n.5 & n.7 (2003).  
 540  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 202. 
 541  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 203. 
 542  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 207. 
 543  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 205. 
 544  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 207 (“Thus the law of evidence and the law of 
criminal procedure give rise to trials in which American jurors (unlike French or German 
ones) often receive a strangely fragmentary selection of the pertinent facts in a given case.”).   
 545  Whitman’s focus on reasonable doubt does not address the pro-prosecution bias of the 
adversary system sketched in Part IV, supra.   
 546  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 208-09. See also WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, 
supra note 168.   
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a morally justifiable system must protect both the innocent and 
the guilty. Our conception of criminal justice has no obvious place 
for protection of the guilty at all.. . . Our morality demands that 
we do everything possible to prevent innocent persons from being 
caught up in the toils of the criminal justice system. But it leaves 
the guilty to whatever fate the punishment system may hold for 
them, . . . while tolerating no doubts about ourselves as judges.”547 
 
Whitman’s concern for punishment may seem orthogonal to trial procedure 
issues. Jurors are supposed to decide facts and render verdicts with no care 
about the sentence, although in the real world residues of human concern 
dribble through. Since the 1970s our penal system abandoned a concern for 
balanced justice that had a place for humane treatment of prisoners and 
instead embarked on harsh policies of world-historic proportions. Current 
prison practices will surely be seen by future generations with the same 
horror now reserved for chattel slavery.548 Whitman’s radical solution for our 
weird trial system—to abandon it for “straightforward procedures for 
determining the truth” along continental lines—is either a non-starter or a 
very long-range project.549 Like Epps, he aims at getting us to think 
differently. The “tragic error” is to “refuse to recognize the harshness of our 
nonblood punishments, and the correspondingly high moral stakes in 
inflicting them. . . .[and] that judging and punishing are morally fearsome 
acts.”550 
Whitman’s ethics might simply be confusing to utilitarians, and may 
not fit into Laudan and Allen’s and Cassell’s Manichean concern for the 
welfare of potential crime victims and the wrongfully convicted to the 
exclusion of concern for those who have been correctly convicted of 
crimes.551  Scientists’ needs to abstract from reality to accomplish a coherent 
research strategy may be necessary in the natural sciences where reductionist 
 
 547  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 209 (emphasis in original). 
 548  See CRAIG HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE PAINS OF 
IMPRISONMENT (2006); WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 168; SIMON, MASS 
INCARCERATION, supra note 444; Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
 549  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 210.  The same could be said for Laudan’s 
proposal to make the prosecutor’s burden of proof dependent on a defendant’s record.   
 550  WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 211. 
 551  Restorative justice does not seem to be for them although it could fit into Whitman’s 
moral universe.  See ROSS LONDON, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: FROM 
THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM (2011).  Although I am not an adherent of the original sin 
doctrine, it seems that those who are might be inclined to look on the non-convicted as 
including many who have not (yet) been apprehended for their criminal delicts.  See Samantha 
Cooney, Here Are All the Public Figures Who’ve Been Accused of Sexual Misconduct 
After Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), http://time.com/5015204/harvey-wein
stein-scandal/.  
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methodologies can produce findings not otherwise obtainable.552  In some 
social science research, and in policy analysis and programming, 
contextualist rather than reductionist strategies require that care be taken in 
deciding what to include as relevant. There is a place for studying reasonable 
doubt or trial procedures in the abstract, but Whitman reminds us that 
abstracting away consequences like the possible effects of our penal system 
might produce both deadly dilemmas and tragic consequences.  As my 
critique of Laudan and Allen suggests, their idea of expanding punishment—
in the absence of a better understanding of the effects of incapacitation—
could impose unnecessary harm on prisoners, their families and 
communities, while doing very little to make potential victims safer. 
My opposition to system changes that could impose greater hardship to 
defendants with perhaps no crime reduction payoff is a partial reason for 
wanting to keep a Blackstonian adjudication system until something better, 
perhaps along the lines of the German criminal process,553 is established.  To 
offer a more positive reason for supporting a Blackstonian system, one that 
might accept the costs of weaker crime control, I claim no originality but 
piggyback my thinking onto a point made by Risinger. 
 
[I]f you think that the state is more responsible for a wrongful 
conviction than for a crime that might result from a criminal’s 
freewill-based choice, influenced by a wrongful acquittal, to 
commit a crime (Laplace’s emboldened wretches), then you will 
reject [Allen and Laudan’s] analysis or at least its most extreme 
implications.  That does not mean that you would not be cognizant 
that wrongful acquittals are indeed undesirable and involve costs 
that must be taken into account in some calculus that tries to 
resolve the dilemma that Allen and Laudan have identified.  But 
it does mean that there would be space for special treatment of the 
problem of convicting the innocent. 
 
Is such a position tenable?  Viewing the state as having more 
responsibility for harm done directly to the immediate subjects of 
its acts than for harm done indirectly by its failures to act, or by 
its choices to act one way rather than another, has a long tradition, 
especially in situations where the latter harm is done by the 
subsequent choice of an independent human agent.554 
 
 
 
 552  ERIC R. KANDEL, IN SEARCH OF MEMORY: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW SCIENCE OF MIND 
(2006). 
 553  Zalman & Grunewald, supra note73, at 214-36. 
 554  Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 1020.  
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Risinger’s observations followed a political-theoretic exchange in which he 
linked his special concern for wrongful convictions to value choices between 
liberal/Romillist or conservative /Payleyite styles.555  Risinger’s 
observations may be of no concern to a Payleyite who is unconcerned with 
the source of false acquittals (i.e., the government) and who registers only 
the fact that false acquittals are (supposedly) imposing deadly dilemmas on 
civilians requiring greater toughness, which might produce a few more 
wrongful convictions.  This narrow focus, however, discounts the risk that 
an unconstrained criminal apparatus is the primary tool of tyranny,556 an 
observation that weighed on the minds of the Constitution’s framers.557 
This train of thought leads to an admission that my pro-Blackstonian 
criminal procedure tilt arises not simply from an evaluation that the justice 
process is stacked against the defendant,558 that innocence reforms can 
improve system-diagnosticity, 559 or that crime victims are far better 
protected by upstream criminal justice processes than from tinkering with 
the standard of proof, which are weaknesses in the anti-Blackstonian view 
of the adversary system’s error-reduction capacity.  It arises from a self-
appreciation of my ideological predilections.  In Packer’s two models, crime 
control ideology favored a speedy and even cursory approach to 
investigating and prosecuting crimes on the assumption that innocent cases 
would be accurately weeded out and that errors were excused because of the 
crime control model’s major concern with factual guilt and protecting 
civilians from the violation of their civil right to live peaceably.  The due 
process ideology is fixated on legal guilt and is willing to tolerate some level 
of crime and disorder in order to retain a legal system that has the capacity 
 
 555  SHKLAR, supra note 253; KENNETH R. HOOVER, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL LIFE, 
SECOND EDITION (1994).  
In democratic countries the political significance of criminal law had almost been forgotten 
when the impact of twentieth century dictatorship, with its unvaried immediate seizure of the 
punitive legal apparatus, revived a startled realization of the dependence of civil liberty on 
criminal law. By a sure and unconscionable instinct, the forces of repression cut straight to 
the heart of the traditional institution—the principle of legality.  JEROME HALL, GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 2ND EDITION 64 (1960).   
 557  The treason clause was designed to prevent a popular President, or perhaps even an 
unpopular President with his hands on the police apparatus, from expanding the definition of 
treason, as did Henry VIII, to label political opponents as “enemies of the state” and crush 
them with treason convictions.  I wrote about this early in my academic career, arguing that 
the overt use of treason in this way was archaic, but that in times of highly polarized political 
passions, political actors seek to tarnish opponents in ways that are redolent of traitors.  See 
Marvin Zalman, The Federal Anti-Riot Act and Political Crime: The Need for Criminal Law 
Theory, 20 VILLANOVA L. REV. 897 (1975). 
 558  See H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD: IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR? 
141-61 (1994).   
 559  For example, that the innocence model is a Reliability Model.  Findley, New 
Paradigm, supra note 10.  
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to slow advances toward executive autocracy and legislatively directed 
repression of civil liberties.560  The ironic result, after a quarter-century of 
innocence movement policy-thinking, has been to expose real weaknesses in 
crime control model assumptions about factual guilt; the case is now strong 
that due-process-model legal procedures (both at trial and post-conviction) 
are really important for testing the factual guilt of individual cases. In light 
of the exposure of criminal justice system weaknesses, the kind of intense 
factual re-examination of specific convictions, exemplified by the forensic 
methodology of Markman and Cassell’s “reprosecution” of James Adams,561 
must be available to defendants and to prisoners in the post-conviction 
process if a major goal of crime-control ideology (i.e., factual guilt) is to be 
achieved. 
Thus I support the Blackstone principle for epistemic and nonepistemic 
reasons, the latter out of my concerns about state power and the instruments 
through which it exercises its supposed monopoly of legitimate force.  These 
nonepistemic grounds may be orthogonal to the concerns of anti-
Blackstonians.  Indeed, Epps “intuited” that support for the Blackstone 
principle may be ideologically linked: 
 
Finally, one’s intuitions here will also depend on underlying views 
about the relationship between the state and its citizens.  Those 
that reject the view that the state has a strong obligation to protect 
its citizens from crime may remain convinced of the moral harm 
argument.  Thoroughgoing libertarians, who prefer a minimal role 
for the state in all domains, are particularly unlikely to be 
persuaded.  For the many people who reject those premises, 
however, and who accept the post-New Deal understanding of the 
government’s positive obligations, the Blackstone principle is 
difficult to justify on deontological grounds.562 
 
Many conservatives and most liberals,563 however, especially those with a 
sense of history, are concerned about excessive state police power.  
Conservatives seek to downsize government’s social welfare role as a way 
of limiting state power but are comfortable with more expansive 
prosecutorial power.564  In my view, the complex needs of a modern, 
 
 560  PACKER. LIMITS, supra note 61.  
 561  Markman & Cassell, supra note 21, at 128-33. 
 562  Epps, supra note 2, at 1138.  The moral harm argument is a deontological ground for 
the Blackstone principle based on moral constraints on punishment.   
 563  These terms are used in conventional, contemporary ways, to identify one’s political 
valence.   
 564  Despite professions of the downsizing goal, state size and power has remained 
substantial over the last half century at times when more or less conservative Republican 
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technological, high population, post-industrial society facing unprecedented 
challenges, implies the necessity of a robust state apparatus in a mixed 
capitalist—social welfare state, i.e., the so-called administrative state.  I also 
value an effective criminal justice (police and prosecution) apparatus to meet 
many challenges posed by crime, whether individual or organizational, 
conventional or novel (e.g., cyber).  Appreciating the civil liberties risks 
flowing from unchecked justice agency power, especially at the behest of 
excessive executive branch power,565 leads me to support an overlapping 
array of limiting institutions both within and without the justice process.  
External checks include legislative and executive oversight, free press and 
alternative media investigative reporting, civil society inquiry through non-
profit organizations, individual citizen checks (from video recording police 
encounters to civil rights lawsuits), and the like.  Internal checks are inherent 
in the adversary system and begin with a robust and fearless defense bar, 
constitutional criminal procedure limitations exemplified by the specifics 
and the ethic underlying Warren Court rulings, and an alert and fair 
judiciary.566  Within this mix, I value rules of procedure that slow down the 
prosecution, but this is simply a way of stating a preference for Packer’s due 
process model, when elements supporting that model, like reasonable doubt, 
are challenged.567  If I thought that Laudan’s crime reduction hypothesis held 
water, my decision would be harder, but I would still adhere to it for these 
reasons.  Although, my values lead me to fear abuses of state power more 
than criminal harms (both are bad!), actual decisions about radically 
 
party-headed administrations were in power and attempts to seriously check the role of the 
state have failed.  See Max Ehrenfreund, Kansas’s Conservative Experiment May Have Gone 
Worse Than People Thought, WASH. POST (June 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/15/kansas-conservative-experiment-may-have-gone-worse-than-
people-thought/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e4e0fa60ec1b.  Whether the current 
administration’s attempt to radically downsize the “administrative state” will succeed remains 
to be seen.  Also, the conservative “small government” ideology supports the Enlightment’s 
valorizing individual freedom over communal controls, a value shared by liberals and 
conservatives albeit in different and not always consistent ways.   
 565  The FBI’s role under J. Edgar Hoover during the cold war stands as a paradigmatic 
example.  See RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER, THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 
(1987).  For a comprehensive view of the ways that the potential negatives of state power 
might be constrained, see Daryl J. Levinson, Incapacitating the State, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 181, 192-206 (2014).   
 566  Luban makes the point forcefully: “The political argument for zealous criminal 
defense does not claim that the adversary system is the best way of obtaining justice. It claims 
just the opposite, that this process is the best way of impeding justice in the name of more 
fundamental political ends, namely keeping the government’s hands off people.”  DAVID 
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 63 (1988).  For other nonconsequentialist 
justifications of the adversary system, see id. at 81-92.  
 567  Substantive criminal law, if bounded by principle, should also play a role in 
constraining the state.  See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 555, at 27-69 (discussing 
the principle of legality).   
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expanding or curtailing prosecutorial power should be subject to empirical 
knowledge and testing, to the lessons of history, and to careful, contextual 
thinking to the greatest degree possible. 
 
